Performance and Problems of Indian Agriculture During the Post WTO Period by Parveen, Shaista
PERFORMANCE AND PROBLEMS OF INDIAN 
AGRICULTURE DURING THE POST WTO PERIOD 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
©octor of ^liilogopljp 
IN 
ECONOMICS 
BY 
SHAISTA PARVEEN 
Under the Supervision of 
DR. SHEHROZ ALAM RIZVI 
(Reader) 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
2008 
3 0 SEP 2014 
T8457 
(Department Of Economics 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH - 202002 (INDIA) 
Phone: 0571-2700916, 920,923 
Extn. 1405 
Ref. No. Dated...'6,J.O...<^.aOE 
ro WJ{OM IT: MAr cojfc^^m 
This is to certify that the thesis entitled 
"Performance and Problems of Indian Agriculture 
During the Post WTO Period" is the original work of 
Mrs. SHAISTA PARVEEN under my supervision and is 
suitable for submission for the award of Ph.D. Degree in 
Economics. 
Dr. Shehroz Alam Rizvi 
(Reader) 
I 
ID I 
Mr 
c 
I 
Who Played A Distinct Role In 
Shaping 
Up My Career And Always 
Motivated 
Me To Work Hard And Learn 
More And More ... 
^c^owtedgement 
Thanks giving and expression of one's gratitude is a pleasant task on the 
completion of a work such as this, to accomplish, which would have been rather 
impossible, but for the direct and indirect assistance and support of others including 
the 'invisible hand'. Only Almighty Allah has kept reserved for himself the faculty of 
creation, single-handed. 
This work, like others, could not be made possible without expert guidance 
and valuable suggestions. For this, I offer a deep sense of profound gratitude and 
reverence to my supervisor Dr. Shehroz Alam Rizvi, Department of Economics, 
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. I am grateful to him for sparing his valuable 
time and for all the kindness he has shown towards me throughout the period of my 
work. 
I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Nisar A. Khan, Reader, 
Department of Economics, A.M.U. for suggesting me such a wonderful topic. I have 
pleasure in expressing my thanks to Prof. Masood Hasan (retired) and Dr. Asif 
Ahmad, Lecturer of Economics, for their valuable suggestions and moral support 
during my research tenure. I am grateful to Prof. Abdul Wahab, Chairman, 
Department of Economics, A.M.U. for providing me a congenial environment to 
complete this work. My thanks are also due to all teaching and non-teaching staff of 
the Department of Economics, A.M.U. for their help at all times. 
In order to acquire necessary capital for producing my thesis, I had visited 
libraries of A.M.U., I.I.F.T., N.C.A.E.R., I.A.S.R.I., Ministry of Agriculture and 
I.S.I.D. The staffs of these libraries are acknowledged with special thanks for showing 
helping attitude an extending all possible support to me. 
I am indebted to Mr. Shyam, Mr. Anoop and Mr. Noor Mohammad Khan for 
doing the pains-taking job of presenting the data in tabular and diagrammatic form on 
computer. Mr. Noor Mohammad has proved very co-operative and helping and did 
not care for time while finalising the tables and graphs, which are furnished in this 
thesis. 
I would fail in my duty if I do not acknowledge the authors whose works have 
been referred in my thesis. 
Fortunately, I am blessed with a fair share of friends like Asfia Khatoon, 
Shahina and Asma, who accompanied me, if not always with their presence, but with 
their best wishes forever, which helped me face stressful moments during my Ph.D 
programme. I will ever remain indebted to all of them. 
I am very much obliged to my friend Mr. Vikas Dixit for his constant help and 
keen interest at every stage of this work, without which it was not possible to 
complete this work with in the given time framework. 
I am also extremely grateful to my brother Mr. Abdus Samad who had always 
been on his feet to help me with anything and for providing much needed support 
throughout this work. The completion of a work is not an easy task without those 
whose support in stressful and tiring movements is countless. For this, I will always 
remain indebted to my Brother's wife Mrs. Ishrat Jahan. 
I kept my special thanks reserved for none other than my loving sister 
Shagufta, my nephew Mr. Sabir Ali, Anjum, and my cousin Mr. Inam Sajid for their 
timely support and participation in accomplishing this task. 
My sincere gratitude goes to my parents without whom I am literally nothing. 
My mother is specially acknowledged with respect and gratitude, who has always 
been a source of strength and inspiration during thick and thin of this work. I also owe 
an immense debt to my grandfather who has always encouraged me during all my life. 
My in-laws, especially father in-law Mr. Irfan Ahmad, are also gratefully 
acknowledged whose best wishes and moral support made me comfortable to 
complete this work successfully. I must also mention the names of Mr. Waseem 
Ahmad, my brother-in-law and Ms. Tabassum Parveen, my sister-in-law with special 
thanks for their encouragement and moral support during the course of my research. 
This thanks giving task would be incomplete without mentioning the name of 
my husband Mr. Tanveer Ahmad who gave me new dreams to pursue and made me 
comfortable in worry some moments. His constant encouragement and sympathetic 
understanding of me and my work made it possible for me to complete this thesis. I 
cannot forget my adorable daughter Maryam who put up with sweet grace all the 
troubles and worries involved in the completion of this work. 
September 28, 2008 Shaista Parveen 
Preface 
Today agriculture is tiie main issue of concern among planners and policy 
makers, both in developed and developing countries. Emerging international food 
crisis and high prices of necessary food articles have made this issue one of the 
priority areas of the government, especially, in developing countries. But this was not 
always so. History provides evidences to suggest that agriculture got step motherly 
treatment in all rounds of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The 1947 
Geneva trade conference resulted in a trade accord- the GATT 1947-signed by 23 
Contracting Parties. The features of the agreement -its limited mandate, qualified 
legal obligations, rudimentary dispute settlement mechanism, improvised institutional 
arrangements in Geneva and unsatisfactory arrangements for agricultural trade were 
to stay with the GATT for the next 47 years. 
Realising the failure of earlier GATT rounds to give due importance to 
agriculture sector, the 8"^  round (also known as Uruguay Round) attempted to reach 
the neglected area and to cover various dimensions of agriculture trade which needed 
careful attention. But both the mid term review (1988, in Montreal) and the first 
attempt at concluding the round (1990, in Brussels) resulted in failure and in walkouts 
by delegations of some agricultural exporting countries. It was only in December 
1993 that an understanding was reached among the Contracting Parties in Geneva, 
allowing the round to be successfully concluded in Marrakesh in 1994. The WTO was 
established and when compared with the GATT, was much wider in scope with a 
stronger institutional basis and with treaty status. It opened a separate window for 
improving the situation of agriculture trade in the form of what is known as 
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). The Agreement on Agriculture contains various 
provisions, which seem to favour both developed and developing nations. These 
include domestic support provision, provision of market access and that of export 
subsidies. 
The present study is undertaken with a view to analyse the impact of various 
provisions of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) for India and the problems arising out 
of these provisions. Specifically, an attempt is made to examine the growth 
performance of agriculture trade in India during post WTO period, i.e., from 1995-96 
to 2005-06. The evaluation of various provisions of AOA in general and their 
implications for India, in particular utilises time series secondary data ( wherever 
HI 
necessary) collected from Agriculture Statistics at a Galance, CMIE, Economic 
Survey, Handbook of Statistics on Indian economy, etc. Statistical tools like simple 
average, co-efficient of variation, simple and compound growth rates, diagrammatical 
presentation and above all, regression analysis have been used for analysing the data 
and for identifying some factors that are likely to affect the growth of agriculture 
import and agriculture export during the period of our study. 
Keeping in view the need of the present work, the entire study is organised 
into seven chapters. 
The first chapter is of introductory nature, which discusses the historical 
background of GATT, the emergence, functions and organisational structure of WTO 
and the introduction of Agreement on Agriculture. The chapter ends with a brief 
description of research motivation, database and methodology. 
The existing literature on the subject under study is reviewed in chapter two 
which could pave the way to be followed for our analysis. In fact, our understanding 
of various issues that need a careful diagnosis, specially, for improving agriculture 
trade in developing countries like India has been made easier by earlier works on the 
subject. 
Chapters from three to six are devoted for the analysis of the provision of 
domestic support, market access. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) and export competitiveness of Indian agriculture respectively. 
Finally in chapter seven main findings of the work along with some policy 
recommendations are presented. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1: GATT and Agriculture; A Historical Background 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was launched in 
Geneva in 1948 by 23 countries including India in order to reshape the world 
economy shattered by the Second World War (1939-45) which followed the Great 
Depression (1929-32). The GATT comprised a trade pact among the member 
countries (more than a hundred, latter) with the objective of forming a permanent 
organisation, which would enforce a set of rules for the conduct of world trade and 
also update these rules (Passah, 2004). 
The birth of GATT is essentially by way of a historical accident. This is due to 
the fact that when the then president of the United States refused to submit the 
Havana Charter to congress for ratification, the Havana Charter and the ITO collapsed 
and there was a virtual head on multilateralism on the one hand, and those who placed 
the whole emphasis on full employment policies on a national basis on the other 
(Kaul, 1977 and Garg, 2004). Embodying such position in a set of'rules and counter 
rules' made the ITO, which was to administer the charter, 'finally collapse of its own 
weight'. 
The basic purpose of the GATT can be scanned through its various articles 
and the text, which is divided into four parts. Part I includes Articles 1 and II (i.e., 
'the most favoured nations' clause and tariff schedules of the contracting parties). Part 
II comprises of commercial policy regulations (including, inter-alia, the provision of 
freedom of transit, anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Quantitative Restrictions 
on discrimination, subsidies, governmental assistance to economic development, 
emergency action, security exceptions, consultation and nullification and 
impairment). Part III includes, inter-alia the provisions on territorial application, 
customs unions and free trade areas, joint action by contracting parties, modification 
of schedules and amendments and withdrawals. Part IV, which was added in 1965 
under the caption 'trade and development', deals with principles and objectives for 
helping less-developing countries delineates commitments and joint action to achieve 
the objectives of trade and development of the world at a large, in general and less-
developing countries, in particular (Autar, 2005). The draft of the articles of the 
GATT happened to be not on tortuous but circuitous also, as the prepatory 
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conferences contained many statements and goals and objectives of the various 
national government representatives (Jackson and Willion, 1986). 
From it's inception till the Uruguay Round, the GATT had held eight rounds 
of negotiations at several places, whose idea can be had from Appendix Box A. 1.1. 
All the earlier rounds of GATT before Uruguay Round proved to be partially 
failure in the sense that the developed countries especially United States were looking 
for solutions to problems in particular industries by negotiating trade restrictive 
agreements entirely outside the framework of GATT rules. But the agreements of 
GATT could not address the problems of developing countries. The developing 
countries continued to be disillusioned although some palliatives in the form of GSP 
for helping them to find markets of their products in developed countries was 
unilaterally accepted and introduced by the developed countries. However, no balance 
no substantial gains had accrued to the least developed countries (LDCs) by such and 
other palliatives. The least developed countries continued to remain outside the 
periphery of GATT and could not substantially and effectively influence the 
multilateral tariff and non-tariff negotiations at the GATT counter. 
As far as the agriculture sector is concerned, until 1994, it was outside the 
GATT purview. The Original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 
applied to trade in agriculture also, but it allowed various exceptions to the rules on 
non-tariff measures and subsidies, which led to reverse distortions in world 
agriculture trade. It allowed countries to use export subsidies on primary agricultural 
products but prohibited export subsidies on industrial products. The GATT rules also 
allowed countries to resort to import restrictions (e.g. import quotas) in the agriculture 
sector under certain conditions to enforce measures to effectively limit domestic 
production. This resulted in a proliferation of impediments to world agriculture trade 
including by means of import bans, quotas setting the maximum level of imports, 
minimum import prices, non-tariff measures maintained by State-Trading Enter 
prises, etc (Mishra, 2004). 
Various reasons, economic as well as non- economic, have been held 
responsible for this phenomoion of discrimincition with agriculture under GATT. As far as 
the non- economic factors are concerned it may be mentioned that the lack of political 
will on the part of developed countries as well as to protect their domestic agriculture from 
international competition especially, in North America and Europe, did not allow 
GATT to interfere in the international agriculture market. Moreover, two special rules 
of GATT 1947 dealing with agriculture trade namely, Article Xl:2(e) (i) on quotas 
and Article XVI :3 on export subsidies which, could have freed agriculture from tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, were not allowed to be pressed in action by the interested 
developed countries. Governments of developed countries tried to find different ways 
to justify high barriers against agricultural imports. Article XI: 2(c) (i) was originally 
supposed to provide legal shelter for the Quantitative Restrictions maintained in 
agriculture by the United States. However, when they turned out to be inconsistent 
with that provision, the United States asked for a waiver in 1955 on the ground that 
United States could not participate in GATT if her farm sector was exposed to GATT 
rules. The European countries after the establishment of EC common agricultural 
policy withdrew all tariff bindings on agriculture products and raised tariffs on 
agriculture products at whatever levels it wished. The European Community adopted 
a regime of variable tariffs, which was a more effective device than that of quotas. 
In the areas of domestic subsidies although the GATT rules did not restrict the 
use of such subsidies and left the contracting parties enough to latitude in using 
domestic subsidies, particularly on those products where tariffs were not bound, the 
peripheral rules, that existed, did not seem to be enforced strictly against those 
agriculture subsidies that were GATT illegal. About economic factors it may be noted 
that the nature of farm sector, which is suspectable to vagaries of nature and the 
demand of food consumers to have a steady supply of quality food at stable prices, 
was by and large responsible to keep agriculture sector out of the discipline of GATT. 
1.2: The Uruguay Round of GATT 
The Uruguay Round was the 8'*^  and final round of GATT which opened new 
dimensions for multilateral trading system. The origin of the Uruguay Round may be 
traced back to 1982, at a time when agricultural protectionism was on the rise. The 
Tokyo Round, completed in 1979, concentrated on tariff reductions and also agreed 
for the first time on rules of conduct in non-tariff areas. Particularly significant were 
the additions of agreements known as 'codes' on the use of domestic and export 
subsidies and countervailing measures. Government procurement, technical barriers to 
trade (standard code), antidumping rules, international dairy arrangement and custom 
valuafion. However, the codes did not prove a great success. In 1982, a GATT 
committee (Autar, 2005) on agriculture was appointed to look at rule changes to assist 
in the settlement of disputes. By 1986 the world trading environment was changing 
rapidly. The nature and complexity of trade was changing and provided challenges to 
the multilateral system. In the face of this changing world's trading environment, the 
United States and other GATT contracting parties decided to renew and strengthen 
GATT, advocating multilateral trade reform with substantial reduction of tariff and 
other barriers to trade. Negotiations of the Uruguay Round, comprehensive and 
complex of all GATT negotiating rounds, began in Punta Del Este in 1986. The 
Uruguay Round ought to have been concluded by the end of 1990, But at the 
ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1990 an impose was reached over the 
area of agriculture and the talks broke down. On December 20, 1991, Arthur Dunkel 
(Passah, 2004), the Director General of GATT released a Draft Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round known as 'Dunkel Draft' text. The text of the compromise kept the 
structure of market access, export competition and introduced the road map for 
liberalisation and elimination of support. This was a 'Take- it' or 'Leave- it' 
document which was hotly discussed at various fora in the member countries through 
1992 till July 1993.Subsequently, this document was some what amended by US and 
EU negotiators in the Blair House Awora in November 1992,and the last minute 
negotiations in Geneva in December 1993 .But it nonetheless provided the main 
elements of the Agreement on Agriculture .111 countries signed the final Act of the 
Uruguay Round in Marrakesh on April 15,1994 and the agreement came into effect in 
1995 (Kumar, 2003). 
The Uruguay Round was related to two aspects of trade in goods and services. 
The first related to increasing market access by reducing or eliminating trade barriers 
which was met by reductions in tariffs, reduction in non- tariff support in agriculture, 
the elimination of Quantitative Restrictions and reductions in barriers to trade in 
services. The second aspect related to increasing the legal security of the new levels 
of market access by strengthening and expanding rules by procedures and institutions 
(Kumar, 2003). 
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations went well beyond the international 
trade. It included the fields of GATT and extended to areas which were essentially 
part of domestic policies of a nation. New issues such as Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs), agriculture, investment, services, etc were brought on the agenda of 
multilateral negotiations. And for the first time the global trade field scraped with the 
most complicated detailed rules formulated by the powerful players. These rules 
decided the pattern of investment that a country should follow, type of technology it 
must promote, the industries, it must deregulate and privatise the agricultural support 
it must maintain and the type of patent system it must adopt and implement. 
The Uruguay Round took seven and half years, almost twice the original 
schedule (Chandiramani, 2002). By the end, 123 countries were taking part. It covered 
almost all trade, from banking to telecommunication, from toothbrushes to pleasure 
boats and from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatment. It was quite simply the 
largest trade negotiations ever, the most probably the largest negotiations of any kind 
in history (Bansal, 2004). 
1.3: World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
1.3.1: Birth of WTO 
When the eighth round of GATT was breathing its last, it was realised by 
most of the GATT partners that a significant progress was achieved in negotiations on 
tariffs and related subjects. In order to resolve finally all issues and to conclude 
negotiations on market access for goods and services, a deal was signed on 15 April 
1994 by the ministers from most of 123 participating governments at a meeting in 
Marrakesh, Morocco (Bansal, 2004). This deal gave birth to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 1995. Indeed, emergence of WTO was a 
culmination of international efforts over the past five decades to establish truly 
international trade organisation. It should cater to the growing needs of international 
economic community which had witnessed substantial and enormous multifaceted 
phenomenon especially of protectionism, regionalism and interdependence, as also to 
substitute the aborted ITO of Havana Charter with a new international organisation 
plugging the weakness of the GATT, which had served the cause of the international 
trade on a loose footed way (Nigam, 2006). 
Marrakesh agreement establishing the WTO consists of preamble and XVI 
Articles, four Annexure and declarafions, decision and undertaking. The purpose of 
the WTO has been spelt out in the preamble and article second of the agreement 
establishing the WTO. Paragraphl of Article II states as, "the WTO shall provide the 
common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members 
in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instrument included in the 
Annexes to this agreement" (Dubey, 1996). 
1.3.2: Functions of WTO 
Article III of GATT defines the ftjnctions of WTO, which include the 
implementation, administration and operation of all the multilateral trade agreements 
included in the Final Act of GATT, as well as the administration of the rules and 
procedures governing the settlement of disputes and of the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism. At present WTO performs many functions which are constantly 
increasing (Zemanek, 1995). Such functions are the following; 
(1) One of the main functions of WTO is to keep intact the sovereignty of state and 
despite their different social systems, it establishes and expands peaceful co-operation 
among them. 
(II) Its second main ftinction is to ensure that the competition going on among the 
individual state remains peaceful. 
Article 22(3) lays down that "the general principles is that the complaining 
party should first seek to suspend concessions-in the same sector—,"and if it 
considers that "it is not practicable or effective" to do so, then "it may seek to suspend 
concessions-—in other sectors under the same agreement", and if that is also "not 
practicable or effective it can suspend concession -—under another covered 
agreemerit"(Dubey, 1996). 
Article III (5) also defines the function of WTO as: "with a view to achieve 
greater coherence of global economic policy making, the WTO shall cooperate in the 
appropriate manner with the IMF and IBRD and its affiliated agencies".—. Article III 
(2) of the agreement establishing WTO read as; "the WTO provide a forum for further 
negotiations among the members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a 
framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations" (Dubey,I996). 
Another important function of the WTO is to compel its member states to 
accept each one of the agreements negotiated under the Uruguay Round. WTO is 
practically all embaracing so far as trade regimes are concerned. This is why this 
Treaty is sometimes called the 'Treaty of treafies' (Singh, 2005). The main 
significance of its agreements is that, to become one of its members, a country has to 
be first a party to all the trade agreements and understandings under it. That is to say, 
no country can opt out of one of its agreemients without being obliged to opt out all 
the agreements. Nor can a country make any reservation to any of these instruments. 
The entire package is offered on a 'take- it' or 'leave- it' basis. This is indeed unique 
in the history of international law. The implication is that either a country accepts 
without reservations all the instruments covered by WTO or is condemned to remain 
outside the international trading system. 
Dispute settlement is not less important function of the WTO. If a country 
feels that her rights under the WTO agreements have been adversely affected by the 
action of another country, or if she feels that another country has not discharged its 
obligations under the WTO agreements, she may take recourse to the dispute 
settlement process of WTO. However, it has to give first an opportunity to the other 
country for consultation with a view to resolving the problem. If the problem cannot 
be solved through consultation, then she can approach the Dispute Settlement Body of 
the WTO for formation of a panel, which will consider the case. The panel, usually of 
3 or 5 independent experts, will go into the dispute, consider the points made by the 
parties to the dispute and, give its findings. The report of the panel has to be adopted 
by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
However, Dispute Settlement Body has its own limitations, which are bom by 
the concerned countries in respect of their dispute settlement. Such as delayed relief, 
illusory relief, constraints on panels in anti-dumping, delay by panels or Appellate 
body, costly process and cross-retaliation. 
1.3.3: Organisational Structure of WTO 
The structure of WTO is comprised of the highest level Ministerial 
Conference, the General Council, the Council for Trade in Goods and Subsidiary 
Bodies (Nigam, 2006). 
The topmost decision making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, 
which has to meet at least every two years. It brings together all members of the 
WTO, all of which are countries or custom unions. The Ministerial Conference has 
the authority to take decision on all matters under any of Multilateral Trade 
Agreements, if so requested by a member, in accordance with the specific 
requirements for decision making in this agreement and in the relevant Multilateral 
Trade Agreement (Garg, 2004). 
As stated above, next to the Ministerial Conference, there is the General 
Council, also composed of all WTO members. The General Council is required to 
report to the Ministerial Conference. The council has to convene in two bodies-the 
Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body (Nigam, 2006 p-9). 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is to oversee the dispute settlement 
procedures, whereas the Trade Policy Body is to conduct regular reviews of the trade 
policies of individual WTO members. 
Third level body of WTO is the Council for Trade in Goods, which works 
under the General Council of WTO. It is composed of three councils 
(I) Council for Trade in Goods 
(II) Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(III) Council for Trade in Services 
The Council for Trade in Goods oversees the implementation and functioning 
of all the agreements covering trade in goods, though many such agreements have 
their own specific overseeing bodies. 
Information on Intellectual Property in the WTO, news and official records of 
the activities of the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) council, and 
details of the WTO's work with other international organisation in the field. The 
council for Trade-in Services operates under the guidance of the General Council and 
is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO members, and can create subsidiary bodies as 
required, such as The Goods Council, The Services Council, Dispute Settlement 
Panels and Appellate Body. 
In addition to this, some other committees have been established by the 
Ministerial Conference and they are to report to the General Council. These Include 
Committees on 
(a) Trade and Environment 
(b) Trade and Development 
(c) Regional Trade Agreements 
(d) Balance of Payments Restrictions 
(e) Budget, Finance and Administration 
.Working Parties on 
(a) Accession 
.Working Parties on 
(a) Trade, Debt and Finance 
(b) Trade and Technology Transfer 
1.3.4: Main Principle of WTO 
WTO is established with the basic goal of ensuring free and fair trade among 
its member countries and to utilise world's resources in an optimum manner. Thus, in 
order to full fill its goal, WTO works under certain guiding principles so as to have a 
transparent and non-discriminatory new Multilateral Trade Regime. These principles 
of WTO govern all negotiating aspects of WTO namely agriculture, textiles and 
clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, industrial standards 
and product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, etc (Bansal, 
2004). 
The two most significant principles are the Most Favoured Nation principle 
and the National Treatment Clause (Hoekman, 2002). Under the former, no 
discrimination is to be exercised among member countries; any trade concession 
offered by one member to another must be offered to all members. Under the latter, 
imported products and domestic products are to be accorded the same treatment. 
Moreover, besides import duty, no extra tax other than ones also levied on domestic 
products is to be imposed. Then the multilateral trade system must be predictable, 
foreign companies, investors and governments must feel assured that trade barriers 
(including tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures) would not be raised 
arbitrarily by any trading partner. Lastly, the new trade regime should work to a 
greater advantage of the less developed countries. They must be given more time to 
adjust, greater flexibility and some special privileges. In over all terms, it would 
appear that for developing economies, the incentive to join the multilateral trade 
system would be no less justified than for the developed world. Jumping into 
international trade arena would look too good to ignore. 
Besides the above mentioned principles, promotion of fair competition, 
encouraging development and economic reform, open trade, etc are some other 
considerations bom in mind in all negotiating agenda's of WTO. 
1.3.5: Membership of the WTO 
Any State or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade 
policies may join the WTO, but WTO members must agree on the terms. Broadly 
speaking the application goes through four stages: 
(I) The joining country should tell about herself to the conceraed party, 
(II) The new member country has to work out with working parties what she has to 
offer. Having made progress on the principles and policies by the working party, 
bilateral talks between the prospective new and industrial countries, 
(III) Having passed the first two stages, the working party finalises the terms of 
accession and 
(IV) The final package, consisting of the report, protocol and lists of commitments, is 
presented to the WTO General Council or the Ministerial Council. If a two-thirds 
majority of WTO members vote in favour, the applicant is free to sign the protocol 
and to accede to the organisation. In many cases, the countries' own parliament or 
legislature has to ratify the agreement before membership is complete. 
The contracting parties to GATT 1947, at the time of entry into force of this 
agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, for which schedules of concessions and commitments 
are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which schedules of specific commitments are 
annexed to GATS, may become original members of the WTO. The present 
membership of WTO is 153. A list of which is given in Appendix A. 1.2 
1.3.6: Ministerial Conferences under WTO 
The first WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore from 9 to 13 
December, 1996. If the realisation of the Uruguay Round closed an important chapter 
of economic history, the first Ministerial Conference opened a new one in the sense 
that WTO has brought together 140 countries in a single compact. The first 
Ministerial Conference launched a work programme on the four so-called Singapore 
issues namely; 
(I) Relationship between Trade and Investment 
(II) Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
(III) Transparency in Government Procurement and 
(IV) Trade Facilitation 
These four issues have come to be known as 'Singapore Issues' (Garg, 2004). 
The Second Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva on IS* and 20* May, 
1998, launched a work programme to develop recommendations regarding 
Implementation of existing WTO agreements and the organisations of future 
negotiating agenda. The Geneva Ministerial Conference was timed to coincide with 
the celebrations of the 50 years of the GATT multilateral trading system (Mishra and 
Puri, 2008). 
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Formal negotiations on the agenda of a new multilateral 'round', which was 
initially scheduled to be launched at the 3'^ '' Ministerial Conference, to be held in 
Seattle, USA, in late November-December 1999, commenced in September 1998. 
While it was confirmed that further liberalisation of agriculture and services was to be 
considered, no consensus was reached on the terms of reference for these negotiations 
prior to the start of the conference. This Ministerial Conference collapsed without 
being able to reach a consensus on the declaration to be adopted by the ministers. In 
February 2000 the General Council agreed to resume talks with regard to agriculture 
and services, and to consider difficulties in implementing the Uruguay Agreement 
accord, which was a main concern of developing countries' states (World Year Book, 
2007). 
The 4"^  Ministerial meeting was held at Doha (Qatar) in November 2001. Most 
of the negotiations were initially scheduled to be concluded, on 1 January, 2005.The 
main features of the Doha Declaration (also known as Doha Development Agenda) 
signed by the member countries are given in Appendix Box A. 1.3 
The major success was in the field of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) and public health claimed by the developing countries 
(particularly India). With regard to the reduction in agricultural subsidies, although 7 
years elapsed since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the developed countries 
had failed to meet their commitments. Infact, the developed countries sharply 
increased their agricultural subsidies instead of reducing them. As a result, prices of 
the major agricultural commodities have suffered a secular decline since 1996. This 
has caused harmful impact on the farmers and competitiveness of developing 
countries. 
In view of the above, the Doha Declaration specifically stated that the 
mandated negotiations would aim at 'Substantial improvements in market access; 
reduction of, with the aim of phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and 
substantial reduction in trade distorting domestic support.' The declaration also 
recognised the importance of non-trade concerns like food security and rural 
development for developing countries. Thus, countries like India, which have a strong 
public distribution system could continue to retain it and, in addition, could also 
provide greater domestic support to the rural economy. 
The 5* WTO Ministerial Council was held in Cancun, Mexico, from 
September 10 to 14*, 2003. It was a mid-temi review of the Doha Development 
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Agenda but it ended in fiasco when the conference chairman declared the conference 
closed unsuccessful due to basic differences among the member countries. The debate 
at Cancun was focused on two issues; 
(I) Liberalisation of agriculture and 
(II) Developing new multilateral disciplines on the Singapore issues. 
Although the Cancun Ministerial Council ended in a fiasco, one important 
development from the point of view of the developing countries has been their 
coming together to push their own agenda at the WTO negotiations. India has played 
a key, constructive role in building developing countries unity and assertion at the 
WTO, whose concrete forms are a 20 nation alliance on agriculture (known as G-20) 
whose chief spokesman is Brazil and another G-16, on the Singapore issues led by 
Malaysia. At Cancun developing countries not only held together, but also became 
more professional in their approach to negotiations offering alternative legal text to 
counter the official draft text presented by the WTO Secretariat (Bansal, 2007). 
After the failure of the Cancun Ministerial Conference, efforts continued to 
reach consensus on the various issues mainly by the group of five interested parties 
(FIPs) (India, Brazil, Australia, the EU and US). The result was the adoption of a 
framework agreement in end-July 2004 (July package), which will be discussed in 
chapter-3 in detail. 
In the field of agriculture, the framework agreement agreed to eliminate export 
subsidies by a credible end date (the G-20 group proposed 5 years while EU in favour 
of a time periods of 10 years). It also proposed a tiered formula for tariff reductions 
based on proportionally lower commitments by developing countries than by 
developed countries. The framework agreement recognised the critical importance of 
agriculture to the economic development of the developing countries and the need to 
enable them to pursue agricultural policies that were supportive of their development 
goals, poverty reduction strategies, food security, etc. 
The 6"' Ministerial Conference was held at Hong Kong from December 13 to 
18,2005. The outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference was, at best, modest 
(key outcomes are furnished in Appendix Box A. 1.4). The initial hopes were that the 
conference would mark the penultimate stage in the Doha Round by facilitating a 
long-delayed agreement on modalities of trade liberalisation in agriculture and 
industry. 
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But when it became clear that differences in the 'three core' areas (agricuhure, 
industry and services) had not been narrowed, 'expectations were lowered' so, that the 
Ministerial Conference did not flop. 
The Commitment in Agriculture: 
From the point of view of developing countries, nothing of consequences was 
achieved at the Honk Kong ministerial conference. 
(I) Most publicised benefit is that export subsidies will be eliminated by 2013. 
There is no achievement as 2013 is the 'furthest possible' date by which 
agricultural subsidies had to be eliminated. The EU did not accept the end date as 
2010 which the developing countries had demanded. 
(II) The major part of agricultural support subsidies is the domestic support 
subsidies. A substantial proportion of these subsidies are in the form of Green Box 
subsidies which are outside the reduction commitments. They will, accordingly, 
continue to be provided by the developing countries even beyond 2013, Moreover, 
the developed countries will try to shift trade-distorting subsidies to this box to 
escape from reduction commitments. 
(III) If domestic support subsidies are not substantially reduced while substantial 
reductions in agricultural tariffs are carried out, the developing countries will be at 
a disadvantage. The subsidised products from developed countries will flood the 
markets of developing countries. Even if India is able to prevent this, Indian 
agricultural products will find it difficult to compete in the world market with 
subsidised products of developed countries. 
(IV) In the field of cotton, the declaration offers the elimination of export subsidies 
in 2006. They constitute only a small portion of nearly $ 4 billion subsidies the US 
gives to cotton producers every year. There is no action agreed for trade distorting 
domestic subsidies which amount to about $3.8 billion or 80 to 90 percent of total 
US support for cotton (Martin Khor, 2005). 
The Present Status of Negotiations: 
A meeting of nearly 30 trade ministers was held at Davos (Switzerland) 
during the last week of January 2007. After hectic discussions and consultations, the 
Director General announced the full resumption of negotiations on the Doha Work 
Programme. Talks were resumed in various negotiating groups on February 7, 2007. 
However, the first formal meeting of the Trade Ministers of G-6 countries was held 
on April 11 and 12, 2007 at New Delhi. This meeting has set a new deadline and 
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proposes to conclude the six years old Doha Round of trade talks by the end of 
December 2007. The new deadline came after talks were stalled over the refusal of 
developed countries to cut farm sops and the developing countries reluctance to 
further open up markets. The achievement of this meeting of trade minister is best 
summed up by the trade ministers of Brazil in following words, 'we did not discuss 
the members, but we are making progress on how to make progress'. 
1.4: Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) 
One of the major agreements that were concluded in the Uruguay Round (UR) 
of negotiations signed in Marrakesh in April 1994 was the Agreement on Agriculture. 
In contrast to the earlier multilateral trade negotiations (the Kennedy Round and the 
Tokyo Round), the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was general and 
systematic. 
The AOA came into effect on 1 January, 1995 and was to be implemented 
over a six years' period ending 31 December, 2000 for developed countries and over 
a ten years' period ending 31 December 2004 for developing countries. Signatories 
agreed that liberalisation of agriculture should continue beyond this agreement and 
that, one year before the end of the implementation period, progress in 
implementation should be reviewed (more detail are presented in Appendix Box 
A.1.5). 
In the agriculture sector the Agreement on Agriculture tried to bring discipline 
and fair competition by removing distortions. The agriculture get heavy amount of 
domestic support of various kind before the Uruguay Round. This support made the 
imports into the domestic market; export subsidies were given to agricultural 
products, which artificially pulled down the agro-prices in international market 
(Mukhopadhayay, 2004, pp-207). 
To reform trade in the agriculture sector and to make policies more market 
oriented is the main objective of the Agreement on Agriculture. This would improve 
predictability and security for importing and exporting countries alike (Bansal 2004, 
pp-18). 
The AOA highlighted three main issues related to agriculture. 
• Facilitating market access, 
• Reducing domestic support and 
• Enhancing export competition 
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Under the AOA Special Differential Treatment is provided for developing 
countries. Developing countries may implement the agreement over a period of up to 
10 years and in general the reduction commitments for each area of the agreement are 
two third of those for developing countries. The least developed countries are not 
required to undertake reduction commitments. 
It is interesting to note that both domestic support and export subsidies are 
stand alone issues. Yet they are directly and indirectly related to the broad issue of 
market access. 
1.4.1: Market Access 
At the Uruguay Round, all non- tariff barriers to trade in agriculture which 
are considered trade distorting converted into tariffs, the process known as 
'tarrification'. The Agreement on Agriculture has a two-fold aim: improve the 
transparency of existing protection measures and facilitate their reduction and open 
domestic market to more imports. On market access the agreement has two basic 
elements; 
(I) The first element provides for tariffication of all non-tariff barriers 
(II) The second element deals with the setting up of minimum level for import share. 
Tariffication has two direct effects; 
(a) It will help distinguish between effects of tariffs and non tariff barriers 
(b) In future, reducfion of tariff barriers will become easier 
The key elements of the market access commitments for agricultural products 
are the establishment of tariffication, tariff reduction and the binding of all 
agriculture tariffs. 
Tariffication: 
In the tariffication process the Quantitative Restrictions, variable levies, 
import bans or other non-tariff barriers are replaced by an import duty. So that there is 
no change in the level of protection. 
The new tariff resulting from tariffication and the applied tariff rate are being 
brought down to reasonable level. The developed countries were to reduce their 
agricultural tariffs by an average of 36 percent over 6 years, while developing 
countries were committed to cut the agriculture tariff by 24 percent in 10 years. The 
least developed countries are exempted to reduce these tariffs (Garg, 2004, pp-61and 
62). 
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In addition to this, there was also a call to maintain current access 
opportunities and to establish a minimum access tariff quota, where there was no 
binding of tariffs. The minimum access tariff quota was to establish at reduced tariff 
rates for those basic products where minimum access was less than 3 percent of 
domestic consumption in the base period 1986-88 in 1995 and is increased 
progressively to 5 percent by 2000 (4 percent by 2004 for developing countries) 
(Chand and Phillip, 2001, pp-3014). 
1.4.2: Domestic Support 
Quantitative Restrictions on domestic support, through Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS) are other important features of Agreement on 
Agriculture. One of the most important goals of the WTOs' Agreement on 
Agriculture has been removal of trade distortions resulting from different level of 
input subsidies, price, market support, export subsidy and other kinds of trade 
distorting support across countries. The agreement allows certain subsidies as they are 
not supposed to distort trade (Deodhar Satish Y, 2006). 
The agreement on domestic support measures has two main aims; 
(I) To identify the measures of support to farmers and at the same time they are 
acceptable and 
(II) To identify support to farmers that is unacceptable and decided to reduce them. 
Agreement on Agriculture divides domestic support into two categories; 
(a) Trade distorting and 
(b) Non-trade distorting 
Amber Box: 
All trade distorting domestic support has been put in the Amber Box. The 
Amber Box contains domestic support policies that distort market prices. These are 
mainly price support, direct payments and non-exempt subsidies. This has to be 
quantified in accordance with the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) and 
removed. The amount of total subsidies given by the government to its agriculture 
sector subject to reduction commitments is measured in terms of Aggregate 
Measurement of Support. The AMS is calculated on a product-by-product basis 
using the difference between the average external reference price for a product and its 
applied and ministered price multiplied by the quantity of production. To compute 
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Aggregate Measurement of Support, non-product specific subsidies are added to the 
total subsidies calculated on a product-by-product basis. 
In the Agreement on Agriculture, it was decided that either for product 
specific support or non-product specific support, the AMS was to exceed 10 percent 
of the total value of agricultural product for developing countries and 5 percent for 
developed countries. If this stipulated level is exceeded by a developed country, it 
would have to reduce by 20 percent over 6 years, whereas developing countries will 
get a 10 years term to reduce it by 13.3 percent (Bhukta, 2001,pp-196). 
As far as non-trade distorting domestic support is concerned, they have been 
divided into; 
(I) Green Box, 
(II) Blue Box and 
(III) Special and Differential Box 
Green Box: 
There are some subsidies which are supposed to have no or at most minimal 
- trade distorting effects or effects on production. So, these measures are called Green 
Box subsidies. The Green Box mainly consists of 
(I) Government service programmes, 
(II) Research, training and extension services, marketing and promotion services, 
infrastructure services, etc, 
(III) Public stock holding for food security purposes, etc, 
(IV) Domestic food aid, 
(V) Direct payments to producers where these are not related to the volume of 
production or factors of production. This is known decoupled income support and 
(VI) Environmental protection programmes. 
Blue Box: 
Subsidies under Blue Box include direct payments given to farmers in the 
form of deficiency, under production limiting programmes. It covers payments 
directly linked to production but not to the price or output volumes. Support under 
Blue Box is also exempted from any reduction commitments. But it has an upper 
limit. 
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Special and Differential Box: 
Special and Differential Box includes measures taken by developing countries 
such as investment subsidies and various agricultural input subsidies generally 
available to low income resource poor producers in a developing economies. 
1.4.3: Export Subsidies 
On export subsidies the agreement follows two steps; 
. To define export subsidies and 
. To take decision to reduce their level 
The agreement requires WTO members to cut both the amount of money they 
spend on export subsidies and the quantities of exports that receive subsidies. Taking 
average for 1986-90 as the base level, developed countries agreed to cut the value of 
export subsidy by 36 percent over 6 years starting in 1995 and developing countries 
cut the export subsidies by 24 percent over the 10 years. Developed countries also 
agreed to reduce the quantities of subsidised exports by 21 percent over the 6 years 
and developing countries reduce the quantities of subsidised exports by 14 percent. 
Least developed countries do not need to make cuts. 
The export subsidies in the Agreement on Agriculture that are subject to 
reduction commitments include; 
(I) Direct subsidy to agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in 
exported products, 
(II) Provisions on favourable terms of internal transport and freight charges on export 
shipments (developing countries are exempted from commitments on this form of 
subsidy), 
(III) Subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing exports of agricultural products 
excluding export promotion and advisory services (again developing countries are 
exempted from reduction commitments) and 
(IV) Sale or disposal of or export of non-commercial stock of agricultural products by 
the governments below domestic market prices (Gulati, Mehta and Narayanan, 1999, 
pp-2940). 
However the developing countries are allowed to maintain certain transport 
and market related subsidies. The reason is to help farmers with institutionalised post-
harvest infrastructure for distribution and marketing. 
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Although the agreement signed in Marrakesh is commonly known as GATT 
agreement. The signatory countries had decided to group together the 29 distinct legal 
arrangements (covering agriculture, services, commodities, etc) and other 
declarations into one single agreement-the WTO agreement. 
1.4.4: Implications of Agreement on Agriculture for India 
The implications of Agreement on Agriculture for India can be analysed in 
terms of its brought provision under the following heads :(Mishra, 2004) 
(a) Implications for Market Access: According to market access provision of 
Agreement on Agriculture, non-tariff barriers such as Quantitative Restrictions on 
imports as were in existence before the agreement came into being, were to be 
replaced by tariff on imports to provide the same level of protection and then were to 
be followed by progressive reduction of tariff levels. 
India has already lifted Quantitative Restrictions on imports of most of the 
agricultural product by April 2001 because of the complaints by USA, Australia, New 
Zealand and EU to Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of WTO based on the decision of 
the Appellate Body. It would require concerted efforts on several fronts like increase 
in the use of modern inputs like fertilisers and plant protection chemicals, expansion 
in the area under high yield varieties and improve seeds, provision of institutional 
credit and development of infrastructure to improve efficiency in product and 
marketing, to compete with the imports. 
Though India is not entitled to use the Special Safeguard Measures of the 
agreement, yet it can take safeguard action under the WTO agreement; if there is a 
surge in imports causing serious injury or if there is a threat of serious injury to the 
domestic products. 
(b) Export Subsidy: Export subsidies of the kind listed in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which attract reduction commitments, are not extended in India. India is 
getting free to provide subsidies for internal and international transport, freight 
charges and reduction of export marketing costs. The impact of reduction in export 
subsidies by the developed country should help in India's exports, though major 
benefits are to be appropriated by developed countries. 
(c) Domestic Support: There are some studies which suggest that in India the 
product specific support is found to be negative, while the non-product specific 
support i.e., subsidies on agricultural inputs, such as power, irrigation, fertilisers, etc 
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is well below the permissible level of 10 percent of the value of agricultural output. 
Even when subsidies provided small and marginal farmers are included, non-product 
specific subsidies do not exceed the qualifying limits. In India, for the present, the 
Minimum Support Price (MSP) provided to commodities is less than fixed external 
price (1986-88) determined under the agreement. There are 21 agricultural 
commodities products namely paddy, wheat, jowar, bajra, maize, ragi, barley, gram, 
tur, urad, moong, groundnut, rapeseed and mustard, soybean, sunflower, safflower, 
cotton, jute, tobacco and copra for which the minimum support prices are fixed, and 
for sugarcane/statutory minimum prices are announced (Naik, et.al., 2001). 
1.4.5: Recent Developments in the Finalisation of Agreement on 
Agriculture 
The Agreement on Agriculture has not been still finalised by the member 
countries of WTO, even when the Doha deadline of first January, 2005 has expired. 
We may now highlight some of the major developments in this field, which are as 
follows: 
(I) Members missed the March 31, 2003 deadline for agreeing on 'modalities' targets 
and issues related to rules for achieving the objective, 
(II) On August 31,2003 a joint EU-US proposal on agriculture was offered in an 
attempt to move negofiafions forward, (forbes, com, November 10,2003), 
(III) On September 14,2003, the 5^^ WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun ended 
without the 'comprehensive draft commitments' from member countries to reduce 
agricultural support and protection and other distortions, 
(IV) On January 12,2004, US Trade Representative Zoellick sent a letter to WTO 
members saying that he believed " an agreement to eliminate export subsidies by a 
certain date was necessary if trade talks were to progress". The proposed setting a 
new mid-2004 deadline for some basic accords and called on trade ministers to 
meet in Hong-Kong before the end of 2004, 
(V) No significant headway could be made in the 6* WTO Ministerial Conference 
held in Hong Kong in December 2005. The ministerial declaration adopted on 
December 18, 2005 conceded the fact that the Doha declaration could not be 
pushed forward much due to lack of consensus. It further stated, "We recognise 
that much remains to be done in order to establish modalities and to conclude the 
negotiations. Therefore, we agree to intensify work on all outstanding issues to 
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fulfill the Doha objectives, in particular, we have resolved to establish modalities 
no later than April 30, 2006 and to submit comprehensive draft schedules, based 
on these modalities not later than July 31,2006 ". 
(VI) WTO meeting in July 2006 for making efforts towards completion of Doha 
round collapsed as key members, including the US remained stuck on their 
positions on agriculture subsidies and 
(VII) The WTO Director General, Mr. Pascal Lamy on his visit to India on January 
19, 2007, made an appeal to all countries to re-examine their respective stands in 
order to kick start the trade negotiations. He said that the roadblock in agriculture 
negotiations needs to be overcome for Doha Round to move forward. Both 
developed and developing countries need to take tariff cuts, though greater 
responsibilities would be on rich nations. He said that even after the concessions, 
nations would have flexibilities. 
1.5: Need and Objectives of the Present Study 
Consequent up on India's signing of GATT agreement in 1994 and joining of 
WTO as a founder member in 1995, many issues were raised relating to its impact on 
our nations' interest. Among various issues, agriculture has received the greatest 
priority, as it still remains the main stay of less developed countries like ours. India's 
signing of GATT agreement and joining of WTO as a founder member has put her 
agriculture into framework of global competition and rule of global market. The 
central point of this development is competition, which in turn, depends on 
continuous improvement in efficiency. The Agreement on Agriculture, which was 
signed by India in 1995, has opened up new vistas of growth for Indian agriculture in 
which India has an inherent strength to dominate the global markets. Indeed, it was 
promised under this agreement that the new trading environment would be clean from 
protectionist measures which were being taken by the developed countries under 
GATT. A free and fair trade was assured among developed and developing nations. 
But Panchmukhi (2001) and Singh and Nandkeoliyar (2001) studies conducted during 
past one decade reveal the fact that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture has promoted 
large-scale industrial production at the expense of small-scale sustainable farming, 
with particulariy devastating impacts on agriculture in economically less developed 
countries. Now, India, after the profound changes in economic policies (due to 
economic reforms and WTO agreements), instead of experiencing an unprecedented 
21 
boom in growth, the agricultural sector in India is facing some serious crisis. 
Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly some real signs of crises in the agricultural 
situation today which require to be understood and addressed. For example, farmers 
frequently find themselves unable to compete with the prices of imported crops. 
Further more, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights provision of 
Agreement on Agriculture allows companies ownership over the seeds and, therefore, 
the crops planted by people around the world. This would compel farmers and 
indigenous to pay royalties to the company when they sell their products. This in turn 
will increase the debt burden on the farmers (as in the case of Punjab and Andhra 
Pradesh) (Nigam, 2006, p-168). 
The recent studies by Bhalla and Singh (1996) and Gulati and Sharma (1994, 
1995) have also shown that support given to agriculture sector in India every year has 
been negative. Also the export competitiveness of this sector got adversely affected 
after the inception of WTO on account of the provision of Agreement on Agriculture 
Khatoon (2005) and Chand and Yadav (2003). Though India is not unaware of the 
challenges arising out of the fact that the WTO bears the birthmarks of a deeply 
divided world, in which the developed countries have many unfair advantages over 
the developing countries. India is playing an active role in mobilising other 
developing countries for removing these disadvantages and establishing a truly just, 
equitable and fair world trading order. Besides, India has taken necessary measures to 
protect the interest of the farmers in the country. 
Thus, what is observed from the above discussion is that Indian agriculture is 
trying hard to convert the challenges posed in the new trading regime into 
opportunities for it. It is in this backdrop that the present study assumes significance. 
The following are the main objectives of the present work; 
(I) To examine and analyse the performance of Indian agriculture since the inception 
of World Trade Organisation, 
(II) More specifically, an attempt will be made to find out as to how various 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture have affected the Indian agriculture, 
(III) To identify what type of problems and hurdles the Indian agriculture has faced 
or likely to face because of these provisions, 
(IV) Much hue and cry has been raised by different economists regarding the pros 
and corns of the agreement and its negative impact on developing countries like 
India. We will try to study the weight of these agreements. 
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(V)An effort would also be made to compare the performance of Indian agriculture 
before and after the formation of World Trade Organisation. This will be done 
simply by reviewing the existing literature on the subject and by analysing 
empirically the trends in agriculture trade of India from 1995-96 to 2005-06, 
(VI) There are many agreements which have not been implemented fully. Our study 
would try to find out the impact of these agreements once they are fully 
implemented and 
(VII) Our study would also try to suggest some policy recommendations to get a level 
playing field with the developed countries in the true spirit of multilateralism and 
facilitate free movements of goods and to boost up the performance of agriculture 
sector in line with global liberalisation of agriculture. 
In order to support the above objectives the hypotheses developed during the 
course of the present work are as follows; 
(I) WTO provisions of AOA have been partially advantageous for Indian agriculture, 
(II) Indian agriculture has suffered a competitive disadvantage for most of the 
products during post WTO period and 
(III) India's terms of trade in agriculture with the whole world have deteriorated since 
the inception of the WTO. 
1.6: Data Base 
The present study is based upon secondary sources of data, which include; 
(I) Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, Department of Agriculture and Co-operation, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India (various issues), 
(II) Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Government of India 
(various issues), 
(III) Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (Agriculture), Ministry of Finance, 
Economic Division, Government of India (various issues), 
(IV) Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (Foreign Trade and Balance of 
Payments), Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Government of India 
(various issues), 
(V) International Financial Statistics (IMF), Year Book (various issues) and 
(VI) Office of Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, 
Government of India. 
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1.7: Research Methodology 
For analytical purposes, the study has used statistical tools like simple ratio 
analysis, simple average, co-efficient of variation, simple and compound growth rates, 
fisher's index number, elasticity co-efficient as the measures of trend analysis, 
diagrammatic representation of data and above all regression analysis for testing the 
statistical significance of major factors affecting agricultural export and import of 
India. The simple growth rate which is the annual percentage change over previous 
year is obtained by dividing the difference between the values of the two consecutive 
years by the value of previous year multiplied by 100. The compound growth rate or 
the annual average growth rate is found using the following exponential functions; 
Y=ab' (1) 
Where, 
Y= values or quantity in absolute terms such as export and import etc. 
t= time variable in year 
a= intercept term 
b= slope co-efficient 
Converting equation (1) into log linear form we obtained 
logY = log a + t log b (2) 
Equation (2) can be estimated through OLS procedure as under 
log b = y logy t* 
Where, y= 7 - f 
t*= /- / 
Therefore, 
b = Antilog of Y logy t* 
The measure of compound growth rate can be obtained from equation (2) as under 
CAGR= [b-1] 100 
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Another way of calculating the compound growth rate is as follows: 
Y,=Yo(l+r)' 
Whose log form is as under: 
Log Yt = log Yo + t log (1+r) 
Likewise the income elasticity co-efficient has been found using the following 
equation 
Y^aX" -— (3) 
Y=import in strict sense 
X= national income which is GDP at factor cost at current prices in our case. 
Rewriting 3'^ '^  in the following manner 
logY = log a+b log X 
Here, 
b gives the direct measure of income elasticity co-efficient 
j j ^ Ilogxlog;^ 
[llogx]^ 
Where x = (X-X) 
y-iY-Y) 
Fisher's index number has been used for working out India's commodity terms of 
trade in agriculture with the whole world assuming 1995-96= 100 for major 
commodities of the trade. The formula for the same is as under 
P . , = , | | ^ X | M L X , 0 0 
For analysing export competitiveness the study has used nominal protection co-
efficient exclusively which is obtained as the ratio between domestic and international 
prices. This is however not to deny other measures of the export competitiveness but 
due to lack of sufficient data, the study neglected them. 
1.8: Limitations of the Present Work 
This study has some limitations; 
(I) The main limitation of this study is that it analysis the impact of AOA provisions 
at all India level and excludes the analysis of individual States. However, a closer 
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examination of States may give comprehensive idea of various provisions of AOA. 
(II) This study does not show the effect of WTO regime under Agreement on 
Agriculture on the various categories of the farmers. 
(III) Advanced econometric analysis of the growth performance of India's agriculture 
trade could not be carried out because of the lack of the availability of advanced 
econometric software. Further, time and resource constraints at our disposal did not 
permit us to get this analysis done from any specialised institute. Therefore, the 
simple econometric technique of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) has been used in the 
present study to estimate the regression. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
2.1: Introduction 
With the establishment of WTO in 1994, a major change tooic place in the 
international scenario. Agriculture for the first time came under the GATT or WTO 
regime in the Uruguay Round when Agreement on Agriculture (URAOA) was 
negotiated. It was expected that various provisions of Agreement on Agriculture of 
this agreement would bring the developed and developing countries on the same 
platform and would be benefited from each other. The long objective of Agreement 
on Agriculture (AOA) was to promote a fair and market oriented agricultural trading 
system. This would (as anticipated) definitely provide ample opportunities for 
developing countries to explore their potentials. 
This has generated a great deal of interest to study various provisions of 
Agreement on Agriculture with respect to centres and peripherals. This chapter deals 
with a brief survey of some of the studies relevant to the present work in order to find 
a path for this study to follow. Keeping in view the purpose of the present study, this 
chapter has been divided in to five parts comprising of the literature on Agreement on 
Agriculture provisions, market access, domestic support, Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) provision and competitiveness of Indian agriculture. 
2.2: Review of Studies Related to WTO Provisions Particularly the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) 
The Uruguay Round was the turning point in the history of world trade in 
agriculture. This round included the Agreement of Agriculture. The agreement 
directed all WTO members to under take such reform measures as would make 
agriculture trade fairer and more market oriented in long run. For this purpose, the 
agreement contends various provisions to ensure and enhance the reform process. 
The provision includes; 
a. Domestic Support, i.e., reducing input subsidies and out put price support. 
Operations so that the relative profitability is least disturbed, 
b. Market Access, i.e., opening markets by removing various restrictions on 
imports, 
c. Export Subsidies, i.e., reducing the subsidies on export operations and 
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d. TRIPs: Patenting rights granted to seed breeds under the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights. 
The Agreement on Agriculture and its various provisions have been briefly 
discussed in chapter one. Here, a brief survey of some of the earlier studies relating to 
provisions of AOA is presented. 
Bhalla and Singh (1996) conducted a study to analyse the likely impact of 
agriculture trade liberalisation under GATT on Punjab agriculture and to make policy 
suggestions that would enable Punjab to drive maximum gains in the new emerging 
situation. They came up with the conclusion that Punjab agriculture could enjoy the 
benefits of trade liberalising measures because of more advancement in its agriculture 
and awareness of farmers. 
Singh and Nandkeoliyar (2001) observed that the WTO agreement was 
likely to benefit the developing nations by bringing substantial gains in world trade 
and increased income from liberalisation, improved market access and greater export 
opportunities. They, however, pointed out loopholes in the WTO commitments by 
stating that these commitments would favour the developed nations. 
Gulati (1998) brings out that globalisation of the economy, including 
agriculture, offers an opportunity to correct for the 'anti-agriculture' bias in Indian 
trade policies that have been in existence since the 1950s. Agriculture can move on to 
a higher growth if supply side bottlenecks are freed and a protective cover is accorded 
to the poor, at least for some time. 
Lindsay Jolly (2001) analyses WTO negotiations on agriculture in the context 
of Doha Round. The author attempted to visualise such aspects as elimination of 
export subsidies, priority for non trade concerns, creation of a development box for 
developing countries, elimination of tariff peaks and tariff -escalation, sugar trade, 
etc. with special reference to EU and United States. It was found that the Doha Round 
opened new dimensions for further negotiations on agriculture trade. 
Gulati and Sharma (1994) have focused on the likely impact of GATT on 
Indian agriculture by analysing various commitments under GATT in the area of 
agriculture namely, market access, domestic support and export competition. On the 
whole, the study finds varied impacts of WTO commitments on Indian agriculture and 
concludes that Indian agriculture will not be benefited much in the open trade 
environment under the present scenario. 
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A similar study by Jugale V.B. (2004) also examined the implications of various 
provisions of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) for India and highlighted the key 
issues, which India must address on priority. 
Thamarajakshi (2002) discussed the progress made in the Doha deliberations 
with regard to the hope of developing countries that the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) would open up export markets for their products in developing countries. 
Issues with regard to the potential of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Sanitaiy 
and Phyto- Sanitary (SPS) and Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
Agreement to negatively impact market access possibilities of developing countries 
were also discussed. A plan of action for Indian agricultural trade was presented. 
By analysing the impact of Agreement on agriculture, the interim report of 
Government of Karnataka (2000) asserts that the diversified nature of agriculture 
sector in India requires large investment in those areas, which fail to compete in the 
international market. 
In this regard, Panchamukhi's study (2001) is worth noting. In his opinion, 
new trading system of WTO seems to give unduly greater emphasis to private sector 
and competition. It fails to recognise the strategic role, which the state has to play in 
promoting the right kind of development with emphasis on equality and social 
infrastructure. 
Gulati and Sudha (1999) examined India's negotiation at Marrakesh 
especially the Agreement on Agriculture and discussed its negotiating agenda for 
Seattle. They suggested a road map for India's negotiation in Seattle, which would 
favour India's agriculture including domestic support and export competition. A 
similar study by Nagoor B.H. (2005) was carried out to analyse WTO commitments 
and their implications for India. In addition to this, the study also examines the 
efficiency and competitiveness of India's agriculture trade in the new trading 
environment. It is inferred from this study that in many ways India is favourably 
placed to take advantage of certain provisions of WTO. 
A subsequent study by Sabanna Talwar (2005) also analysed the 
implications of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) for Indian agriculture and found 
that the implementation of AOA in case of India meant and upheaval to the attitudes 
to work hard, meet agreed schedule and deliver quality products. 
Naik et.al. (2001) examined the extent of opportunities available and the 
challenges that lie ahead of WTO Agreement on Agriculture so that informed 
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negotiations could take place. The study revealed that WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture was discriminatory in nature having several deficiencies, which favoured 
developed countries. 
Salam et.al. (2004) in their study proposed to examine to what extent India 
had gained out of the Uruguay Round of Agreement on Agriculture (URAOA). For 
this purpose authors took a stock of India's expectations from AOA and how they 
were fuUfiUed. They observed trade distorting effects of Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) for India, especially commitment relating to Aggregate Measurement o^ 
Support (AMS) reduction. 
Deodhar (2006) focused on the scenario of Indian agricultural trade in the 
context of Agreement on Agriculture and tried to explore the possibilities where it 
could improve. The study inferred that in the presence of imperfectly competitive 
export structures, the increase in terms of trade for Indian agriculture might not be 
very high and what ever little improvement may occur in the terms of trade, it would 
have negative or at best very little effect on farmers welfare. 
Hansen (2001) in his study argues that the break down of negotiations in 
Seattle, the arm twisting leading up to a New Round of negotiations after Doha and 
the events in between the two ministerial meetings indicate that major parts of the 
global civil societies are not supporting the one dimensional thinking of the new 
liberal economics. This, according to him, was the main reason for global trade 
negotiations being surrounded by suspicion. 
Gupta (2001) points out that the most important task of the Indian 
Government in the field of international trade is to improve its bargaining power. He 
further argues that accounting for only 0.6 percent of the world trade, India alone 
cannot achieve much whether inside or outside the WTO. 
Bhattacharya (2000) held that GATT was primarily concerned with trade 
liberalisation in manufactures, whereas WTO's agenda included agriculture, trade in 
services, intellectual property rights, all forms of policy instruments perceived to have 
trade impact, environment, social clauses, competition policy and investment. The 
author thus, contents that the loss of sovereignty of WTO in policy making is a live 
one. This is especially true for the developing countries because for them, the WTO 
agenda is not necessarily to their interests. 
Chadha (2001) examines the most intense 8 year long Pre- WTO Uruguay 
Round ending towards the end of 1994. It is claimed that the world economic 
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community was called up on to take a very comprehensive view of trade and trade -
related issues and to devise an equally comprehensive package of trade practices, rule 
and instrumentalities to be adhered to by the trading partners to obviate unfair trade 
practices. Thus, on a broad plane, WTO is to encompass international trade in goods 
(including agricultural commodities), services and Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
Yadav Subah (2001), while analysing the impact of WTO on Indian 
agriculture, gave special thought on various related aspects of Agreement on 
Agriculture (AOA). He felt a strong need to formulate appropriate policies to safe 
guard the immediate and long term interest of farmers. He also added that trade 
policies should incorporate agricultural aspects in a detail length in order to encourage 
larger investment in areas of production where we have comparative advantage. 
Aggarwal (2005) also studied negotiations relating to agriculture under the 
phase of WTO. The study covers different elements of Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) that were recalled and renegotiated from time to time. The study reveals large 
gap between developed and developing countries with regard to the provision made in 
different rounds of negotiations including domestic support, export subsidies, etc. A 
similar conclusion emerged in the study of Munzara Manyara Angeline (2006) the 
study is based on Agreement on Agriculture and its implications to small holder 
farmers and how it served as a tool for continued marginalisation of Africa farmers. 
For this purpose, the study covered all aspects of Agreement on Agriculture, normally 
market access, domestic support and export subsidies. Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) is found to be biased in favour of developed countries and their agriculture 
support programmes. Food imports and sudden import surges had led to the 
displacement of small farmers and the erosion of food security in many developing 
countries. 
Chakraborty and Singh (2006) examined various provisions of WTO 
agreement and tried to formulate suitable negotiating strategies to be followed by the 
developing countries like India. The study pointed out the need for implementing 
2003, EU proposal for de-coupling of CAP subsidies by formulating a single farm 
payment independent from production. 
Besides the studies reviewed above, contributions of Mishra R.S. (2004) 
Awasthi and Mishra (2004), Rudrappan (2004), Mukherjee and Pal (2004), Singh 
Arjun (2004) and Mishra P.C. (2004) are worth mentioning here. These authors 
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have also examined various provisions of Agreement on Agriculture and their 
implications for India and other developing countries from different angles. Though 
the studies reviewed or coated in the on going section may be questioned regarding 
the methodology or the way they have adopted in their analysis, but an important and 
interesting finding that emerges from almost all these studies is that the commitments 
of Agreement on Agriculture are biased in favour of developed countries and it has 
been found that the provisions of Agreement on Agriculture are badly affecting the 
competitiveness of agriculture in developing countries. Thus, preparedness for 
negotiations and strengthening the regional co-operations and institutions are 
suggested for developing countries, for, in practice, the AOA so far has 
institutionalised in equalities between countries that can give substantial support and 
protection to their agricultural sectors (developed countries) and those, which do not, 
or can not provide such support (developing and least developed countries). 
2.3: Studies on Domestic Support to Agriculture 
The provision on domestic support for developed and developing countries as 
per Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) has been discussed briefly in chapter one. This 
section reviews the attempts made to examine this provision and to what extent it 
proved useful. 
Pal (2005) provides a useful discussion on the issue of agriculture subsidies 
viewed in WTO negotiation with special reference to July Framework. The study 
indicates that, by itself, the July package will not lead to any real decrease in domestic 
levels of subsidies in developed countries. The July Framework is found to be 
incomplete having loopholes for developing countries. The author proposes some 
negotiating strategies for India for future. 
Khatoon S (2005) attempted to analyse the situation of the rural India in the 
post reform period. The author covered various aspects of Indian agriculture including 
subsidy support, Amber Box, Green Box, etc and analysed them in the context of 
WTO agreement .The study revealed that Indian agriculture had been hit hard during 
post WTO period (1995-2003). The share of agro goods in India's global export has 
declined during this period. During post WTO period agriculture subsidies of 
developed countries had been rather increased. 
According to Datt (2003) earlier the Indian agriculture prices were lower than 
international prices mostly before the year 1996. But as a result of the heavy 
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subsidisation of agricultural exports by the developed countries, the situation 
undertook a dramatic turn. The Indian farmers have been put to serious disadvantage. 
The phenomenon of farmers' suicides is growing interest in several States because of 
the distress of farmers specialising in agricultural commodities and their exports is a 
very serious human problem. 
Gulati, Mehta and Narayanan (1999) examine that the Agreement on 
Agriculture itself provides enough loopholes to exploit and the developed countries 
are doing exactly the same. Since reduction commitments are on the total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support, a country may offer huge subsidy to some products, while 
extending little or no support to some others so that the Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) does not exceed the commitment level. 
Rao (2001) finds that there is a marked shift away from support prices and 
export subsidies. The support prices and export subsidies are considered highly trade 
distorting towards direct payments. These are considered 'minimally trade distorting' 
and have been placed under the Blue and Green Boxes which are exempt from 
reduction commitments. However, it would be a misnomer to call these payments on 
distortion of agriculture trade, in so far as they are not fiilly de-linked from the use of 
inputs. These do influence the allocation of resources, in the sense that in the absence 
of such payments, fewer resources would be committed to agriculture leading to 
lower output, higher prices and smaller export surpluses. 
Bhalla and Singh (1996) in their study observed that the administered price 
support provided by the government or its agencies for the three main agricultural 
crops of Punjab namely wheat, paddy and cotton was much lower than their 
respective international prices during the decade of the eighties. Taken together, the 
product specific support (at market price) remained negative throughout the 1981-82 
to 1992-93 periods. Almost all the inputs like fertilisers, irrigation water, seed, 
agricultural credit and electricity were supplied at subsidised rates to farmers of 
Punjab. 
While reviewing various provisions of Agreement on Agriculture, Awasthi 
and Mishra (2004) conclude that the most unfavourable clause from India's 
viewpoint in the entire Agreement on Agriculture pertains to Aggregate Measurement 
of Support, while it is highly favourable to certain developed countries like USA, EU 
Japan, etc. It has also been found from this study that the current domestic support on 
wheat in India exceeds 10 percent norm. Furthermore, the study reveals the extent of 
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disadvantage regarding export subsidy provision of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) 
that India is facing and is likely to continue in future. Jugale V.B. (2004) in this 
connection suggests that complete elimination of export subsidy and domestic support 
by developed countries is essential so that export from under developed countries may 
be encouraged by putting a check on the falling prices of agricultural products. The 
study by Singh Arjun (2004) supports jugale's argument and infers that the unfair 
trade practices have irrupted through supports and subsidies under agreement, which 
is quite favourable to developed nations clearly. Therefore, it is suggested in this 
study that developing nations in further negotiations should jointly try to get these 
policies changed and quashed for their need of the poor people. 
Mishra's P.C. (2004) proposals for India to negotiate further are worth noting 
here. He asserts that India should propose the following in further rounds of 
negotiations to safeguard the interest of the nation-
(a) Total elimination of export subsidies within three years, failing which potential 
exporters like India should have the right to ask for compensation for subsidy giving 
exporting countries for the potential loss of their markets. 
(b) Non-subsidising countries like India should have the right to impose 
countervailing duty equivalent to the export subsidies by exporting countries. 
Chadha (2001) advocates that if the farmers of developed and developing 
countries compete in the same market, then the huge annual subsidies that developed 
countries provide to their farmers must be reduced to the negligible amounts that 
developing countries earmark for their farm sector. 
Gulati (2001) explores the issue of domestic support that the Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS) does not adequately reflect the level of support since 
it exempts a number of supports and compensations from inclusion in the computation 
of current total Aggregated Measurement of Support. 
Gulati and Sharma (1994) explain that the domestic support level in India 
are negative in most of the agricultural commodities, which is in sharp contrast to the 
support levels prevailing in developed countries of the world. Almost all developed 
countries provide positive support to their cultivators and their supports levels are 
quite high generally more than 10 percent of the total value of agriculture output. 
Gulati and Sharma (1995) trace out that the estimate based on support prices 
reveal that product specific Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for India (for 
17 products out of 22 total products for which India maintains market price support 
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programmes) works out to be negative to the tune of (-) Rs. 242 billions during tlie 
period 1986-87 to 1988-89. This forms (-) 27.74 percent of total value of agricultural 
production (excluding forestry and fishery). Non-product specific Aggregate 
Measurement of Support works out to be Rs.46 billion, 5.24 percent of total value of 
agricultural production. 
Gupta (2001) argues that India has not challenged the western definition of 
what is and what is not trade distorting subsidy. Nor it has challenged the WTO 
provision of reducing subsidy in percentage terms. Keeping in mind the gap between 
western and Indian levels of subsidies, India's demand should have been for 
Quantitative Restrictions in subsidies, preferably based on some per capita ceiling 
norm. To add to this, Pandey and Tiwari (2004) point out that the total support to 
agriculture in the countries of the European Union range from 25 percent to 50 
percent of the GDP of agriculture. It is now realised that the developed countries 
shifted subsidies from the non-exempt categories to the exempt categories. 
The study of Mohideen and Haroon (2004) indicates that the most developed 
countries have manipulated subsidy commitments made by them and continued to 
provide substantial support to their agricultural sector. Developed countries have been 
shifting their subsidies from prohibitive categories (AmbaBox) to the non-prohibitive 
categories (Blue and Green Box). This is continued to distort agricultural trade. 
In this context, Patel's (2001) assertion seems valid that Green Box related 
supports are rare in developing countries, largely due to inadequate administrative 
capacity for designing and implementing such policies. Moreover, many developing 
countries have undertaken Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) calling for less 
government intervention and requiring reductions of budgetary outlays. Thus, such 
countries will not be able to adopt expensive support policies, even though they are 
allowed under the agreement. 
Panchmukhi (2001) observes that the Agreement on Agriculture, as part of 
WTO has mandated phase reduction of agricultural subsidies, even though some of 
the so-called Green Box measures, such as decoupled income support, adopted in the 
USA and other countries, have continued to retain the distortions in the market-based 
trading environment of agriculture. 
Charkraborty (2006) feels that no agriculture subsidy reform measure is 
likely to be successful without serious commitment from the EU and the US. The only 
positive development in this front might occur if the 2003 EU proposal for de-
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coupling of CAP subsidies by formulating a single farm payment independent from 
production is implemented. 
View's of Khatoon S (2005) on this point is not very much different from that 
of Charkraborty (2006). She finds that during post WTO period, agricultural 
subsidies of developed countries have been rather increased. Therefore, it is difficult 
for India to face global agricultural competitiveness in such a scenario. 
It has been found by Munzara Manyara Angeline (2006) that since subsidy 
commitments is biased in favour of developed countries and due to the unfair trade 
practices of such countries, many agricultural exporting countries in the 70's and 80's 
like the Philippine have been transformed into net food importers. It is further added 
that as there were no corresponding dramatic increases in developing countries' 
agricultural exports after their accession to the WTO, the massive food imports and 
import surges contributed to the huge trade deficits in agriculture during this period. 
Sabanna Talwar (2005) discovered that the total support to agriculture for the 
OECD countries mounted around US $361 billion in 1999 and constituting 1.4 
percent of GDP, on an average. As a percentage of gross farm receipts, support to 
producers as measured by PSEs represented 40 percent in 1999. But the author feels 
that there are some advantages for developing countries to strengthen their 
competitiveness on domestic as well as on international fronts. 
Nagoor's (2005) study is in fine agreement with that of Sabanna, which 
stresses that in many ways India is favourably placed to take advantage of certain 
provisions of WTO. According to the author, the major challenge to the viability of 
agriculture of most developing countries, including India, is posed by the high 
domestic support, export subsidies and denial of market access through various tariff 
and non-tariff barriers in developed countries. Thus, he argues that India should 
accept the challenge by increasing substantially the public investment on irrigation, 
power, roads and agricultural research and extension rather than providing subsidies. 
Yadav (2001) expresses his concern over shock waves among farmers in 
developing nations caused by the sharp increase in domestic prices after 1996. He also 
adds that with the phase reduction in agricultural subsidies in developing nations, the 
market did not decrease in the post Uruguay Round phase for most of the 
commodities. The author, therefore, proposes that an appropriate formula with a cap 
on tariff bindings should be evolved to effect substantial reduction in all tariff levels 
including peak tariff and tariff escalations in developed countries. 
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A Study by Aggarwal (2005) has shown that the July framework did not 
establish a new Blue Box G-20 developing countries, although if foreshadowed the 
possibility of establishing a new Blue Box contingent up on an agreement on the 
criteria that truly ensure, that these payments are less trade distorting than the 
Aggregate Measurement of Support measures. The position held by the G-20 that the 
additional criteria should include product specific caps and reduction, limitation on 
price gaps, disciplines on accumulation of support on certain products and offsets 
against transfers from Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)/deminimis was, 
therefore, preserved. 
Having gone through the literature on domestic support to agriculture, it 
becomes clear that the concept of subsidies introduced in Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) is quite ambiguous and disturbing as these subsidies distort and did not 
provided income support to farmers, especially to developing countries. Thus, the real 
picture seems contradictory to what was argued in Agreement on Agriculture, (that is, 
the reduction of subsidies to a minimum level would augment free and fair 
international trade). Developed countries to implement the Agreement on Agriculture 
provisions but they are neglecting itself to implement the Agreement on Agriculture 
provisions particularly in the reduction of Aggregate Measurement of Support. 
2.4: Review of Studies Related to the Implications of Tariffication 
or Market Access 
As discussed in chapter one, the provision of tariffication refers to a norm 
under which non -tariff barriers are to be replaced by tariff barriers that provide 
substantially the same level of protection as of the base year (1986-88). The 
commitment for reducing the tariffs on an average is 36 percent in 6 years with a 
minimum of 15 percent of each commodity for developed countries and 24 percent in 
10 years with a minimum of 10 percent for each commodity for developing countries. 
Several studies have been carried out with a view to examine the follow-up impact of 
market access on the agriculture performance of developed and developing countries. 
We begin with the study by Yadav Subah (2001) who asserts that India being one of 
the founder members of GATT as well as WTO stands committed to adhere to the 
philosophy of removing Quantitative Restrictions. But it always took the recourse to 
the exceptions provided by GATT for maintaining such Quantitative Restrictions 
(QRs) owing to balance of payment difficulties on account of discernible 
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improvement in balance of payment situation in the country from mid 90's.India has 
removed Quantitative Restrictions in phased manner since April, 1996.To deal with 
the possible adverse consequences of elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, India 
has considerable flexibility for imposing higher level of tariffs with in the bound level 
on import of agricultural produce. This is evident from the import duties raised 
upward on several agricultural commodities to protect domestic producers. 
The analysis of (Agarwal, 2005) WTO commitments and July Framework 
brings out some remarkable indications, especially for developing countries. The 
blended formula for tariff reduction which was perceived as biased in favour of the 
tariff structures of its proponents enabling them to maintain the status quo; and at the 
same time, imposing an overly onerous burden of tariff reduction on developing 
countries, has been replaced with the tiered formula based on the principle of 
progressively tariff reductions through deeply cuts in higher tariffs. It is however, 
proposed in the analysis that the gaps which remain pronounced even after July 
framework on the concerned issue of tariffication should be fulfilled in further 
negotiations. 
Jugale (2004) opines that the entry of new -comers is difficult in the existing 
Tariff Rate Quotas, because, the tariff in certain sectors such as cereals, sugar and 
dairy products is still high. He adds that India is demanding substantial expansion of 
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) pending their eventual abolition and more transparent 
administration of tariff quotas. 
Munzara Manyara Angeline (2006) has found that the wide scale dumping 
in developing countries has displaced local production and caused food imports bills 
to rise, threatening the right to food and to an adequate standard of living and to life. 
As a result of tariffication and progressive reduction of tariffs stipulated in the 
Agreement on Agriculture, developing countries now have very low tariffs with 
bound rates averaging at 30-40 percent and at much lower applied rates, at 7-15 
percent in the case of the Philippines (Grip Arzeetal, 2002). Logically, he adds 
further, such low rates could not provide protection to domestic producers long 
saddled by depressed farm gate prices, spiralling cost of production and lack of access 
to scarce capital and resources. 
Sabanna Talwar (2005) seems more practical and argues that if developing 
countries like India wish to get on to vehicle of WTO, they have to adopt a sound 
strategy to convert their challenges posed by WTO commitments to opportunities for 
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them. The author suggests that and integrated strategy should be adopted by such 
economies to strengthen their agriculture sector in the new trading system. 
Nagoor (2005) observes that the denial of market access through various tariff 
and non-tariff barriers in developed countries posses a serious challenge to viability of 
agriculture of most developing countries, including India. It is, therefore, suggested 
that in order to face this and other similar challenges, India should be prepared 
enough to realise any deviation from main objective of WTO and take initiative in 
organising other developing countries for same purpose. 
Awasthi and Mishra (2004) have come up with the finding that because of 
unawareness regarding primary purpose of Agreement on Agriculture, each country 
proposed fairly high tariff rates, which intern, resulted in a dirty tariffication and in 
such a situation export of developing countries, especially, that of India got adversely 
affected. Their analysis further reveals that the nature of market access clause has 
tended to escalate the food subsidy burden of the Indian Government as well as 
aggravated the miseries of the farmers. 
Gulati and Sharma (1994) point out that the provision of market access, 
minimum access quota and additional import duty measures proposed in the 
agreement will not have any adverse effect on Indian agriculture during the 
implementation period. This is because imports of various agricultural commodities in 
India are subjected to mainly Quantitative Restrictions for balance of payment 
reasons. The special provisions of agreement allow any country to maintain import 
restrictions up to the end of the implementation period. In any case, even if India does 
not have Balance of Payment (BOP) cover, that does not mean that India will have to 
compulsorily import 3 percent of its domestic consumption. 
According to Bhattacharya (2000), in the Uruguay Round, the market access 
conditions reflected the relative bargaining strengths of the developed rather than 
developing countries. Maximum tariff reductions were given to product groups in 
which interests of developed countries were supreme. 
Chadha (2001) points out that India's unilateral decision to 'over-comply' 
with its tariff reduction commitment could perhaps be interpreted as a tactical lapse. 
In this connection, the author argues that inspite of big gap between bound rate and 
applied rate for many agriculture crops, India has to import these crops guided by 
negotiating considerations and demand constraint. Thus, Chadha's findings support 
the conclusions of Mishra (2004) Gulati (2001) and Rao (2001). Gulati brings out 
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that leaving apart some of the restrictive tariff lines, India has gone ahead unilaterally 
to reduce tariff barriers much below the bound rates of duty stipulated under Uruguay 
Round Agreement. Rao also contained that as for the protection through tariffs, India 
has already negotiated tariff binding at the level of 100 percent for raw commodities, 
300 percent for most edible oils and 150 percent for raw processed agro-commodities. 
Santos-Paulino (2002) while analysing the impact of reduction of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers on the imports of 22 selected developing countries, have found that 
domestic income and relative process are the significant factors of import growth. 
Moreover, it has been observed that import duties caused a reduction in the import 
growth, but the effect varied from one region to another under new trading regime. 
The results also show that the elimination of trade policy distortions has a strong 
positive impact on import growth. Finally, it is found that income and price 
elasticities are higher as a result of trade policy reform. 
Bhukta's (2001) study suggests that India and other developing countries 
should negotiate for more liberal environment with the rest of world, as he finds that 
inspite of its comparative advantage in many agricultural commodities, India cannot 
enjoy the fruits of this advantage because market of developed countries are highly 
protected in the sense of high to very high tariff rates of most of the agricultural crops. 
This is well supported by Mehta (2000), who added to the suggestion of Bukhta 
(2001) by saying that if India wants to restrict the import of some sensitive items of 
industrial sector like fertilisers or vehicles, an appropriate tariff rate can be imposed. 
An attempt should also be made to identify the list of these commodities and estimate 
the appropriate level of tariff rate. This was followed by a subsequent study of 
Ghuman (2001), which after analysing the challenges being faced by Indian 
agriculture in the new trading system, came to conclusion that the removal of 
Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on 825 agricultural items would certainly create a 
tough competition for Indian agriculture and allied activities. He further proposed that 
in order to cope with the onslaught of cheap foreign goods, the Government of India 
must impose tariff duties on the import for those items for which Quantitative 
Restrictions have been removed. 
Patel (2001) also raised a serious concern over considerable tariff escalation 
that existed for a number of product chains, especially, those important to developing 
countries in Asia such as crude vegetable oils, leather, fish products, which in turn 
could limit the potential for vertical diversification in to higher value added products 
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and processed agricultural products by Asian countries. 
Gupta (2001) expressed that it was our foolishness that made WTO decide to 
abolish Quantitative Restrictions, for, according to WTO provision, abolition of 
Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) is a necessary condition for free trade and this could 
be retain when balance of payment of trade is in deficit, which is experienced as a 
regular phenomenon in case of India. 
Singh Shanvan (2001) contained that globalisation process would be derailed 
if the developed countries failed to provide market access to developing countries to 
fulfil their commitments to the WTO. Globalisation could be powerful force for 
development only if it is properly managed. Globalisation should involve improving 
market access for goods and services of particular interest to developing countries; 
issues relating to the implementation of WTO agreement, including special and 
differential treatment needed to be resolved. 
The studies reviewed above are diverse in findings and most of them are 
unable to reflect the tariff binding strategy for agricultural commodities in case of 
India. A common point that may be inferred from the review of these studies is that 
the existing nature of tariffs as per WTO negotiations is causing a rise in huge import 
bills for India and other developing countries as well. 
2.5: Review of Studies Related to Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
This aspect of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) could not be neglected by the 
researchers, as it carried a lot of apprehensions and controversies associated with it. 
The most controversial rule of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) for India is the 
patenting of seeds. However, a close examination of Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights provision in respect of India's agriculture would reveal 
that even under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regime, the 
Indian farmers can use self-retained seeds for most of the crops and also collect from 
their fellow farmers and relatives. The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights system provides Indian farmers a first rate seed technology, though at a higher 
price. This will push up agricultural production of India as argued in the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) regime. These and other 
dimensions of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement have 
resulted in a number of studies to analyse its advantages and disadvantages for 
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agriculture sector in India and in other countries. Like earlier once, Studies on this 
aspect have also attempted to compare and assess the worth of Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights provision for developed and developing countries. 
In respect of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
provision for agriculture sector, an Indian study by Mukharjee and Pal (2004) 
advocates that only by better seed verities, India cannot achieve sustained agricultural 
growth. For realisation of sustainable agricultural growth, channelling vast potential 
natural resources and strengthening rural infrastructure are also required 
Watal (1997) highlights India's obligations under the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement and shows that the options before 
the country are not as stark as they seem. According to the author, it is possible for 
India to comply with the provision of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement while retaining a balance between public interest and 
private interest of the holders of Intellectual Property Rights. The immediate task 
before the Government of India is to make the acceptance of product patent 
applications in pharmaceuticals and agriculture chemicals legal and transparent and 
then begin to more comprehensive legislative exercises. 
If Chadha's (2001) view is accepted, then the impact of Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement in all pervasive and 
profound both in form and content. He describes it as more sensitive, complex and 
controversial in comparison to other agreements. 
Singh (2001) finds an opportunity for India to boost up its agriculture 
production under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
regime by up grading the existing abundant plant breeding skills coupled with the 
agro ecological diversity. This, according to the author, may be done by getting first 
rates seed technology, which will enable the country to develop a vibrant seed 
industry capable of being computable on domestic and international fronts. 
A Study by Izhar M. (2005) tries to assess the impact of the introduction of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection on developing and least developed 
countries in accordance with the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) agreement. The author addresses the question whether developing 
countries will be able to catch up with their technological development if Intellectual 
Property Rights protection is extended. Therefore, an urgent need is felt to reform 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights if developing countries want to 
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comply with the obligations imposed on them by the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights agreement. 
Singh and Nandkeoliyar (2001) point out that the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement would badly affect the economy of 
India, because it goes against the Patent Act of India 1970.Under this Patent Act, only 
the process patent are granted in food, chemicals and medicines, whereas in Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, product patents 
are granted in all these areas. Under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights agreement, methods of agriculture, horticulture and biotechnological 
processes, are all patentable. The agreement provides 20 years for a general term of 
patent but the Indian Patent Act provides for a general term of 14 years both for 
product patent as well as process patents. Thus, to meet the requirement of Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the entire Patent Act, as operative in 
India, will have to be changed. Most of the changes will be detrimental to Indian 
interests and further lead to brain drain, which would prove costly to India. 
Chakrborty's (2006) study on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) and agriculture trade of India indicates that there are more efficient 
economies in the field of agriculture. The areas where India seems to have some 
advantage are the labour intensive sectors. The growth in cereal exports is a matter of 
off- loading stocks, the costs of storing, which have become too much to bear and yet 
continue to pile up gives the high support prices. 
It has been pointed out in the analysis of Mishra (2001) that the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement deprives Indian farmers of their 
rights to produce, reproduce, modify and sell seeds. Under this agreement, farmers 
cannot use farm-seed unless they pay royalties to the patent holder. The problem is 
complicated, because, the Indian Patent Act 1970 does not recognise any form of 
Intellectual Property Rights in the area of bio-diversity. 
Anita Ramanna's (2001) study suggests that India and other developing 
countries must redefine the concept of access so as to ensure the transfer of benefit 
from commercialisation of crops back to farmers and also to ensure good health. 
Ramasamy and Balasundaram (2001), however, seem more optimistic by 
stating that Intellectual Property Rights in the area of seeds and plant will increase the 
national debt tenfold. They argue that the shift to control of agriculture through the control 
of seed will contribute to secondary impact of other natural resources like land and water. 
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To sum up, the studies on the issue of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) are numerous like Cullet (2005), Sharma (2005), Raju 
(2005), Bhattacharya (2002), Pillai (2005) and Shiva (1996) and it is not possible in 
the present work to review the whole literature on this aspect. However, most of these 
studies reveal that the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
agreement is neither completely advantageous nor disadvantageous for developing 
countries, especially in case of agriculture sector. What is urgently required is to re-
negotiate on this issue and to redefine its norms in order to make it more favourable to 
the developing and least developed countries. 
2.6: Survey of Literature on Competitiveness of Agriculture 
The discussion in the previous section leads us to examine the impact of WTO 
provisions on the competitiveness of agriculture via the earlier studies on the subject. 
This will certainly give us a clue as to where do we stand and what else is required to 
be done in the direction of strengthening the competitiveness of Indian agriculture 
under post-WTO era. 
There have been several studies to access and evaluate the competitiveness of 
agriculture since liberalisation, specially, after the establishment of WTO. Some of 
these studies concentrate exclusively on this issue, while others consider it along with 
other elements of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). 
Studies by Anderson and Tyres (1993), Subramanian (1993) and Parikh 
et.al. (1995) used macro techniques like computable general equilibrium models to 
study the effects of policy liberalisation. Anderson and Tyres predicted that Indian 
farmers, including land less rural labourers, would benefit to the tune of 1.6 billion 
and the net increases in the economic welfare would be 1.1 billion US dollars in 1985. 
They expected a net change in foreign exchange earnings to the tune of 3.3 billion 
dollars from food trade alone. According to Subramanian, India stood to gain from 
higher world prices in the long run as India also liberalised agriculture trade. 
However, the increase in the domestic food prices skewed the distribution of gains 
only in favour of large farmers. Real incomes of landless laboures and small farmers 
fell. This is contrary to what Anderson and Tyers have predicted. If true, this is an 
important result as proportion of small farmers and landless labourers is quite large in 
India. Further, Parikh et.al have reached a still different conclusion. Their study shows 
that if agriculture alone is liberalised, then terms of trade will improve for Indian 
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agriculture by about two percent, and, if both the agriculture and non-agricultural 
sectors are liberalised, then the terms of trade will improve for agriculture by 27 
percent. 
Regarding the export competitiveness of Indian agriculture, Gulati and 
Sharma (1994) have highlighted than on the average during 1987-88 to 1993-94, 
domestic prices of wheat, rice and cotton were well below the prices prevailing in the 
world market. This gives a measure of the potential increase in farm income arising 
from trade liberalisation. This lead to the conclusion that Indian agriculture is highly 
export competitive and that free trade would help the country to harness vast export 
potential. They also anticipated that implementation of Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) would result in the increase in agriculture prices and would increase export 
competitiveness of Indian agriculture. A follow up study by Nayyar and Sen (1994) 
witnessed more volatility in case of world prices as compared to Indian prices. It is 
thus, inferred from this study that dismantling trade barriers on imports would 
increase the volatility of Indian prices and farm income, whereas Gulati and Sharma 
anticipated that the variability of international price will reduce. 
Debory (1996) opined that India's exports could obtain an additional 
competitive advantage under GATT. The author concluded that the earlier estimates 
revealed a partial picture of India's trade as they were based on liberalisation in 
agriculture, textiles and clothing and the reduction on tariffs. The author, therefore, 
did not leave the hope of greater gains in future if other areas would be considered. 
The WTO agreement-specific models by GATT and Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimate that world GDP will rise 
by 230 to 275 billion US dollars and developing countries will receive 30 to 40 
percent of the global economic growth (Sharma, 1997). 
A Study by National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCEAR, 1997) 
estimates the export demand and supply elasticities to predict the effects of WTO 
agreements on agricultural exports. But it finds that domestic non-price supply 
constraints may impede agricultural exports, while the direction of the change in the 
welfare of developing countries like India, as predicted by the various economic 
studies, may be correct certainly the same cannot be said about the magnitude and 
distribution of these changes. If one takes into account some empirical and some 
theoretical considerations of India's agricultural trade and the WTO agreements, the 
gains to Indian agriculture will be severely lower than what has been anticipated. 
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Murugavelu (2005) conducted a study with a view to analyse the growth 
performance of Indian agriculture export and to identify the key determinants 
affecting it in the era of globalisation considering trade openness as the indicator of 
globalisation along with real effective exchange rate as yet another explanatory 
variable and using simple and multiple regression models. The author inferred that 
trade openness positively influenced the agriculture and manufacturing exports and it 
is found that the process of globalisation leads Indian agriculture export to a higher 
plane and provide the path for sustainable development. 
Nagoor (2005) also undertook a similar study by examining growth 
performance of India's agriculture export during 1990's and suggested some measures 
to improve its situation. The author asserts that developing countries like India must 
form an association on international front. It has been found that India is loosing its 
comparative advantage in agriculture sector, which is a key issue of concern for 
planner and policy makers. 
The Committee on Commodity Problems (1999) assessed the impact of 
Uruguay Round on agriculture commodities by comparing the longer term of trade 
with actual developments since 1995.It reached the following conclusions; 
(I) For a number of agricultural commodities, the reasonably buoyant market 
condition in 1995-97 could be partly attributed to the Uruguay Round, 
(II) The food import bills of the least developed and net food importing 
developing countries rose nearly since the early nineties due partly to the higher 
prices and partly to Uruguay Round and 
(III) There is little evidence that there has been any significant change in 
world price instability, either year to year or with in the year. 
Ravi P.C Reddy and D.M.G (1998) have examined the comparative 
advantage of selected agricultural commodities in domestic and international markets 
with particular reference to Kamataka. The export competitiveness of six important 
crops grown in Kamataka, namely, jowar and maize as food crops, groundnut and 
sunflower cotton as commercial crop and coffee as a plantation crop is examined 
using the nominal protection coefficient as measure of competitiveness. Kamataka is 
found to lack comparative advantage in most of the crops considered in the analysis, 
except cotton. The study stressed on the need for India to capitalise through 
comparative advantage in domestic market ensuring its position as a dependable long 
term supplier of quality cotton through progressive export policies. 
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Datta's (2000) study out lines India's competitiveness in rice during WTO era 
and finds that Indian rice is fairly price-competitive and has the potential together 
further competitive strength through concerted by products use, India need not worry 
on the price front nor change her position about imposition of zero import duty on 
rice. The only consideration India must have during WTO renegotiations is that her 
rice exports do not become a victim of manipulation. 
In his another study, Datta (2002) provides an excellent discussion on the 
possible factors accounting for dismal performance of the Indian economy, in general, 
and of its dominant agriculture sector, in particular, in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms with a view to evolving future strategies to reverse this pattern, 
especially, when India has joined the WTO. 
Patel (2001) observes that although escalation has been reduced generally, 
considerable tariff-escalation still exists for a number of product chains, in particular, 
those important to developing countries in Asia, such as crude vegetable oils, leather, 
fish and fish products. There has been a considerable increase in trade flows since the 
World War second. However, the share of agriculture commodities in world trade had 
progressively reduced. Relative prices of agriculture commodities along with its terms 
of trade fell sharply over the period Jenicek V (2001). Same is the view of Ghuman 
(2001) who also expresses his concern over the adverse impact on global 
competitiveness of Indian agriculture in general and Punjab agriculture in particular 
under the liberalised trade regime. The factors that he holds responsible to this 
adverse impact include comparatively low average yield of domestic agriculture, 
diminishing returns, declining global prices of primary commodities, rigid cropping 
pattern and shrinking expenditure on research and development. 
Ganesah (2001) feels that there is need for further liberalisation and reforms 
to take advantage of increasing opportunities in the international market for 
agricultural commodities in general, and rice, in particular. Constant and continuous 
efforts with a view to increase productivity of rice through a wide variety of measures 
and programmes are strongly called for. Instead of providing various forms of 
subsidies, investment in agriculture and rural development programmes, better 
technology and technical assistance, investment in infrastructure are required to 
increase to competitive strength of the India's agricultural trade. 
Studies by Chakraborty (2006), Jha (2002), Vyas (2001), Guleria (2001), 
Gulati (2001) and Bhukta (2001) also provide a useful discussion on the 
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competitiveness of India's agriculture. Most of them expressed their concerns over the 
worsening situation of the domestic agriculture in the international market and argue 
that India must increase its trade in those commodities in which it has comparative 
advantage. Moreover, Government of India should take measures to strengthen the 
supply side of the agriculture sector. This is not only in case of India but for other 
developing countries as well to reflect better performance in their agriculture sectors 
in the new liberalised regime. 
A study by Carter (2002) reveals that over the period from 1990-97, China's 
agriculture trade has expanded along comparative advantage lines in only a very 
modest way suggesting that WTO membership will have a large impact on china's 
agricultural trade patterns, who can deny the fact that the lack of infrastructure 
remains a major bottleneck in economic growth of most of the developing and least 
developed countries. 
It has been pointed out in Alagh Committee Report (Govt, of Punjab, 2003) 
that much of our competitiveness is lost due to infrastructure factors. Therefore, 
transport subsidies in the form of freight equalisation for purposes of import of raw 
materials and exports of fresh goods should be given as earlier and their would be 
considerable improvement in the export competitiveness of our major agriculture 
commodities, i.e., wheat and rice. 
Chandra and Yadav (2003) aimed at analysing the potential of India's 
agriculture export and real cost in the post WTO liberalised regime. For a careful 
examination of the situation, the study considered total as well as commodity wise 
agriculture trade with their respective prices (domestic and international) and also 
computed coefficients of protection. Authors reached the conclusion that India's agro-
export declined considerably after 1996-97 both in absolute and relative terms 
following a sharp fall in international prices. They feel a strong need for introducing 
such majors as may put a check on declining export when the international prices are 
unfavourable. 
Bhattacharya (2003) in this regard argues that the domestic price policy of 
agriculture should be consistent with liberalised regime to make Indian agriculture 
internationally more competitive. It is further advocated that there should be 
rethinking on domestic price policy in long run keeping in mind WTO mandated 
negotiations. 
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Sharma Anil (2003) reviewed the progress made in post WTO era liberalising 
agricultural trade and provided framework with in which the future agenda for trade 
reforms ought to be prepared and implemented. The study called for a more holistic 
approach towards managing change and create adjustment mechanism to deal with the 
transition process, otherwise, developing countries may be adversely affected in the 
new trading environment. As remarked by Passah (2004) their competitiveness would 
be reduced and the growth process as a whole would be hampered. 
As pointed out by Kumar Mandal (2004), developing countries like India 
need to improve their competitiveness by increased productivity, which requires large 
investment in rural infrastructure, in agriculture research and in bio-technology and 
creation of institutional arrangements for percolating benefits of research to all the 
cultivators including the small farmers. We should take all possible efforts to protect 
our vital interests along with like-minded countries (Mishra R.S 2004). 
Studies by Hasan Masood (2004), V.Radja Ramane et.al (2004), Salam 
M.et.al (2004), Nanda and Rakhi (2004), Pal and Govind (2004), Singh Bishwa-
Nath (2004), Beohar Bipin (2004), Renuka and Nagesh (2004), Perumalsamy and 
asimani (2004) Perumalsamy and asimani (2004), Shrivastav (2004), Kaushik 
et.al (2006) and Jugale (2004) have also focussed on the competitiveness of 
agriculture of India and other developing countries by analysing time series and cross-
sectional trends in aggregate export and import as well as commodity wise trade in 
agriculture sector. Measures such as time trend analysis, protection coefficient, index 
number, arithmetic mean, coefficient of variation, etc have been used along with 
diagrammatic representation, (where-ever necessary) for a comprehensive analysis. 
These studies agree at the point that the agriculture export of India has not grown at 
the pace at which it was expected to grow in the post WTO period. It is, therefore, 
emphasised unanimously by these authors that India should utilise properly its main 
power resources and should increase the investment in infrastructure such as power, 
irrigation, fertilisers, etc in order to strengthen its base. A need is felt to change the 
rural mindset of the farmers to provoke them to produce those products which are 
commercially feasible and await their demand in the international market in 
commodity wise analysis, marine products, oil meals, cashew and basmati rice 
emerged as the major exporting commodities from India, whereas sugar and edible 
oils have been the major importing items to India. It has also been found that domestic 
prices of most of the agricultural commodities have been higher than the international 
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prices. It is therefore, suggested that Centre and States should join hand in hand to 
find new ways and possibiUties to increase the productivity in agriculture sector at 
reduced cost. 
A study conducted by FAO (2004) made an attempt to analyse world 
agricultural market situation with respect to commodity prices, food import bills and 
international prices of food import for developing countries, etc. The study outlined 
changing pattern of agricultural trade with particular attention to their implications for 
commodity dependent farmers and countries in the developing world. Commenting on 
the challenges in Indian agriculture sector due to the United States mediated 
globalisation and the challenge to the institutionalisation of monopolism represented 
by the World Trade Organisation. 
Tiwari (106) also suggests some feasible short term and long term measures 
(as do Kumar et.al., 2002) that are needed to reform the concerned sector. A 
subsequent study for Russia indicates that Russia has comparative advantage in 
producing grain compared to meat but also a comparative advantage in producing 
agricultural inputs compared to agriculture outputs (Liefert et. al., 2003). 
A recent study by Aggarwal (2005) concludes that the July framework has 
provided a road map to be followed by both developed and developing countries in 
order to make their agriculture sector domestically as well as internationally 
competitive. The author however, points towards the loopholes of the framework 
agreement, which have to be dealt with in further rounds of negotiations. 
Naik (2005) also expresses the similar opinion and finds that the developed 
countries provide nearly 90 percent of both domestic support and export subsidy to 
agriculture. However, the indications are that these subsidies are unlikely to be 
withdrawn in the near future. 
From the forgone discussion it may safely be concluded that India's 
international competitiveness in agriculture sector is adversely affected in absolute as 
well as in relative terms, especially during post WTO era. In this respect, the whole 
developing world is far behind the developed world and the former needs assistance 
to catch up the latter. Developing countries should form an association so as to get a 
better plat-form on the international front to voice about their problems and 
difficulties in various rounds of negotiations. 
In this connection, a recent study Chaisse and Chakrborty (2005) present a 
comparative analysis of India and china, already on the track of mutual collaborations 
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on several grounds and since 2003, the two countries have jointly communicated 
fifteen proposals to WTO secretariat in association with other developing countries. 
Since, WTO commitments are found to be trade distorting. So, it is highly desirable to 
bring about a change in existing trade provisions of WTO on domestic as well as 
international fronts. On international front all developing countries must unanimously 
raise the concern against rising export subsidies by the developed countries, which 
should be wiped out with immediate effect. On domestic front, developing countries 
like India have to utilise their existing resources, which are comparatively cheaper in 
the international market and have to increase investment in agriculture to enhance the 
production and to control the rising prices of agricultural commodities. 
The studies reviewed in this chapter indicate that various provisions of 
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) have been directed in the manner so as to favour 
more the developed world than the developing world. It is an agreed fact that all 
provisions may not be beneficial at a time for each country, therefore, it is advocated 
that each country should work so as to transform the challenges posed by these 
provisions in to the opportunities'. It is in this context that the present study is 
designed. In this study, an attempt shall be made to identify the possibilities and 
explore them so as to strengthen the agriculture sector to cope with the WTO 
challenges. 
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Chapter 3 
Domestic Support to Agriculture 
3.1: Introduction 
In most developing agrarian countries, agriculture is a way of life. Rapid 
growth of agriculture is necessary for ensuring household food security and 
alleviation of poverty. Agriculture still contributes significantly to their overall Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and employs a large proportion of the workforce in 
developing countries. The land holdings are however, very small, unirrigated and 
dependent on the vagaries of nature. Further, the agricultural practices are labour 
intensive with relatively low intensity of farm inputs. Consequently, the farm 
productivity in developing countries is low. As most farmers in countries like India 
are engaged in subsistance farming, their participation in international trade is very 
low. The food needs and a supply gap in developing countries is a developmental 
problem and thus, all their policies for agricultural development aimed at bearing the 
potential for increasing productivity and production in the agriculture sector. 
Agricultural growth helps in increasing wages, lowering food prices, 
increasing demand for consumer and intermediate goods and services, facilitating 
development of agribusiness, increasing returns to labour and capital and improving 
the overall allocative efficiency of factor markets. Increasing agricultural growth in 
developing countries requires integration with the world economy, provided the world 
market prices are not distorted (Focus WTO, 2006a). 
In developing countries, agriculture is the main source of livelihood. Hence, it 
is expected that developing countries heavily subsidise agriculture, to promote 
farmers interest and protect them from competition from developed countries that can 
produce at a lower cost, using modern technologies and more efficient means of 
cultivation. (Focus WTO, 2006 b). 
Broadly speaking, there are three ways of subsidising farmers through 
government intervention; 
(I) There are some sets of domestic and external policies so that domestic 
cultivators receive higher prices for their outputs than would have been 
possible, where trade to become completely free. This can be done through 
domestic price support policies, tariffs, quotas, export enhancement 
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programmes, price stabilisation measures, import licensing and 
canalisation, 
(II) By providing inputs at prices below cost of supply to farmers or at prices 
that are lower than prices charged from other consumers of the same 
product, farmers can be subsidised. Examples are subsidies in electricity, 
credit, fertilisers, transport and irrigation, farm fuel tax exemption, 
livestock feed and crop insurance and 
(III) The other method of subsidisation is through direct cash payments to 
cultivators (Debroy, 2000). 
It is the world's richest and most developed countries that subsidise 
agriculture the most. Under certain circumstances, such a practice may give 
disadvantage to the industry and trade of another countries. The amount of 
agricultural subsidies totally provided every year by OECD countries like Australia, 
Canada, European Union countries and the USA is estimated to be between 
$280billion and $300 billion. This amount is roughly 6 times the total development 
aid provided by these countries. US subsidies to its cotton growers alone are three 
times of its foreign aid to Africa (Focus WTO, 2006b). 
One of the most important objectives of World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreement on Agriculture has been removal of trade distortion resulting from 
different levels of input subsidies, price and market support, export subsidy and other 
kinds of trade distorting supports across countries (Chand and Phillip, 2001). 
The basic cause of distortion of international trade in agriculture has been the 
high domestic subsidies given by the developed countries to their agricultural sector 
over many years. It is well recorded that these subsidies have seriously affected more 
efficient producers of agricultural commodities from exploiting their true potential in 
agricultural production and its dumping in international markets as well as import 
restrictions to keep out foreign agricultural products from their domestic markets 
(India and WTO, 1999). 
The actual hurdle in freeing agricultural trade is the issue of subsidisation. 
Hence, for the establishment of fair agricultural trade regime, the starting point had to 
be the reduction of domestic production subsidies given by the developed countries, 
reduction in the volume of subsidised exports and minimum market access 
opportunities for agricultural producers worldwide. Therefore, under the Agreement 
on Agriculture, one of the most sensitive topics for reform was that of subsidies. 
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A numbers of different types of subsidies are provided to agriculture by WTO 
member countries, with varied impact on trade. In some countries extensive use of 
production related subsidies, such as price support, leads to significant surplus in 
production. Exporting this excess production requires export subsidy. Subsidised 
production reduced the imports and also led to more subsidies distorting international 
trade. Subsidies were grouped into boxes using the traffic signal approach depending 
on the extent of distortion in trade. Export subsidies, prohibited for industrial 
products, were treated separately and therefore the Red Box disappeared (Naik, 2005). 
• An Amber Box—one category of subsidies that has been subjected to the 
reduction commitments. In other words, use of these subsidies will have to be 
reduced over time. 
• Blue and Green Box— t^he two other categories were exempted from any 
reduction. 
3.1.1: Amber Box 
All domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade 
(with some exceptions) fall into the Amber Box, which is defined in Article 6 of the 
Agreement of Agriculture, as all domestic supports, except those in the Blue and 
Green Boxes. These include measures to support prices, or subsidies directly related 
to production quantities. 
Amber Box subsidies, expressed in terms of Aggregate Measurement of 
Support, include both product specific and non-product specific subsidies. Aggregate 
Measurement of Support consists of subsidies provided over and above the 'de 
minimis' level of 5 percent for developed countries and 10 percent for developing 
countries of the total value of agricultural production. 30 WTO members that had 
larger subsidies than the de -minimis level at the beginning of the post Uruguay 
Round reform period are committed to reduce these subsidies. 
Reduction commitments on Amber Box policies apply to total agricultural 
support and are not related to any specific agricultural sector. Therefore, without 
changing total support for agriculture, government can reduce support in one sector 
and increase it in another (Gorter et.al., 2005). 
The reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a 'total aggregate 
measurement of support' which includes all supports for specified products together 
with supports that are not for specific products, in one single figure. In the current 
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negotiations, various proposals deal with how much these subsidies should be reduced 
further and whether limits should be set for specific products rather than continuing 
with the single over all 'aggregate' limits. Aggregate Measurement of support is 
defined in Article 1 and Annexes III and IV in the Agreement on Agriculture. 
The conflation of domestic support can be best summarised by the formula; 
Double counting = MPSofndai = (Pdomdai - Pwbase)* Qt 
Where the gap in the official and base prices are not necessarily equal to the actual 
domestic and world market prices respectively. If there is no difference between 
actual and formula prices, then the gap measured is actual border protection and so is 
'double counted, when measured in the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). 
The official AMS is given by: 
AMSofficiaP Double counting + Flashing amber 
Where 'flashing amber' is defined as that trade distorting domestic support not 
captured in the gap between domestic and world market prices. Double ccounting 
occurs because border support (tariff quotas and export subsidies) is conflated with 
the AMS because Pdofficial, Pdactual and PWactual are in themselves affected by 
border support (Gorter and Ingco, 2002). 
Flashing amber is the sum of output and input price subsidies. 
Flasing amber =OPS + IPS =AMSactuai 
Pure double counting occurs when MPSacwai = MPSofnciai but over /under counting 
occurs when MPSacmai diverges from MPSomciai 
3.1.2: Blue Box 
This is the 'Amber Box with conditions', conditions designed to reduce 
distortion. Or the first categories of subsidies that are exempt from the reduction 
commitments are those that are provided in Article 6.5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, so called 'Blue Box measures'. 
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The Blue Box measures refer to direct payments to producers like decoupled 
income support; payments not linked to production, structural adjustment assistance 
provided through investment aids to compensate for the structural disadvantage, 
structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programmes, 
through producer retirement programmes, government financial participation in 
income insurance and income safety net programmes. These shall relate solely to 
income and not to either the level of production or to prices (domestic or 
international) (Gulati et.al., 1999). 
Depending on how the program is designed and implemented. Blue Box 
support can be trade distorting. 'Blue Box measures' include programmes that are 
'production limiting'. Support for production limiting programmes has been exempted 
from being treated under AMS to encourage countries to produce less and avoid 
creating conditions of the glut in the market. This provision was included to address 
one of the main concerns that found expression in the negotiating mandate of 
Uruguay Round. The instability in agricultural prices arisis out of over production. 
One of the prominent examples is the deficiency payment programmes followed by 
the US in which farmers were compensated by the government if prices of specific 
commodities fell below a specified threshold (Dhar, 2001). 
At present, there are no limits on spending on Blue Box subsidies. In the 
current negotiations, some countries want to keep the Blue Box, as it is because they 
view it as a crucial means of moving away from distorting Amber Box subsidies 
without causing too much hardship. Others wanted to set limits or reduction 
commitments, some advocating moving these supports into the Amber Box 
(http:www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/agric-e/agric-e.htm). 
3.1.3: Green Box 
The third category of domestic support includes those that are exempt from 
reduction commitments are included in Annex II of Agreement on Agriculture. For 
identifying the Green Box measures, two sets of criteria have been laid down; 
(I) First, these measures have to be ones that have 'no or [have] at most minimal, 
trade distorting effects or effect on production' and 
(II) The second set of criteria laid down specifies that; 
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(a) The support in question should be provided through a publicly-funded government 
programme (including government revenue forgone) not involving transfers from 
consumers and 
(b) The support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers (Dhar, 2001). 
The Green Box measures essentially involve measures of the nature of funding for 
research, pest and disease control, training services, extention and advisory 
services,etc, payments under environment programmes, payments under regional 
assistance programmes limited to producers in disadvantaged regions, payments made 
(either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop insurance 
schemes) for relief from natural disasters (Chkraborty, 2001). The detail of Green Box 
constituents is furnished in Appendix Box A.3.1. 
They tend to be programmes that are not targeted at particular products, and 
include direct income supports for farmers that are not related to current production 
levels or prices. 'Green Box' subsidies are, therefore, allowed without limits, 
provided they comply with the policy-specific criteria set out in Annex-II. 
It is thus clear from the above discussion that the most controversial measures 
of domestic support among the Annex-II is 'decoupled income support', which shall 
be determined by clearly-defined criteria, such as income, status as a producer or land 
owner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base period. The logic 
behind inclusion of the decoupled income support in the exempt categories of 
subsidies has been that since direct payments are based on a past, fixed base period, 
the producers cannot affect the size of the payment through current behavior and their 
current production will only be based on market considerations. 
In the current negotiations, developing countries argue that some of subsidies 
listed in Annex II might not meet the criteria of the Annex's first paragraph. Because 
of the large amounts paid, or because of the nature of these subsidies, the trade 
distortion they cause might be more than minima. Among the subsidies under 
discussion here are; direct payments to producers (paragraph 5), including decoupled 
income support (paragraph 6), government financial support for income insurance and 
income safety - net programmes (paragraph 7) and other paragraphs. On the contrary, 
developing countries take the opposite view that the current criteria are adequate, and 
might even need to be made more fiexible to take better account of non trade concerns 
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such as environmental protection and animal welfare 
(http:/www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/agric-e/agric-e.htm). 
The 'de coupled' support and other supports under paras 5, 6, and 7of Annex 
II (Green Box) and the production-limiting subsidies under Article 6.5 (Blue Box) of 
Agreement on Agriculture are not as minimally trade distorting on account of the 
following reasons; 
(I) The ability of the farmers to take risk as well as to make farm investments 
substantially increases if support in the form of assured payments including de-
coupled income support is provided, 
(II) These direct payments encourage greater use of farm inputs and enhance access to 
technology leading to over production, which in turn distorts agricultural markets, 
(III) De-coupled or direct payments can be a powerful incentive to maintain or Increase 
production in the expectation of receiving higher levels of future support, 
(IV) De-coupled payments have been found to increase land values resulting in 
maintenance of land in farming rather than putting it to some other economically 
better use and 
(V) Direct payments heavily subsidies the cost of production, which enables the 
receivers of such support to capture a substantial share in the markets at the cost of 
more efficient producers (Focus WTO, 2006a). 
3.1.4: Box Shifting 
The developed countries have been trying to adjust their subsidies in those 
boxes where reduction commitments least affect the support of protectionist 
agriculture policies, while at the same time they have fulfilled their WTO subsidy 
reduction commitments. Consequently, the subsidy at best has been changing colours 
with contributing much towards the intended gains from agricultural trade 
liberalisation (World Trade Development Report, 2003). 
There is a growing consensus among economists that many Blue Box and 
some of the Green Box measures indeed, have trade distorting effects, and by 
providing exemptions to these types of subsidies, the agreement has allowed 
distortions in agricultural trade to continue. India, in its proposal to the WTO 
(G/AG/NG/W/I02), has categorically pointed out that Blue and Green Box subsidies 
are not as minimally trade distorting as is made out, on account of the following 
reasons; 
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(I) The ability of the farmers to take risk as well as to make farm investments 
substantially increase, if support in the form of assured payments including 
decoupled income support is provided, since such payments entail insurance and 
wealth effects, 
(II) These direct payments encourage greater use of farm inputs and enhance access to 
technology leading to over-production, which in turn distort agricultural markets, 
(III) Decoupled or direct payments can be powerful incentive to maintain or increase 
current production in the expectation of receiving higher level of future support, 
(IV) Decoupled or direct payments have been found to increase land values resulting in 
maintenance of land in farming rather than putting it to some other economically 
better use and 
(V) Decoupled payments heavily subsidise the cost of production, which enables the 
receivers of such support to capture a substantial share in the exports markets at the 
cost of more efficient producers'. 
Given the continuation of very high levels of domestic subsidies in developed 
countries, it is not surprising that some of the chronic problems of international 
agricultural trade like secular decline in and high volatility of commodity prices 
continue unabated even after the Uruguay Round and failure of the Agreement on 
Agreement to reduce domestic farm subsidies becomes even more stark. 
It is often proposed that Green Box measures alone should be exempt from 
reduction commitments. The Blue Box measures, on the other hand, ought to be 
included in the calculations of Aggregate Measurement of Support and subject to 
reduction commitments. 
3.1.5: The Commitments 
The Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) quantifies the different 
categories of support that come under the Amber Box for the period 1986 to 1988. 
They are then subject to reductions. The reduction commitments of AMS vary across 
countries. According to rules developed countries, which do not subsidies their 
agriculture much, have been allowed to retain subsidies up to 5 percent of their value 
of agricultural output. In case of developing countries, the maximum permissible limit 
of subsidies is 10 percent. This is keeping with the Special and Differential Treatment 
that these countries have enjoyed in GATT/WTO multilateral regime. 
59 
Countries that heavily subsidised their agriculture have been treated 
differently. They would not be subject to any upper limits, but are only expected to 
bring down their subsidies by 20 percent in 6 years. This reductions commitment, for 
developing has been put at a lower level of 13.3 or 2/3 of the amount by which 
developed countries are committed to decrease their support. The least developed 
countries have no commitment to undertake reductions. 
It is not difficult to see the obvious advantage that the high countries, which 
include the majority of developed countries, can have in the WTO enforced discipline 
in the agricultural sector. They have to decrease their subsidies by 20 percent, in other 
words, they can retain 80 percent of the existing subsidies, while the developing 
countries, most of which have not been subsidising their agriculture to the extent that 
the industrialised countries have been involved in, can subsidise their farmers no more 
than 10 percent. 
Countries may therefore, retain their support programmes, but with in the 
authorised limit. However, a country cannot introduce a production support 
programme if it did not have one during the base period (1986-1988). This restriction 
created disequilibrium between developed and developing countries since the latter 
had already reduced or even removed their domestic support under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAPs). 
3.1.6:'De-Minimis Provision' and the Special and Differential 
Treatment 
'De- minimis' provision makes it possible to avoid reduction commitments if the 
value of the support for a given product is lower than 5 percent of the total production 
value of this product (10 percent for developing countries), or if the value of non-
product specific support is lower than 5 percent of the value of the country's total 
agricultural production (10 percent for developing countries). 
Before the final agreement of GATT (GATT 1994) came into being, i.e., 
before the WTO agreements came into effect, developing countries used to give 
subsidies to their industries without much rigidity and regulation. Subsidy was used as 
an important tool to diversify and develop their production and export. In fact, 
subsidy was considered quite necessary to mitigate the handicaps that stood in the 
way of their production and trade, which was still inadequate to compete in the world 
market. 
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The Uruguay Round agreement on subsidies has severely curtailed the 
developing countries, preference to use subsidies. However, the agreement on subsidy 
still contains some special provisions for these developing countries under the Special 
and Differential Treatment. The final agreement thus, prescribes that the least 
developed countries (LDCs) and other developing countries with the GNP per capita 
less than US $1,000 per annum are exempt from the prohibition of export subsidy. 
Until they reach the level of export competitiveness (Singh, 2005). 
There is a special exemption in favour of developing countries. "In accordance 
with the mid term review agreement that government measures of assistance, whether 
direct or in direct, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part 
of the development programmes of developing countries and investment subsidies, 
are generally available to low income or resource- poor producers in developing 
countries. Members shall be exempt from domestic support reduction commitments 
that would otherwise be applicable to such measures, as shall domestic support to 
producers in developing country, members to encourage diversification from growing 
illicit narcotic crops" (Article 6.2)(Debroy, 2000). 
3.1.7: Product Coverage 
The agreement defines agricultural products with reference to the harmonised 
system of product classification. The definition covers not only basic agricultural 
products such as wheat, bread, butter, other dairy products and meat as well as all 
processed wines, spirits and tobacco products, fibers such as cotton, wool and silk and 
raw animal skins designed for leather production. Fish products are not included nor 
are forestry products. 
3.1.8: Implementation Period 
The implementation period for the country-specific commitments is the six 
years' period commencing in 1995. However, developing countries have the 
flexibility to implement their reduction and other specific commitments over a period 
of up to 10 years. Members had the choice of implementing their concessions and 
commitments on the basis of calender, marketing (crop) or fiscal years A WTO 
member's implementation year for tariff reduction may thus, differ from the one 
applied to export subsidy reductions. For the purpose of the 'peace clause' the 
implementation period is the 9-years' period commencing from 1995. 
3.1.9: The 'Due- Restraint' or Peace Clause 
The Agreement on Agriculture contains a 'due restraint' or 'peace clause' 
(Article 13), which regulates the application of other WTO agreements on subsidies in 
respect of agricultural products (Details are given in Appendix Box A.3.2). The 
Article provides that Green Box domestic support measures cannot be the subject of 
countervailing duty action or other subsidy action under the WTO Agreement on 
subsidies and countervailing measures, nor can they be subject to actions based on 
nullification or impairment of tariff concessions under the GATT. Other domestic 
measures which are in conformity with the provisions of the AOA, may be the subject 
to countervailing duty actions, but due restraint is to be exercised by members in 
initiating such investigations. Further, in so far as the support provided to individual 
products does not exceed that decided in the 1992 marketing year, these measures are 
exempt from other subsidy action or nullification or impairment action. Export 
subsidies conforming to the Agreement on Agriculture are subject to countervailing 
actions, but here also due restraint is to be exercised by members in initiating such 
investigations. The peace clause remains in the effect for a period of 9 years from 
1995, i.e., the entry into force of the WTO agreement. 
3.2: Methodological Issues in Domestic Support 
In the Agreement on Agriculture, the impact of price support and related 
policies is captured through a major known as Aggregate Measurement of Support. 
The Aggregate Measurement of Support is the subsidy tags, net of direct taxes or 
levies provided to producers expressed as a percentage of market value of total output 
of each commodity. 
AMS=[Qd(Pd-Pb)-Af]/Qd*Pd) 
Where, 
Qd = quantity produced of a particular commodity, 
Pd =domestic price of the same commodity for which the 
market support/tax is being calculated, 
Pb = border price of the same commodity for which the market 
support/tax is being calculated and 
Af =associated fees or levies charged on that particular 
commodity. 
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This measure of support is a variant of producer subsidy equivalent, which estimates 
the value of transfers from government policies to producers of a given commodity. 
PSE = [Qd (Pd-Pb) +D+l]/Qd*Pd+D) 
Where, 
D and I are the direct payments and the indirect transfers through inputs 
subsidies, marketing assistance, research and infrastructure support and other income 
support programmes, etc. 
The difference between the two measures of support (AMS and PSE) is that in 
Producer Support Estimate direct payments and inputs subsidies for each commodity 
are included, while calculating total support that a particular commodity gets. In the 
Aggregate Measurement of Support only subsidy tax provided through price support 
and direct taxes is taken into account. Since, crop specific allocation of input 
subsidies is difficult, therefore, these are put into one non- product specific Aggregate 
Measurement of Support, which measures total indirect support for the agricultural 
sector. Like wise, for those commodities, for which AMS calculation is difficult, an 
Equivalent Measure of Support has to be calculated and included in the calculation of 
total Aggregate Measurement of Support for the entire agricultural sector. 
Thus, there are two main differences between Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) and Producer Support Estimate (PSE); 
(I) Producer Support Estimate is a measure of all transfers resulting from agricultural 
policies, whereas AMS includes only those payments that are production and trade 
distorting and 
(II) Producer Support Estimate is based on the difference between domestic price and 
current external reference [rice. In the case of AMS, the current Aggregate 
Measurement of Support is calculated as the difference between domestic price 
and fixed external reference price (triennium ending (TE) 1988-89) (Sharma, 
2000). 
The extent of subsidisation in a country is generally measured through 
Aggregate Measurement of Support. According to the GATT Agreement on 
Agriculture, domestic support is to be measured in terms of total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support. This means the sum of all the domestic annual level of 
support, expressed in monetary terms, provided in favour of agriculture. The AMS 
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could be calculated separately both for product specific and non-product specific 
categories. The product specific Aggregate Measurement of Support is calculated for 
a particular crop receiving market price support, non-exempt direct payments, or any 
other subsidy that is not exempted from the reduction commitment, under the 
Agreement on Agriculture. On the other hand, non-product specific Aggregate 
Measurement of Support is calculated using non -exempt direct payments that are not 
based on price differential and are generally estimated using budgetary expenditures. 
Therefore, 
Total AMS = Product Specific AMS + Non-Product Specific AMS + Equivalent 
Measurement of Support 
3.2.1: Product Specific Aggregate Measurement of Support 
All support measures directed at producers of various agricultural products 
and provided on a product by product (like rice, wheat, cotton, etc.) basis constitutes 
the product specific Aggregate Measurement of Support. Minimum Procurement price 
support, area and/or production and cattle head limiting programmes, support 
extended to the processors of basic agricultural commodities, are some of such 
products specific support measures extended in various forms by different countries to 
their agricultural sector. These support measures fall under three broad categories; 
market price support, on exempt direct payment and other product specific support. 
3.2.2: Market Price Support 
Market price support refers to the support extended by the government to 
agricultural producers through providing some minimum floor to market prices of 
agricultural products. It is required to be measured on product by product basis as the 
gap between 'applied administered price' and reference prices times the quantity of 
that product eligible to receive market support minus fees/levis paid by producers on 
that product, i.e., (Gulati and Sharma, 1994). 
Market Price Support = (Applied Administered - Fixed Reference Price) x 
(Quantity Eligible to Receive Support) - (Associated Fees/Levies) 
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The reference price id per unit fob (export) price for the product concerned for 
the 'net exporting' and cif (import) price for the 'net importing' country. The applied 
administered price is the actual floor price and the quantity eligible to receive support 
is the marketable surplus of that product. The reference price shall be based on the 
year 1986-87to 1988-89. 
3.2.3: Non-Exempt Direct Support 
There are two types of product specific direct payments made by countries to 
their agricultural producers. These are 
(I) Payments dependent on a price gap and 
(II) Other than price dependent payments 
However, a number of non price dependent payments like direct payments 
made under production limiting programmes based on fixed area and yield, and on 
production up to 85 percent of base level production of a product, cattle limiting 
programmes, etc; are exempted under the WTO Agreement on AMS. Non exempt 
direct support component of the product specific support composes of all non exempt 
price dependent or non price dependent supports, where in direct payments are 
measured on product by product basis (and then aggregate). 
Non-exempt direct payments are to be calculated by using the gap between 
external reference price and administered price or by using budgetary outlays. Input 
subsidies and other policies like marketing cost reduction measures are to be 
determined by using budgetary outlays. However, if budgetary outlays do not reflect 
the full extent of subsidy, the subsidy has to be worked out by using the gap between 
the subsidised price of input in question and a representative market price multiplied 
by the quantity used of that input (Gulati et.al., 1999). 
3.2.4: Other Non- Exempt Product Specific Support 
All support, other than market price and direct payments, provided on product-
by-product basis are not exempted from Aggregate Measurement of Support. These 
are required to be measured for each basic product. When taken together, these 
constitute the 'other non exempt product specific support' component of product 
specific support. This is required to be measured by using budgetary outlays or as the 
price gap times the quantity of goods or services in quesfion. 
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3.2,5: Non-Product Specific Support 
The other component of AMS is non-product specific Aggregate Measure of 
Support. It includes non-exempt direct payments that are not based on the domestic 
reference price differential, and are estimated using budgetary outlays. If these do not 
reflect the full extent of subsidy, an alternative estimate can be used, typically using 
the gap between price of the subsidised goods or services and a representative market 
price multiplied by the quantity of the good or services. 
3.2.6: Equivalent Measurement of Support 
Equivalent measurement of support shall be estimated for all those agricultural 
products receiving market price support but for which calculation of AMS is not 
practicable as per already described methodology (of price gap time's quantity 
eligible to receive support). 'Equivalent measurement of support means the annual 
level of support expressed in monetary terms, provided to producers of a basic 
agricultural product through the application of one or more measures, the calculation 
of which, in accordance with the Aggregate Measurement of Support methodology, is 
impracticable'. [(Article 1(d)]. 
3.3: Problems in the Computation of Aggregate Measurement of 
Support 
Following ambiguities are observed while estimating Aggregate Measurement 
of Support; 
(I) The legal text of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) suggests that the year of fixed 
reference price is to be taken as 1986-88. It seems economically illogical 
especially during the Post WTO regime when world prices have gone up more 
sharply specially during 1995-97 compared to 1986-88 period. Due to very low 
world prices in 1986-88, Aggregate Measurement of Support turned out to be 
quite high for that period. This again poses a question on the reduction 
commitments of Aggregate Measurement of Support by 20 percent by developed 
countries in 6 years, because the sharp increase in world prices during the mid 
1990's makes it nonsense. This process is termed as 'dirty AMSiffication'. 
Obviously, the estimates of AMS would differ depending upon whether one uses a 
fixed (1986-88) external reference price or varying reference price, 
(II) The nature of exchange rate adopted by a country also influences the calculation 
of Aggregate Measurement of Support. For example, in countries like India, fixed 
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exchange rate regime was followed during 1986-88 and the official exchange rate 
was about 15 to 20 percent below the 'free exchange rate'. But fixed exchange 
rate was abandoned in the liberalised regime and a system of flexible exchange 
rate is in practice. This leads in correct estimation of AMS in most of the 
developing countries including India, 
(III) Furthermore, the legal text of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) is ambiguous 
regarding the use of fixed external reference price. It states that cif should be used 
by net importing countries whereas fob should be used by net exporting countries. 
The question arises as to what indicator of fixed external reference price should 
continue to be used by the country, which was net importer in 1986-88, but has 
become net exporter after 1995. Further, if one of cif or fob indicator is used, then 
it should be used on what base year (1986-88 or some other year)? Moreover, the 
assumption of price taken for a country which is large does not seem justifiable, 
(IV) It has been described earlier that in the calculation of Aggregate Measurement 
of Support, the difference between external reference price and domestic support 
price is multiplied by the 'Quantity of production eligible for support'. But the 
problem in using this concept is commonly observed in developing countries 
where a large part of the production is used for domestic consumption. The 
dilemma is that whether total production of a commodity should be taken into 
account as the relevant quantity or the marketed surplus or the quantity actually 
purchased by the government agency at the support price, 
(V)In case of non-product specific support, say for fertilisers, the issue is: should one 
use the budgetary support under the title 'Fertiliser subsidy' or estimate it as the 
difference between external reference price (fixed or variable) and domestic price 
paid by the farmers? . This is important in India as almost half the fertiliser 
subsidy shown in the budget is given to fertiliser companies ( on flat rate basis or 
through retention price scheme) to cover their high costs or production compare to 
the import parity prices ( Gulati , 1999). Is the farmer being subsidised, or the 
fertiliser industry? Similar problem arises in case of estimating non-product 
specific support through power supplies to agriculture, canal irrigation and rural 
credit. In case of power, for example, it is well known that consumption figures 
for agriculture sector are worked out on 'residual basis', and that over estimation 
of real consumption is found by a wide margin in these government estimates, any 
where from 20 percent to 80percent, depending upon the State. In case of canal 
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irrigation, should one take the difference between only the Opportunity and 
Marginal (O&M) costs and recoveries, or also include amortised capital costs on 
the cost side? In case of rural credit, should one take only the concession in the 
interest rates as the relevant subsidy, or also include the likely bad debts? Even if 
on theory, one comes to an agreement on these issues, it is difficult to obtain 
accurate information on many of these in developing countries. So, the estimates 
of Aggregate Measurement of Support can vary widely depending upon what 
definition of non-product specific support one uses. The text of Agreement on 
Agriculture seems to suggest, using budgetary figures, but given the distortions in 
pricing, it may not be very correct on pure economic grounds 
(VI) Finally, the AOA (Article-VI, Para II) allows for exempfion of support 
(investment subsidies as well as agricultural input subsidies) that are generally 
given to 'low income or resource poor producers' in developing countries to 
encourage agricultural and rural development programmes. It clearly states that 
the 'domestic support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required 
to be included in a member's calculation of its current Total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support'. This exemption clause raises a question: who is a 'low 
income and resource poor producer'? In a country like India, can one say a farmer 
cultivating less than 10 hectares or 4 hectares or 2 hectares is a resource poor 
producer? 
3.4: Domestic Support to Indian Agriculture 
The developing countries account for only 10 percent of the domestic support 
payment. The major users of domestic support among the developing countries are 
Brazil, Thailand, South Africa, Israel and Colombia. The least developing countries 
share is almost negligible in the total domestic support. 
Over the issue of subsidisation, India did not raise concern until recently. This was not 
because India had vested interests in not raising the issue due to its own agricultural 
support programmes. On the contrary, historically, overall support to agriculture in 
India has been negative since the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
(Chakraborty and Singh, 2006). 
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3.4.1: Trends in India's Domestic Support During 2005-06 
Using the methodology for calculating Aggregate Measurement of Support (as 
mentioned in the previous section), we have computed product specific support for six 
crops whose minimum support price and import reference price were easily available 
or/obtainable. These crops include wheat, rice, cotton, sugar, jute and groundnuts. The 
trends in product specific support of these crops are shown in Appendix Tables from 
A.3.1toA.3.6. 
It can be seen from these tables that the total subsidy and hence, the extent of 
support for each crop are negative for the entire period under study. For wheat, rice 
and groundnuts, total subsidy as well as the extent of support is positive only in the 
year 2003-04, for which strong reasons could not be identified. But for other three 
crops, no positive figure either for total subsidy or of extent of support exists in any 
year of the study period. The negative subsidy and extent of support for all crops in 
almost all the years are the result of higher import reference price (export price only 
for groundnuts) in comparison to minimum support price. Furthermore, it can also be 
observed that whereas minimum support price for all the crops witnessed a continuous 
increase (not necessarily at the same rate), sharp fluctuations are exhibited in 
import/export or cif/fob price over the study period. 
On the basis of product specific support computed for each crop, we have 
estimated product specific Aggregate Measurement of Support and its share in the 
value of crops. The results are reported in Appendix Table A.3.7. As is evident from 
this table, total Aggregate Measurement of Support is negative in all the years of the 
study period and reveals no systematic pattern of change. It was the lowest in negative 
at Rs 654948.45 in the year 2003-04. As a percent of the value of crops, it ranged in 
negative from Rs 260.70 to Rs 2073.38. 
As far as non- product specific support is concerned, at the time of 
compilation of the data subsidies on only four agricultural inputs were available, 
namely, fertilisers'"subsidy, irrigation subsidy, electricity and other subsidies given to 
marginal farmers and farmers' co-operative societies in the form of seeds, 
development of oilseeds, pulses, etc. Data on credit subsidy, which were desirable for 
the present study, were not available for all India. The results of these subsidies are 
furnished in Appendix Table A.3.8. Moreover, all support measures related with 
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investment, both on and off farm, provision of infrastructure services, etc are to be 
excluded from the measure of non- product specific support. 
Shown in Appendix Table A.3.9 are the trends in total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support and its share in the value of agriculture output. The table 
reveals that total Aggregate Measurement of Support to Indian agriculture is negative 
to the extent of Rs 1869219.21, which, has gone up in negative to Rs 3772090.27 in 
2002-03, indicating a reduction of 49.95 percent. This is well beyond what is 
proposed in the WTO negotiations on domestic support. However, in negative terms 
the total Aggregate Measurement of Support reached at the peak of Rs 4846167.94 in 
the year 2000-01. This may be due to crashing of world prices of a number of 
commodities to unusually low levels during 2000-02 (Huda and Gulati, 2008). The 
share of total Aggregate Measurement of Support in the value of agricultural output 
was (-881) percent in 1995-96, which increased in negative to 1691 percent in 2002-
03 ranging between (-559) percent to (-2058) percent. 
The ratio of product specific Aggregate Measurement of Support to GDP 
(Appendix Table A.3.10) from agriculture ranged from (-13) percent in 2003-04 to 
(-115) percent in 2000-01. It recorded a decline in negative from 67.89 percent in 
1995-96 to (-36) percent in 1998-99. Then it rose rapidly to reach at (-115) percent in 
2000-01 and showed fluctuations their after. On the other hand, the ratio of non-
product specific Aggregate Measurement of Support to GDP from agriculture was 
less than unity in all years from 1995-96 to 2001-02. However, in 2002-03 it was 2.97 
percent. Moreover, sharp fluctuations can be observed in the ratio of non- product 
specific Aggregate Measurement of Support than that of product specific Aggregate 
Measurement of Support to GDP from agriculture. 
The ratio of total Aggregate Measurement of Support to GDP from agriculture 
exhibits the similar pattern of growth as is depicted in the case of the ratio of product 
specific Aggregate Measurement of Support. The ratio of total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support declined continuously in negafive from 67.28 percent to 
35.14 percent in 1998-99. Then it attends the maximum figure in negative of 114.43 
percent in 2000-01. Thereafter, it showed fluctuations and declined to reach at the 
lowest level -22.99 percent in 2001-02 (Appendix Table A.3.10). 
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3.4.2: What will happen if all Subsidies are removed? 
The adverse effect of support has been recorded in the case of US cotton. By 
international standards, the US is not particularly low cost producer. Its productivity 
levels are also lower than those other major exporting countries. There has been a 
steep downturn in the mid 1990's in world cotton price, which fell by 54 percent. The 
US expanded its area under cotton cultivation and increase output in this period. 
Increasing subsidies have enabled the US to expand its share of world cotton 
production from around 16 percent at the beginning of the 1990's to over 20 percent 
toward the end of the decade and its export share is very significant at about 35 
percent (Oxfam, 2002). 
The withdrawal of subsidies is expected to result in a decline in US production 
of 1.4 million tones, or around 10 percent. The overall effect will be an increase in 
world prices by 1 percent per pound or by almost 26 percent (Oxfam, 2002). This will 
enormously benefit other cotton exporting countries such as Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso 
and India. 
It is estimated that if the US and Europe removed their farm subsidies, the 
value of African food exports would double. According to an Oxfam study, protection 
of agriculture in rich countries costs the developing world 60 billion euros a year. The 
economic research service at the US department of agriculture reported in 2001 that 
full elimination of global trade distorting agricultural subsidies would result in annual 
world welfare gain of US $56 billion (Focus WTO, 2006b). 
3.5: Derbez Draft 
Cancun Ministerial came out with a revised Ministerial Draft issued by the 
Mexican Foreign Secretary and the conference chairman, Mr. Luis Ernesto Derbez on 
13th September 2003, popularly known as the 'Derbez Draft' (JOB (03I/156/Rev.2). 
The Annex - A of the draft deals with issues pertaining to future reforms in 
agriculture. However, Derbez Draft proved to be not useful for all members, though it 
began with the aim to please all quarters. It has been realised by almost all developing 
countries that Derbez Draft, meant for the interest of the EU and US, is put in a 
different language with the will that developing countries should adopt it in his 
negotiating processes. 
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In Annex - II, of the draft, a comparative analysis of various propositions 
made during 2003 has been provided, where a comparison of those with the Derbez 
Draft is given. The apathy of almost all quarters to accept the Derbez Draft as a basis 
of negotiations had put a big question mark on the future of agriculture negotiations 
for almost 10 months, as nobody was willing to compromise there interest. 
The Derbez Draft was received with extensive criticism from Intellectual 
forum as well. The International Food and Agriculture Trade Policy Council (2004) 
pointed out that there existed ample scope to impre the draft for securing the interest 
of the negotiating partners. India too, refused to accept the draft on the 3 grounds; 
(I) If felt that the draft does not consider the developing countries' perspective on 
domestic support, 
(II) While in Doha it was decided that the negotiations on modalities for Singapore 
issues would commence only after explicit consensus is reached at the next 
Ministerial Conference, The Derbez Draft on its own decided to initiate 
negotiations on these issues and 
(III) Finally, the subsidisation scenario in cotton in developed countries causes severe 
loss for developing countries and has always been a major source of friction. 
However, the Derbez Draft by passed the issue. 
Owing to these dissatisfying features of the draft, India, along with other 
developing countries turned it down. The views expressed by the commerce minister 
of India shortly after the Ministerial Conference are presented in Appendix Box A.3.4 
3.6: July Framework and Domestic Subsidies 
The July Framework was seen as a major breakthrough in the current round of 
negotiations. After the framework was signed, most developing countries' 
representatives projected it as a victory that would help protect the interests of the 
developing countries by eliminating billions of dollars on farm subsidies. It is 
undoubtedly true that the July package is an improvement over the Derbez Draft, and 
proposes a number of new measures to reduce domestic subsidies in developed 
countries substantially. Among the salient points of the July Framework are the 
following; 
(I) Reduction of AMS commitments by a tiered formula, with higher AMS levels to be 
reduced by a proportionately higher amount thereby leading to near harmonisation. 
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The appropriate formula has not been spelt out and has been left to be decided 
through negotiations, 
(II) Reduction of de-minimis subsidies by a certain percentage. The extent of reduction 
is to be negotiated, 
(III) Capping of Blue Box subsidies. The July Framework suggested that the Blue Box 
subsidies should not exceed 5 percent of the total value of agriculture production 
during a 'Historical period', which is to be decided, 
(IV) An overall reduction in Trade Distorting Subsidies, which includes disciplining 
Amber Box, de-minimis and Blue Box subsidies and 
(V) An explicit recognition that Special and Differential (S&D) treatment for 
developing countries is an integral component of domestic support. 
3.6.1: July Framework and Domestic Farm Subsidy in India 
July Framework allows enough room to allow developed countries to get 
away with much less than 'Substantial reductions in trade distorting domestic 
support'. 
After the announcement of the July Framework, countries are now trying to 
devise a specific tiered formula for AMS reduction. Negotiating countries and groups 
of countries have given a number of prepositions. However, the discussion still 
continues and will be negotiated once the structure of the tiers is finalised. 
Different structures of the tiered formula have been suggested by member 
countries. For instance, according to the G-20 approach, there would be four bands: 
1^ ' comprising countries with support of US $ 2 billion, 
2"'' comprising countries with support of US $ 2-12 billion, 
S^ '' comprising countries with support of US $ 12-25 billion and 
4* comprising countries with support of above 25 billion. 
The rate of reduction would be higher for countries with higher level of 
support. Other countries like US and Australia have also proposed different variants 
of this tiered formula. They are shown in Appendix Table A.3.11. 
Regarding the reduction formula for the overall Total Domestic Support 
(TDS), the negotiations are stuck at the stage of structuring the tiers. In this case also, 
there are few approaches suggested by negotiating groups as shown in Appendix 
Table A.3.12. 
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It is interesting to note that the G-20 has suggested a three-stage structure for 
developed countries, whereas for developing countries it has suggested a separate 
category. The tiered formulae for the reduction of both AMS and total domestic 
support will be based on absolute and not on relative levels of subsidies. 
India had no specific total Aggregate Measurement of Support reduction 
commitments in its schedule. India's notifications submitted to the WTO shows that 
India's product specific support is negative and its non- product specific support is 
well below the de-minimis level. India's product specific support is negative because 
it's minimum support price for most commodities were below the external reference 
price for the concerned period, and, because India does not provide any product 
specific support other than MPS. 
India does not have any Blue Box payments, but India has notified Green Box 
subsidies. Green Box subsidies were around US $ 2502 million in 1996-97. Among 
the Green Box subsidies, a very high percentage of subsidies went into public stock 
holding for food security purposes (Pal, 2005). 
It may be noticed from Appendix Table A.3.I3 that once a large percentage of 
India's non- product specific support has been shifted under the S«&D category, 
India's non- product specific subsidy becomes rather insignificant. 
3.7: Issues in the Negotiation on Domestic Support 
Getting the developed countries to make sharp reductions in their domestic 
support is of paramount importance not only to obtain access to their markets but also 
to obtain access to third world markets. The outstanding issues in domestic support 
include the tiered formulae for overall trade distorting support (OTDS) as well as for 
total AMS. Separate reductions are envisaged for the Blue Box and de-minimis 
categories that constitute elements of trade-distorting support. 
It had already been agreed that developed countries would eliminate export 
subsidies by 2013, but it was still under negotiation whether the phase out would be 
front-loaded. At Hong Kong, it was also agreed that the developing countries would 
continue to benefit from the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
for 5 years after the end date for elimination of all forms of export subsidies. For the 
duration of the implementation period, Article 9.4 had exempted from reduction 
commitments certain categories of export subsidies (those for marketing and transport 
costs) granted by developing countries on agricultural products. However, the end 
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date for other export subsidies by the developing countries had not yet been 
determined. 
It has been noted that there is a standoff with respect to review of the criteria 
for the Blue Box between the United States and other members. The best strategy for 
the developing countries in this situation is to preserve in taking a stand for steep 
reduction of the other trade domestic support, squeezing the constituent elements in 
the process. 
It is an observed fact that some of the Green Box measures are now 
acknowledged to be causing more than minimal distortion to production and trade. 
This is a serious cause of concern, which has to be addressed on priority. The cause 
for concern is not general services, public stockholding for food security purposes, or 
domestic food, but the direct payments enumerated in the list of exempt measures in 
Annex II of the Agreement on Agriculture. It should be possible to argue that in order 
to ensure that the Green Box measures have a minimal effect, only small farmers 
should be eligible for such payments (WTO Doc.WT/L/579). 
In this light, Huda and Gulati (2008) proposed that it would be equitable to 
impose a similar criterion for direct payments under the Green Box in view of the 
potential of these measures to cause more than minimal distortions. Given the massive 
recourse to decoupled income support in the major developed countries, agreement on 
this proposal should be the sine qua non for the developing countries' acceptance of 
the Doha Round package. 
It has also been suggested that developing countries should seek a 
clarification, which would give them some additional room to maneuver. 
Moreover, when all farmers are eligible for input subsidies, the proportion of 
the subsidies given to low income or resource poor farmers be deducted from the 
computation of non-product specific support. 
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Chapter 4 
Market Access 
4.1: Introduction 
All countries, at the Uruguay Round, are obliged to eliminate all their non-
tariff barriers like import ban, import quota or Quantitative Restrictions on imports etc 
and convert these in to tariff. The process is known as 'tariffication'. The tariff rate 
should be equivalent to the barriers that were imposed in the base (reference) period 
of 1986-88. All countries have to bind their tariffs on all agricultural products and 
progressively reduce all tariffs starting from their initial bound rate in 1995 to their 
final bound rate at the end of the implementation period. Developed countries were 
expected to lower tariff on agricultural imports by an average of 36 percent between 
1995- 2000, and each tariff was to be reduced by at least 15 percent. Developing 
countries were mandated to reduce agricultural tariffs by an average of 24 percent 
between 1995-2004, with each tariff being reduced by at least 10 percent (Nagoor, 
2005). The idea of reduction commitments can be had from the table given below. 
Average Reduction 
Minimum Reduction 
Tariffication 
Reduction Commitments 
Schedules contain Commitments 
Developed Developing 
36% 24% 
15% 10% 
Non -Tariff Measures to Tariffs 
Ceiling Binding for Developing Countries 
Least Developed 
0 
0 
Source: - Chakraborty and Singh (2005) 
However, in acknowledgement of the fact that even these changes might not 
cut significantly into agricultural protectionism, the Uruguay Round also created the 
'tariff quota system' to ensure market access for agricultural goods subject to tariffs. 
A quota of specific agricultural goods would be subject to a special low tariff rate 
under this system. Import of that good above the quota would be subject to the normal 
relatively high rate. 
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4.2: Market Access Provision 
Exporting countries were apprehensive that, for some products the imports of 
which were restricted by Quantitative Restrictions or variable levies, there was a 
danger that the tariffication process by itself would not have a significant liberalising 
effect. The use of current and Minimum Access commitments was, therefore, adopted 
to complement the tariffication process. The market access provision is thus, sub 
divided into two parts (Awasthi and Mishra, 2004). 
(a) Minimum Access (b) Current Access 
4.2.1: Minimum Access 
Minimum Access requirement is implemented on the basis of the 'Tariff Rate 
Quota' (TRq) where by a certain quota of imports is permitted to enter at below the 
normal tariff rate or at a nominal rate according to 'Most Favoured Nation Principle' 
(MFN). 
4.2.2: Current Access 
It is defined as the amount of exports to a particular country under bilateral 
trade aitangement at preferential tariff rates. The intention of the agreement is also to 
protect the Current Access, (i.e., exports of existing exporters to other countries at 
preferential tariff rates). 
The two provisions are not cumulative; rather they exist side by side. 
However, where Current Access provisions do not prevail, market access provisions 
are sufficient for imports but where Current Access provisions exist, overall import 
will be higher than the stipulated level of 3 to 5 percent. 
However, as envisaged in Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) that provision of 
Minimum Access and Current Access would improve the market conditions of the 
member countries but these do not seem to have served the purpose especially for 
Asian countries. According to WTO, only 62 percent of tariff quota volume was 
achieved in 1998, which further declined to 50 percent in 1999 for the total of all 
WTO members. There are also reports for individual commodities which show that 
Minimum Access provisions were to a large extent met by applying preferential tariff 
quota to the same countries which benefited from it previously and Asian countries 
could not get real benefit out of these (Punsell and Gupta, 1999). 
Agricultural products are divided sometimes into two groups, viz., tropical 
products and other products. Though there is no agreed definition of tropical products. 
beverages like tea, cotton and hard fibres like jute, coffee and cocoa; fruits and other 
products that are almost predominantly produced in developing countries are treated 
as tropical products. These products were subject to both high tariffs and internal 
taxes in most advanced countries, in the years following the establishment of GATT. 
As these products are of export interest predominantly to developing countries, 
priority was given in the past rounds of GATT negotiations to remove the barriers to 
trade in such products. 
Most developed countries, however, continued to apply to imports of other 
agricultural products-like wheat and other grains, meat and meat products-both high 
levels of tariff and non-tariff measures. The government's basic objective in providing 
protection to such products was to guarantee domestic producers prices that were 
much higher than world prices, in order to assure them reasonable incomes. These 
policies apart from reducing trade opportunities for competitive foreign producers 
also put heavy burdens on the budgetary resources of governments. 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) establishes a programme for the 
gradual reform of trade in agriculture. The AOA has a two-fold aim, 
(i) Improve the transparency of existing protection measures and facilitate 
their reduction and 
(ii) Open domestic markets to more imports. 
The most important aspects of the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) are the 
new rules. These require the countries, which applied non-tariff measures to abolish 
them by calculating their tariff equivalents and adding these to the fixed tariffs. As a 
result, countries have established new rates of tariff for products to which they 
previously applied non-tariff measures. The tariff equivalent of non-tariff measures 
was calculated on the basis of average world market prices for the product subject to 
non-tariff measures and its internal price in the importing country. 
A minimum import threshold is stipulated for each sector of agricultural 
production where there are non-tariff barriers. This was set at 3 percent of domestic 
consumption in 1995 and is increased progressively to 5 percent by 2000 (4 percent 
by 2004 for developing countries). This is a minimum 'market access opportunity', 
rather than a mandatory volume of imports. Custom duties on these Minimum Access 
requirements must be low or the minimum (India and WTO, 1999). 
Special Safeguard Provisions allow additional duty to be imposed on imports 
above the bound tariff rates, as a temporary measure in special cases. 
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4,3: Tariffication 
One of the primary features of the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) is to 
replace all Quantitative Restrictions on agricultural commodities by an appropriate 
amount of tariff. The method for estimating appropriate level of tariff is as follows 
(FAO, 1998). 
T = (Pd-Pw/Pw)xlOO 
Where, 
T is tariff equivalent or base rate of duty 
Pd is domestic price of the product 
Pw is the average world price (border price) during the 3 years base period 
1986-88 
The base period was selected from 1986 to 1988 keeping in view that the 
world prices of different agricultural commodities particularly those of food grains 
were fairly low and, therefore, the difference between domestic and world prices will 
provide sufficient protection to each country for their domestic products against the 
search in imports (Awasthi and Mishra 2004). 
But many countries either used an overestimated domestic price or under 
estimated world price of the commodity to impart a much higher level of protection 
than the one prevailing in the base period by way of tariffs. For instance, European 
Union (EU) raised base tariff on rice from 153 percent to 361 percent. 
India too, followed the same path as adopted by other countries in order to 
protect its sensitive agricultural products by imposing a high tariff ceiling than what 
would have prevailed, if all other countries have honestly worked out the base rate 
duty. In the case of wheat for which India has a potential threat from USA and few 
other countries, the base rate of duty, if applied on a rational basis, would have been 
6.58 percent. However, India has offered to fix a tariff binding of 100 percent. This 
process of suggesting tariff bindings in an arbitrary way has been termed as 'DIRTY 
TARIFFICATION' (Gulati and Sharma, 1998) but as long as results are not 
challenged during the verification process, which in general they are not, everything 
will remain fair and India like other countries can continue to protect the sensitive 
agricultural products behind the high tariff wall. 
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4.4: Main Approaches on Market Access 
There is a strong demand for reduction in tariff and tariff escalation. Proposal 
by developing countries and independent proposal by India plead for allowing 
developing countries to readjust bound tariff. Proposal by group of developing 
countries recommends elimination of tariff peaks and escalation in developed 
countries and use of appropriate formula to bring down extremely high tariff by larger 
amounts to a reasonable level. The proposal wants tariff reduction to weighted, rather 
than unweighted, to ensure that sensitive products in developed countries are not 
given protection. 
4.4.1: Tariffs 
Tariffs are the main instruments for regulating import as Quantitative Restrictions. 
Broadly four types of formula are being negotiated for tariff reduction (Gibson, 
Waino and Whitly, 2001). 
(a) Sliding scale: - it reduces tariff in a given range by a fixed percent and 
provides for specific treatment to duties below and above the given range. If 
the reduction coefficient is selected as 0.5, all duties with in the range would 
be reduced to half. Any duty higher than the upper limit of range is also 
reduced to the same level as the reduced level of upper limit. Similarly, any 
duty below the lower limit is brought to zero. 
(b) Second formula is termed as LINEAR HARMONISATION. It includes 
linear cut in tariff to the tune of 60 percent but adds 3 points to the reduced 
tariff The difference between the first and the second formula is that the latter 
applies 60 percent cut, instead of 50 percent in sliding scale formula, but 
uniformally adds 3 percent tariff to the reduced tariff in the range. 
(c) Swiss Formula: It takes final tariff as the ratio of 'initial tariff multiplied by 
parameter chosen for tariff ceiling' and 'some of initial tariff and the chosen 
parameter'. First: it reduces higher tariff by higher percentage and vice-versa. 
Second: lower the value of chosen parameter higher would be the reduction. 
Third: as the value of chosen parameter declines, the relative cut at higher 
tariff becomes sharper compare to lower tariff Swiss formulae imposes 
automatic ceiling at chosen parameter 
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(d) Finally, the fourth formula is termed as HARMONISATION/LOW CEILING. 
It proposes highest ceiling of 25 percent in the final tariff. Any tariff above 50 
percent is reduced to 25 percent level and tariff below 50 percent are reduced 
by same fraction as the initial tariff 
Some developing countries want to exempt sensitive products from the general 
disciplines for food security/livelihood considerations. This may be fulfilled by a 
'positive list' approach whereby a limited list of products would be subject to 
disciplines and all other products would be exempted. A less protecting approach is 
based on 'negative list' whereby only a limited list of products is excluded fi-om the 
disciplines. There are also issues for some developing countries of taking into account 
unilateral tariff cuts prior to the Uruguay Round, while for other countries there are 
concerns about the erosion of trade preferences as a result of tariff cuts by the 
preference giving countries. 
4.4.2: Tariff Rate Quotas 
A quota is a quantitative limit placed on the importation of a specific 
commodity. A tariff rate quota (TRq) is simply a two-tiered tariff: 
- a limited volume (the quota) can be Imported at a lower tariff and 
- imports in excess of the quota volume are charged a higher tariff usually prohibitive. 
One major issue on tariff rate quotas concerns the administration method used 
to implement them. Developing countries' proposal includes several suggestions on 
tariff rate quota (TRq). It asks for; 
(I) Tariff Rate Quotas to be transparent and simple to administer, 
(II) Common base for calculating domestic consumption for Minimum Access 
commitments, 
(III) Basing quotas on specific products rather than aggregated commodity group, 
(IV) Mandatory filling of quotas in developed countries before imports are treated 
at above quota level, 
(V) Equal access to new suppliers in allotment with in Tariff Rate Quota and 
(VI) Regular enhancement of Tariff Rate Quota is in developed countries to 
improve market access for developing countries (Chand, 2002). 
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4.4.3: Special Safeguard 
During the initial years following implementation of Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAOA) international prices of agricultural commodities 
were quite high, as they were at the peak of cyclical phase, which characterised 
behaviour of international prices. Thus, import liberalisation in the initial years of 
WTO did not cause serious threat to domestic production. The situation took a serious 
turn after 1997, when international prices started declining sharply. This made export 
highly competitive, caused adverse impact on export earnings and rendered import 
cheaper than domestic produce in several commodities. By the year 2000, 
international prices plummeted in their lowest level in the last 20 years, which posed 
threat even to the developing countries (lATRC, 2001). This has created flutter in the 
farming sector in developing countries, as these countries find themselves unable to 
check imports and to do something to safeguard against adverse effect on farm 
incomes. Developed countries have resources and mechanisms to deal with this kind 
of situation by making income deficiency payments, export subsidy and Green and 
Blue Box support. This mechanism and resources for countering adverse impact on 
farm income are awfully missing in developing economies. Because of this, several 
developing countries raised concern about special and differential treatment to equip 
them to safeguard against unfavourable trade scenario. In this regard, there are four 
approaches. 
One approach suggests the elimination of Special Safeguard altogether. A 
second approach calls for maintaining the current Special Safeguard and expanding it 
to all countries, including a new provision for perishable and seasonal products. A 
third approach calls for the elimination of Special Safeguard for developed countries 
and creating of a new mechanism for developing countries. Finally, a fourth approach 
calls for the application of countervailing measures in cases of subsidised imports, 
without proof of injury, with the additional duty equivalent to the subsidisation 
provided (Chand, 2002). 
4.4.4: Other Market Access Issues 
These include food safety, labelling and geographical indication. In all of 
these issues there are those, which argue about their relevance to the negotiations on 
agriculture and the need to be addressed with in these negotiations. Also, there are 
issues that fall outside the agriculture negotiations, i.e., food safety being a Sanitary 
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and Phyto-Sanitary Issue (SPS), food-labelling being a Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) issue and geographical indication being a Trade Related Intellectual Property 
issue. 
4.4.5: Greater Access to Markets 
There are some relevant measures, which bears significant impact on 
international markets. The measures are concerned to restrict access to national 
markets. They include tariff barriers, i.e., custom duties and non-tariff barriers, 
specially import quotas, variable entry levies and minimum import licences. 
These measures are considered to have negative effect on the market that 
penalise consumers and restrict international trade by reducing access to national 
markets. There are two important objectives which guide various initiatives taken at 
the international level to improve the market conditions. 
The first objective brings transparency to levels of protection and reduces 
them. This include following steps. 
First step to have more transparent border protection. This entails converting 
existing non-tariff barriers into custom duties (or tariff equivalents). This is the 
principle of tariffication. 
The base period used to calculate these 'tariff equivalents' is 1986-88. Custom 
duties obtained through tariffication are added to existing custom duties. 
Second step is to reduce new protection. New tariff should decrease by an 
average of 36 percent over 6 years (1995-2000) for developed countries and by 24 
percent over 10 years (1995-2004) for developing countries. This reduction should be 
equivalent to at least 15 percent in the case of developed countries and 10 percent in 
the case of developing countries per 'tariff line' or category of product (beef, chicken, 
etc). The reduction is progressive and is carried out on an annual basis. The least 
developed countries (LDCs) are not subject to reduction commitments (Dhar, 2001). 
Third step is to ensure that new protective measures will stop increasing. At 
the end of the implementation period (2000-2004), all tariffs are bound at the final 
level and can no longer be increased. This is the binding principle. WTO members 
agreed to bind the maximum tariff rates that may be applied for imported products at 
base period (1986-88) levels. As a result of this discipline, 100 percent of agricultural 
products now have bound tariff Member countries are free to apply tariff rates that 
are below the bound rate, but may never apply a tariff rate in excess of the bound rate 
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without first consulting with the other members that are most likely to be affected by 
such a change and agreeing on some level of compensation (Article 28 of the GATT). 
In the case of Least Developed Countries, the bound rate is the one defined at the 
beginning of the implementation stage since, it cannot be reduced at a latter stage. 
The second objective is to further open domestic markets to imports. In 
addition to a fall in the level of protection, the agreement provides minimum threshold 
for products that have been terrified. 
In the first place, signatory countries are obliged to give 'Current Access' to 
each product, equivalent to the average imports for the period 1986-88. Furthermore, 
every signatory country must ensure, in 2000 in the case of developed countries and 
in 2004 in the case of developing countries, a minimal access equal to 5 percent of the 
average internal consumption during the period 1986-88(3 percent in 1995) for 
imported products that have been tariffied. 
4.4.6: The Exceptions 
One of the features of the reform programme is that tariffs (including those 
resulting from tariffication) applicable to agricultural products have been bound by all 
countries (developed, developing, least developed and transition) against increases 
above the levels indicated in their schedules of concessions. 
Under the agreement, developing countries have the option not to tariffy their 
protection and to bind their tariff at free rates (known as ceiling rates). Owing to the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), most developing 
countries have very low protection levels. As a result, tariffication would have had 
effects on these countries, thus, explaining why a number of them opted for a ceiling 
rate. 
Developing and least developed countries were given the flexibility to bind 
their tariff at ceiling rates, which could be higher than their applied rates or those 
resulting from reductions agreed in the negotiations. A number of these countries 
have taken advantage of this flexibility and have given a ceiling binding undertaking 
not to raise any tariffs applicable to agricultural products over an agreed level (say 60 
percent or 80 percent). The applied rates in all these countries are significantly lower 
than ceiling rates. 
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An Annex to the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) (Annex V) defines the 
conditions under which countries may continue to use non- tariff measures, especially 
for certain basic food products in developing countries. 
4.4: The Safeguard Provisions 
The agreement responds to the concern of importing countries that the 
removal of Quantitative Restrictions may lead, despite the tariff equivalents, to 
sudden increases in imports by permitting them to impose Special Safeguards on 
tariffled products. 
In the event of a rapid surge in the volume of imports or a strong fall in the 
prices of imported products, a country may add additional tax to the existing tariffs, 
according to the Special Safeguard Provisions. 
The Special Safeguard Provisions (SSPs) provide country an opportunity to 
levy additional import duties along with normal import tariff only in two situations. 
(I) When actual import volume rises above a specified trigger level and 
(II) When import prices denominated in domestic currency fall below a certain 
trigger level. 
The Special Safeguard provision permits a member country to impose additional 
import duty up to a maximum of 30 percent of normal level of custom duty for a 
period of one year during which it is levied in order to check the large surge in the 
volume of imports, which is defined by the relationship. 
V,>Qav(Tqi) + AC 
Where, 
Vt is volume of imports in period t 
Qav is the average volume of imports during the base period 
AC is the change in the volume of domestic consumption 
Tqi is the quantitative trigger level, which is expressed for three 
separate amounts of market access (M) being provided by the country but now desire 
to use Special Safeguard provision. These three separate amounts are as follows; 
If, 
M<10 percent Then Tqi= 125 percent 
10 percent< MOO percent Then Tq2=l 10 percent 
M>30 percent Then Tq3= 105 percent 
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It is observed from the equation that once the process of tariff reduction is 
over, it is not easy to restrict the volume of imports since it is directly linked to the 
domestic consumption. As the domestic consumption C (A C) rises over the average 
base period, the volume of imports too will rise at a given level of import duty. 
Moreover, the countries that will be affected on account of imports will be those 
wherever smaller amounts of imports allowed under market access clause will have an 
impact in generating larger surplus of the product. 
In the first case when M<10 percent, the volume of imports must exceed over 
25 percent to use the Special Safeguard provision. Thus, Special Safeguard Provision 
is inapplicable to restrict low volume of imports. However, in the second and third 
cases, countries can use this provision to restrict imports to some extent but these will 
be those who are net importing countries of agricultural commodities and will hardly 
find beneficial to restrict imports by using Special Safeguard provision. The Special 
Safeguard provision of imposing of additional import duty has hardly any relevance 
especially for India, as it is not a major importer different agricultural product. 
The Special Safeguard provision in the second instance can be used when 
import price of a commodity denominated in domestic currency falls below a certain 
trigger level. Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) has specified the following criteria 
with regard to 5 different cases (Awasthi and Mishra, 2004). 
Case: I 
When, 
(Tp-P) < (Tp X 10 percent) D,=0 
Where, 
Tp= average base period import price of the product. 
P= Current import price of that commodity. 
Di== Additional duty 
It means if the current import price of an agricultural product has fallen by less 
than 10 percent of the average base period price of import of that commodity, then no 
additional duty can be imposed. It is obvious that domestic demand of agricultural 
products is not at all insulated against the adverse impact cause by the downfall in the 
current import price up to 10 percent of the average base period price of imports. 
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Case: II 
If (Tp X 10 percent) < (Tp-P) < (Tp x 40 percent) 
Then Dj = 30 percent [(Tp-P) - (Tp x 10 percent)] 
If the current import price falls more than 10 percent but less than 40 percent 
of the average base period import, then additional import duty will be levied up to the 
extent of 30 percent of the change exceeding 10 percent of the average base period 
import price. This clearly reveals that the Special Safeguard provision is not very 
effective in regulating cheap inflow of imports. 
Case: II 
If Tp x 40 percent < (Tp-P) < (Tp x 60 percent) 
Then D3=50 percent x [(Tp-P) - (Tp x 40 percent)] +D2 
This case is an extension of case II. 
Case: IV 
This case is relevant when the current import price falls below 60 percent of 
the average base period import price. This is obvious from the subsequent equation. 
Tp X 60 percent < (Tp-P) < (Tp x75 percent) 
This extent of additional import duty that will be imposing in this case is as follows. 
D4=70 percent [(Tp-P)-(Tp x 60 percent)] +l)^+J), 
Case: V 
Finally, the most extreme case whose probability of happening is almost 
negligible is applicable when current import price more than 75 percent of the average 
base period price and in equation. 
(Tp-P) > (Tp X 75 percent) 
The extent of additional import duty levied is 
D5 = 90 percent [(Tp-P)-(Tp x 75 percent)] +D2+D3+D4 
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The chance of occurrence of case third, fourth and fifth are rare but even if 
they occur, the imposition of additional import duty is fairly low. These illustrations 
clearly highlight that domestic prices are not effectively insulated from the effect of 
the changes in the world market prices. 
The AOA, no doubt, provides Special Safeguard provision but its practical 
relevance is severely limited on account of the insignificant relief provided under the 
framework governing the Special Safeguard provision. These provisions thus, clearly 
suggest that India should cautiously liberalise trade of agricultural commodities 
failing which surge in imports is difficult to be controlled. 
4.5: Negotiations on Market Access 
At the outset of the negotiations for the continuation of the reform process in 
agriculture, two across the board issues dominated the talks, namely non-trade 
concerns and Special and Differential (S&D) treatment of developing countries. The 
fundamental issue in the negotiations is the level of ambition for the reduction of 
protection and support in agriculture. 
Tiered formula for tariff reductions was on top of the unfinished agenda of the 
negotiations on market access. It had been agreed that there would be four tariff bands 
and that the developing country tariffs would be subject to lower cuts. But the 
thresholds of these bands and the formula for cuts (linear or average cuts subject to a 
maximum and minimum for each band) were not decided. It had also been agreed that 
for sensitive products, the Tariff Rate Quotas would be expanded. The extent of 
expansion and whether the expansion would be made in terms of a proportion of 
domestic consumption or on the basis of some other yardstick were points on which 
there was still lack of agreement. The members had agreed on the formula for 
conversion of non-advalorem tariffs into advalorem equivalents for the purpose of 
application of the tired formula, but there was no agreement on whether the bound 
duties would be in the form of simplified advalorem or in their existing specific duty 
or complex forms. 
Agreement had been reached at the Hong Kong session that the developing 
countries would have the right to self-designate special products, but there was wide 
variation in the thinking on its scope and on whether it should cover as much as 20 
percent of the total agricultural tariff lines or be more limited in scope. The tariff 
treatment of special products, whether outright exemption or lower rate of reduction. 
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was another pending issue. Three important market access issues that were of concern 
to a large number of WTO members and had not been resolved were fullest 
liberalisation of trade in tropical products, measures dealing with the erosion of long-
standing preferences and flexibility for newly acceded members that had undertaken 
far-reaching commitments in the process of accession. 
The most important issue that the negotiators must grapple with is that of tariff 
peaks. That some WTO members can continue with tariff levels of 200 percent, 300 
percent and even 500 percent represents a severe indictment of the trading system. 
While the EC has already accepted the G-20 proposal that tariffs be capped at 100 
percent and the US demand is for 75 percent, the G-10 is not willing to accept a 
ceiling at all. Unless a tariff cap is applied to sensitive products too, the WTO 
membership will not be able to undo the reversal in the liberalisation process that the 
phenomenon of'dirty-tariffication' brought about in the Uruguay Round. In fact, 100 
percent should become the common maximum for sensitive and special products, and 
for other products the maximum tariff at the end of the implementation period should 
be in the range of 60-70 percent advalorem, for both the developing and developed 
countries. In china, a developing country no agricultural tariff has been higher than 65 
percent since 2004. There is no reason that any other developing country cannot 
accept a maximum general level of tariff of that order. 
However, if the maximum tariff levels for sensitive products were to be 
established at 100 percent (as has been suggested by Huda and Gulati, 2008), Tariff 
Rate Quotas would need to be continued as a transitional measure. In this situation, 
obtaining expansion of the existing Tariff Rate Quotas should be an important 
objective of the negotiations for developing countries in order to further improve 
market access. 
Once the agreement is achieved on the maximum level or levels of tariff, the 
task of settling on a formula for tiered reduction will become easier to address. 
Suggestions on the tiered formula were before the participants at the time the 
negotiations were suspended and separate bands and rates of reduction have been 
proposed for the developing and developed countries. But these suggestions are not 
set in stone, and there will be scope for variations whenever the negotiations resume. 
There is a case for narrowing the difference between the tiered reductions to be 
undertaken by the developing and developed countries. 
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4.6: India and Tarifflcation 
The economic reforms introduced in 1991 led to a substantial liberalisation of 
India's external trade regime. However, progress in phasing out Quantitative 
Restrictions on consumer products including agricultural products was very slow. 
Consequent upon the disputes against India by several countries, on April 1, 2001, 
India eliminated the last Quantitative Restrictions on 715 digit tariff lines including 
147 tariff lines pertaining to agriculture. After this date, Quantitative Restrictions on 
imports were maintained only for such reasons as protection of health and morals, as 
permitted under Article XX of GATT 1994. 
Following its 1991 economic reforms, India progressively trimmed the list of 
products subject to import monopoly. The export-import (EXIM) policy for 2002-07 
retained import monopolies on only copra and coconut oil (for the Food Corporation 
of India). The use of import monopolies is consistent with Article XVII of GATT 
1994 as long as the agencies that have been granted these monopolies have a free 
hand in importing the canalised products. 
The economic policy of 1991 led to sweeping changes in India's tariff policy 
on agricultural products, but very little on agriculture. Auxiliary duties were merged 
with the basic custom duty, and the peak rate was cut to 150 percent as a first step in 
1991-92 and further brought down to 110 percent the next year. Since then, the 
maximum rate of the basic custom duty on non-agricultural products has been reduced 
in successive years; the level as of April 1, 2006, was 12.5 percent, with a few 
exceptions. Reductions have not been the general rule with regard to agricultural 
products. 
One other development has taken place with regard to India's agricultural 
tariffs in the post Uruguay Round period. India retained in its WTO schedule the tariff 
commitments it had made during the early rounds of GATT. These commitments 
included zero duties on certain cereals and milk products. In view of the impending 
phase-out of restrictions, India renegotiated these commitments under article XXVI11 
of 1994. And the levels of bound tariffs were raised from zero to 60 percent for 
skimmed milk powder, from 60 to 80 percent for cereals and from 45 to 75 percent 
for rape, colza and mustard oils. A feature of the renegotiated tariffs was that for the 
first time India had tariff quotas with lower in-quota rates for maize and skimmed 
milk powder and for rape, colza and mustard oils and their fractions (other than 
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crude). Following the increase in the bound level, India raised the levels of the duties 
applied on these products. In accordance with the requirement in Article XXVI1 of 
GATT 1994, India made compensatory reductions in the tariffs on other agricultural 
products. These products included butter, cheese, almonds, fresh citrus and other 
fruit, malt, olive oil, and processed food including biscuits, orange juice, shorn wool 
and wool tops. For sunflower seed and safflower oil, the bound level of 300 percent 
was maintained. But global Tariff Rate Quotas of 150000 metric tons (MT) was 
opened at an in-quota tariff-rate of 50 percent. 
Following the introduction of the 1996 version of the Harmonised System 
(HS96), India's modified tariff schedule went into effect on March 15, 2000(WTO 
Doc.WT/Le/340). India's current bindings, after 1996 revision of Harmonised System 
(HS) and the 1999 renegotiations (WTO Doc.w/LeT/440), retain the overall structure 
that emerged from the Uruguay Round: 100 percent for agricultural commodities, 150 
percent for processed products and 300 percent for edible oils. The departures from 
this pattern are mainly related to tariff lines that figured in the negotiations and 
renegotiations before the Uruguay Round and the 1999 renegotiations, and they are 
lower tariff rates. With regard to the items important in international trade, lower 
bound rates apply to certain meats (35 percent), certain dairy products (40-60 
percent), certain temperate-zone fruits (30-55 percent), cereals (60-80 percent), 
rapeseed oil (75 percent), soybean oil (45 percent), certain prepared meat and 
vegetables products (55 percent), certain fruit juices (85 percent), hides and skins (25 
percent) and wool (25 percent). 
The most striking feature of India's Post Uruguay Round tariffs is the wide 
gap between the bound and applied levels. Compared with the simple average bound 
tariff of 114.8 percent, the average applied rate of the basic custom duty as of April 1, 
2004, was 37 percent (Huda and Gulati, 2008). Custom Tariff Act of 1975(0011975) 
section 3 gives the Central government the authority to levy duties equal to the excise 
duties on similar domestic products. 
The only way in which an additional duty can be imposed on a product as a 
charge equivalent to an internal tax is by imposing it on the basis of the state of 
consumption and making it equal to the excise duty in that State. Any averaging of the 
rate of duty, as appeared to be the case in 2004, imparted to it the character of an 
ODC rather than of a charge equivalent to an internal tax. The applied level of duty on 
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alcoholic products including the additional duty must remain below the bound level of 
duty. 
4.7: India's Tariffs and Bound Rates on Major Agricultural 
Commodities/Groups 
In the Uruguay Round agreement ceiling tariff bindings had to be submitted 
for all agricultural products, which were covered under Quantitative Restrictions 
(QRs) for balance of payments (BOP) reasons. For developing countries provided the 
tariff had not been previously bound under the GATT, there was no limit on the level 
of these bindings. In addition, there was no obligation to reduce them during the 
implementation period. India had previously bound only some of the agricultural tariff 
such as rice, but for other products for which no tariff had been bound earlier; India 
had submitted very high ceiling bindings of 100, 150 and 300 percent. Recently, 
under the Article 28 negotiations, tariffs have been renegotiated and new bindings are 
sufficiently high. For example as on January I, 2006, the tariff binding in the case of 
rice was 80 percent. The bindings were 50 percent in the case of maize and 50 percent 
in the case of sorghum and 50 percent in the case of millets. For the dairy products, 
binding were 30 percent in the case of fresh milk and creams, 30 percent in the case of 
cheese and 60 percent in the case of milk powder (Appendix Table 4.1). 
Therefore, if these bindings have to be renegotiated, then what should be the 
level of tariff? Ideally form the resource allocation and efficiency point of view, tariff 
on both agricultural and industrial goods should be equal. This will provide level 
playing field for both agricultural as well as industrial goods and will do away with 
the disparity that exists between the two sectors. If one goes by this logic, than a 
ceiling binding of 40 to 50 percent or 60 percent at the most should be an ideal choice 
for agricultural products in India because the ceiling binding for industrial products is 
40 percent. The general principles of tariff reform are to have low rates, along with 
reduction of spread and dispersion of tariff rates and eventually to aim for uniformity 
in tariff rates. A tariff level of 40 to 60 percent may appear to be very low, but this 
should be viewed against very low rates of effective protection for major commodities 
too. There are two important considerations that need to be kept in mind while 
fixing tariff-what should be the level, which provides sufficient incentives for 
producers to continue producing, while maintaining prices for consumer low enough 
so that, they do not have to pay unduly high prices? However, in the majority of cases 
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the viewpoint of producers oversliadows the interests of the consumers. Thus, an 
optimum balance must be struck while deciding the level of tariffs. 
Within the agricultural sector, for different commodities, also there could be 
two possibilities; first, there could be identical ceiling bindings for all the 
commodities across the board. This will provide equal protection to all the 
commodities. From the efficiency point of view such a tariff will be ideal. The other 
alternative is to have different bindings for different commodities. Certainly, 
binding's tariffs at zero levels is problematic, because domestic producers are subject 
to excess of taxes and in case international prices fall below domestic prices, domestic 
producers should be protected to a certain extent. For example, in the case of cereals, 
the domestic producers have to bear a burden of around 10 percent of the value of 
output, which goes in the form of Mandy taxes, storage charges and a movement and 
handling charges. Further, there are levies on rice and sugar. Therefore, tariff could be 
set anywhere between 20 to 50 percent or at the most 60 percent if the policy makers 
want to have more leverage to protect domestic producers from unduly low levels of 
international prices. 
However, to guard against very low levels of international prices, the issue 
that needs consideration in the next round is the Special Safeguards, which are 
available to only those countries which used tarifficatlon formulae to set tariffs. This 
is very important because anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties have very 
little significance in agriculture, as they take long time. Also, by the time these duties 
are imposed, the damage is already done. However, if there are serious difficulties 
then countries can resort to emergency protection in those cases where imports of a 
product cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of directly competitive 
products (Article XIX). Further, the use of Quantitative Restrictions for balance of 
payments (BOP) problems can also be re-invoked. It is proved that price based 
measures such as import surcharges and exchange rate adjustment are not able to 
assist a sharp deterioration in the balance of payments (BOP) position. 
Finally, (Rao C.H. Hanumantha, 1994) suggests that for developing countries 
to reap the fruits of liberalisation certain pre-requisites are necessary, 
(I) Agricultural output needs to be stepped up for exports by diversifying into value-
added areas such as horticulture, floriculture, animal husbandry, etc., where 
demands are elastic, 
(II) Investments on research and extension services indicate a high rate of return, 
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(III) Developments of institutional infrastructure including that of human capital is 
necessary to raise the profitability of investment in research and 
(IV) Agriculture serves as the biggest safety net in the process of adjustment to the 
new trade regime. 
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Chapter 5 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Provisions 
Under WTO 
5.1: Introduction 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) is the result of seven years of negotiations from September 1986 to 
December 1993, as part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations of 
the GATT. These negotiations were floated at Punta Del Este, Uruguay and formally 
arranged in April 1994 at Marrakesh, Morocco, along with the other negotiations of 
the Uruguay Round. With the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
TRIPs came into existence on the first day of the year 1995 (Watal, 2001 pp-11). 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is very important 
agreement because it consolidates the trade in 'ideas' with in the sphere of WTO's 
activities. It obliges signatory countries to define in their national legislation the 
minimal standards for protecting intellectual property, as well as the means to ensure 
compliance with these norms. Agriculture in developing countries is very much 
concerned, since this agreement covers all living organisms (animals, plants, micro-
organisms, genes, etc). It clearly addresses the question of the appropriation of seeds, 
biological resources or traditional knowledge and, in exchange, the cost of access to 
them and their use. 
5.2: The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) Agreement 
The agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was 
one of the main consequences of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations concluded 
in 1994, which also led to the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. 
Although the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) existed as a 
specialised UN agency to deal with Intellectual Property Protection. It was felt that 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) was toothless in the matter of 
enforcement. Thus, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) was included in the schedule 
of GATT negotiations, and it was felt by many countries that this inclusion would not 
only enable them to set uniform and higher standards for protection and enforcement. 
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but also empower them to take recourse to 'cross retaliation' in the goods sector to 
ensure compliance (Singh, 2005). 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is now the key 
international agreement promoting the harmonisation of national Intellectual Property 
Right regimes. The purpose of the TRIPs agreement, as stated in the preamble, is to 
introduce new rules and disciplines for global trade concerning the provision of: 
(i) Adequate standards and principles concerning the availability scope and 
use of Trade-Related Intellectual property rights and 
(ii) Effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
Protection and enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) should, 
according to Article 7(0bjectives), "contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conductive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations". 
Furthermore, Article 8.2 states "appropriate measures, provided they are consistent 
with the provisions of the agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
Intellectual Property Rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology"(Mashelkar, 2005). Just as social and economic welfare are considered as 
priority matters. Article 8 Paragraph 1 gives priority not only to the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to social, economic and technological development, but 
also to public health and nutrition. 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) follows the 
GATT tradition of adopting the multilateral disciplines of Non-discrimination (as 
embedded in the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment principles) 
and a commitment to transparency. But TRIPs is also an innovation, having 
established minimum standards of protection and guidelines for enforcement, while 
giving member countries discretion in how these standards are implemented (Carlos, 
Carsten and Claudia, 2004). 
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5.3: The Structure of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement consists 
of seven parts and seventy three Articles given in Appendix Box A.5.1 
5.3.1: General Provisions and Basic Principles 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets out general 
provisions and basic principles, notably, a National Treatment Commitment and the 
Most Favoured Nation treatment (MFN) commitment. According to the Article 3 of 
the TRIPs agreements, the National Treatment, "each member shall accord to the 
nations of other members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own 
nations" for the protection of Intellectual Property (GATT, 1994). 
Article IV of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement stipulates the Most Favoured Nation Clause, "Any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by a member to the nationals of any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all 
members"(GATi; 1994). 
Article 63 introduces the principle of transparency also as a general obligation. 
Members are required to publish law and regulations as well as final judicial decisions 
and administrative rulings related to the agreement. The intention is to allow 
governments and right holders to acquaint themselves with measures that can affect 
their interest in the area of Intellectual Property Rights. 
5.3.2: Standards 
Part II of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
(establishes minimum standards governing the availability, scope, and use of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). it covers eight categories of Intellectual Property 
(IP), namely, 
(I) Copyrights and Related Rights, 
(II) Trade Marks, 
(III) Geographical Indication, 
(IV) Industrial Design, 
(V) Patents, 
(VI) Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits, 
(VII) Protection of Undisclosed Information and 
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(VIII) Control of Anticompetitive Practices in Contractual Licenses. 
Earlier, patents, industrial design and trademarks were considered as three 
different type of industrial property. These forms of industrial property along with the 
others, mentioned above, are now referred to as Intellectual Property (IP). Basics 
about all these types of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are dealt with here. 
(I) Copy Rights and Related Rights 
Copyrights provides for protection of literary and artistic works. This includes 
'literary works' such as books, short stories, poems, other writings instruction 
manuals, catalogues, 'dramatic works' including plays, films, scripts, scenarios and 
other intended to be performed such as 'choreographic works', musical works, 
'photographic works' and audio visual works, etc (Bagchi, 2007). 
Copyright law protects the work of authors from the time they create it 
(typically when the material is first produced). It covers the original expression of an 
idea, rather than the idea itself RELATED or neighboring rights, on the other hand, 
protect the work of performers, phonogram, producers and broad casters (Khan, 
2005). 
The term of the copyright is the life of the author of the work, plus 60 years with 
certain exceptions. Copyrights law which is undergoing changes and as per the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) it will be valid for a period of 
25 years from the date of registration. Copyright is a kind of Intellectual Property the 
importance of which has increased in recent times due to rapid technological 
development. The object of copyright law is to protect the author of copyright work 
from an unlawful reproduction. It is essential to encourage exploitation of copyright 
work for the benefit of the public. 
Remedies granted the copyright are more powerful than those provided under 
any other regime of Intellectual Property Protection (IPP). For some products there is 
choice between patent copyright protections. 
(II) Trademarks 
Trademarks are commercial symbols used to identify goods and services or 
their producers. A trademark is 'any sign or any combination of signs, capable of 
distinguishing the goods and services of one undertaking from those of the other 
undertakings'. The law of trademark is based mainly on two concepts- distinctiveness 
and deceptive similarity (Basen and Raskind, 2004). 
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Trademark protection differs from the other forms of Intellectual Property, 
(IP) both in legal basis and its economic function. There is no constitutional 
foundation for trademark protection unlike patents and copyrights (Naik, 2006). 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement 
negotiates that trademarks should be registered for a period of not less than 7 years. 
The term of protection between registration and its renewal is to be not less than 7 
years, and indefinite renewal is to be allowed. A registered trademark may be 
cancelled if it is not used for a continuous period of at least 3 years. 
Patents require novelty, copyright requires originality and the counterpart of 
these terms for trademark is distinctiveness. 
(III) Geographical Indications 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement 
defines Geographical Indications which identify a good as originating in the territory 
of a member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality reputation 
or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. 
Geographical indication requirements specify that the quality, reputation or other 
characteristics of a good can each be sufficient basis for eligibility as a geographical 
indication. The agreement provides that interested parties must have legal means to 
prevent the use of indications that mislead the public, especially, with respect to 
geographical origin of the good and use of which shall constitute an act of unfair 
competifion (Bhatt, 2006). 
(IV) Industrial Design 
Design means only features of shapes, configuration, pattern or ornamental 
applied to any article by any industrial process or means whether manual, mechanical 
or chemical. In order to be registrable a design must be new, or original not 
previously published. 
Industrial design protects the ornamental features of a useful product (the 
shape of the article, and lines, designs and colours). There are fourteen classes under 
which design can be registered, viz., metal, glass, textiles, leather, rubber, etc. 
Industrial design is protected for a period of 10 years under the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. The agreement furnishes that the 
owners of protected design/registered design must be able to prevent the manufacture, 
sale or importation of articles bearing or embodying a design, which is a copy of the 
protected design (Akask, 2007). 
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(V) Patents 
One of the oldest forms of protection of Intellectual Property is patent. A 
patent may be granted on any new and useful process, machine, and manufacture, 
composition of matter, improvement and plant as well as to new, original and 
ornamental design for an article of manufacture. A patent is a monopoly right granted 
to a person who has invented a new and useful article, or an improvement of an 
existing article, or a new process of making an article. The patent right is the most 
powerful in the Intellectual Property system, enabling the patent holder (patentee) to 
exclude all others from making, selling or using the subject matter. Any use of the 
patented subject matter requires permission of the patentee during the term of the 
patent. The subject matter enters the public domain or anybody can make use of the 
invention after the expiry of the duration of the patent (Debroy and Saqib, 2005). 
The scope of protection offered by a patent is determined by its claim, which 
is technical descriptions of the process machine, method contained in the original 
patent application. The purpose of patent is to provide a form of protection for 
technological advances. The patent protection provides a reward not only for the 
creation of an invention, but also for the development of an invention to the point at 
which it is technologically feasible and marketable. It promotes additional creativity 
and encourages companies to continue their development of new technology to the 
point at which it is useful to the public and desirable for the public good (Analil, 
2000). 
What can be Patented? 
A patent is granted for an invention. According to the Indian Patent Act, 1970, 
'invention' means any new and useful; 
(I) Art, process, method or manner of manufacture, 
(II) Machine, apparatus or other article and 
(III) Substance produced by manufacture and includes any new and useful 
improvement of any of them. 
To be patentable, an invention must be 
(I) Non-obvious for someone skilled in the art, i.e., not simply be an extension of 
something that already exists-it must require some inventive steps, 
(II) Novel or not previously known and 
(III) Industrially applicable in someway (Ingco and Nash, 2005). 
100 
Article 27.1 states, "subject to the provisions of paragraphs II and III, patent 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new and involve an inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application". 
For granting of a patent, one of the most urgent requirement is that the 
invention covered by the patent must not have been published anywhere in the world 
even by the author. It should also not have been displayed in a scientific 
workshop/exhibition, etc. The details of invention must not be in public knowledge. 
Under the TRIPs agreement, patents can be given for products and processes 
and are limited to a fixed period-at least 20 years. After which the invention moves 
into the public region and can be used by anyone (Tansey, 2005). 
What cannot be Patented? 
(I) A method of agriculture or horticulture, 
(II) An invention which is unfavorable to well established natural laws, 
(III) The mere discovery of any new property or the mere use of a known process, 
machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product, 
(IV) The mere discovery of a scienfific principle or formulation of an abstract 
theory, 
(V) Inventions relating to atomic energy and 
(VI) A method or process of testing for rendering the machine/equipment more 
efficient. 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement 
goes against the Patent Act of India 1970. The Indian Patent Act precludes nuclear 
energy, method of agriculture and horticulture and biotechnological processes and 
products from patentability, the TRIPs agreement makes all these methods and 
products patentable. Process patents grant only to food, medicines, drugs and 
chemical products, by the Indian Act, whereas the TRIPs agreement allows product 
patents also in these areas. The Indian Act negotiates a shorter duration of patent (5 to 
7 years for products for which only process patent is granted and 14 years for those 
for which product patent is granted), while the TRIPs agreement will have 20 years in 
both cases. There is no specific provision for compulsory licensing of right of patent 
under the TRIPs agreement as is there in the Indian Patent Act (Singh and 
Nandkeoliyar,2001). 
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Evaluation Criteria of Innovations for Patenting 
Evaluation involves answering the following questions satisfactorily. 
Inventiveness 
(I) What is the object of the invention? What are the problems or difficulties the 
inventor seeks to surmount? Have these problems been surmounted in reality? 
(II) What are the new and additional features of this invention over what has been 
published or known? 
(III) What is the relevant known information related to this invention? 
(IV) Has a systematic and structured prior art search been done on local and 
international database? 
(V) How does this invention differ from the prior art or from what is known in 
related fields? 
Non-Obviousness 
(I) Have any experimental tests been conducted to show that the prior art does not 
sufficiently solve the problem being tackled by the present invention? and 
(II) Can this invention be considered as an 'obvious extension of the present state of 
knowledge in this field'? 
(VI) Layout Design of Integrated Circuits 
The need for an international system for integrated circuits arose as a 
significance of the development and spin-off characteristics of new technologies, 
playing a significant role in international trade and competition. An integrated circuit 
is a high utility product with multifarious applications for electronic industry. Unlike 
industrial designs, layout design of integrated circuits are highly functional and help 
to reduce the dimensions or increase the functions of integrated circuits incorporated 
in semiconductor chips-which are merged into a variety of products-computers, 
washing machine, etc (Watal, 2001). 
The. Uruguay Round agreement on integrated circuits requires protection on the basis 
of the Washington Treaty with the following additional requirements; 
(I) Protection available for a minimum period of 10 years. 
(II) Compulsory licensing is allowed only under strict conditions. 
(III) The rights must extend to articles incorporating infringing layout design. 
Trade Secrets and know how 
'Any formula, pattern, device of information which is used in one's business, and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 
102 
know or use it'. It has been described as Trade-Secret. Trade secret law covers 
specific business information transmitted by persons, firms and markets (Mathur, 
2005). 
Article 39.2 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement states, 'the protection must apply to information that is secret that 
has commercial value because, it is a secret that has been subject to reasonable steps 
to keep it secret'. The 'undisclosed information' provision needs to provide higher 
level of protection for highly technical areas along with commercial implication of 
information and sensitiveness. Undisclosed information is another TRIPs provision 
that does not specify the term of protection by virtue of its utility. 
(VII) Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses 
The last section of Part II of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) agreement addresses the use of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to 
impose abusive contract terms that might inhibit the transfer and diffusion of 
technology. Article 40 recognises that licensing practices and the exercise of 
Intellectual Property Rights may have anticompetitive effects. But it gives member 
countries discretion over implementing measures to counter such practices, on the 
condition that they should not conflict with other provisions of the agreement. 
5.3.3: The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
Part III of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
agreement introduces detailed provisions for Intellectual Property Rights 
enforcement. This part sets out the obligations of member governments to provide 
procedures and remedies under their own domestic laws to ensure that the Intellectual 
Property Rights can be effectively enforced. 
Under the general obligations for enforcement, members are required to 
provide 'expeditious to prevent infringements and remedies with constitute deterrent 
to further infringements' (GATT, 1994). These measures should be fair and equitable, 
not overly complex or expensive, available to both foreign and national right holders, 
they must allow for judicial review of final administrative decisions. 
5.3.4: Acquisition and Maintenance of Intellectual Property Rights 
Article 62 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement confirms disciplines for imposing conditions on the maintenance 
of Intellectual Property Rights. It basically requires that these procedures and 
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formalities be consistent with the overall provisions of the agreement and that they 
should be expeditious enough 'to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the period of 
protection'. 
5.3.5: Dispute Prevention and Settlement 
One important outcome of the Uruguay Round is the integrated dispute 
settlement mechanism that provides automatic procedures and strict timetables 
(Jackson 1994). Dispute over Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) matters will be handled by a dispute settlement body established in Article II 
of the 'understanding of rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes' of 
the Marrakesh agreement. 
5.3.6: Transitional Arrangements 
The agreement envisages a one-year period for developed countries to bring 
their legislations and practices in conformity with the WTO rulings. The developing 
countries and transition economies must do so in 5 years, whereas least developed 
countries in 11 years. However, countries like India, which do not at present provide 
product patent protection in an area of technology, must do so in 10 years. 
5.3.7: Institutional Arrangements; Final Provisions 
The agreement concludes with a series of articles addressing the creation of a 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) council for monitoring 
the agreement and helping members implement it, an exhortation for international co-
operation, measures to address obligations for protecting pre-existing subject matter, 
and conditions for review, amendment, reservations and security exceptions. 
5.4: Patents and India 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement 
lays down minimum standards of protection and enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) in member countries and requires them to bring their laws and 
Regulation on Intellectual Property (IP) into conformity with their obligations with in 
the time negotiated in the agreement. Patents, which constitute one element of 
Intellectual Property (IP), come in the purview of the TRIPs agreement. 
The TRIPs agreement indicates a phased schedule of implementation of the 
agreement according to the level of development of the member countries. The 
developed countries were provided 1 year to bring their legislation in tune with 
provisions of this agreement that is by January 1, 1996, whereas the developing 
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countries were provided 4 more years to implement the provisions of this agreement, 
i.e., January 1, 2000 (Watal, 1997). This deadline expired on December 31, 1999. 
Further, an additional period of 5 years was provided to those developing countries 
that did not provide for product patent in certain areas mainly, in the areas of 
pharmaceuticals, food and agricultural chemicals. 
During the transition period relating to the extension of product patent 
protection to pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals. The agreement specified 
certain conditions relating to a 'MAIL BOX' in which product patent applications can 
be received during the transition period for consideration with effect from January 1, 
2005. In the transition period. Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMRs) are to be granted 
for a period of 5 years from the date of obtaining marketing approval in the country or 
until a product patent is granted or rejected, whichever period is shorter. India has 
already made these transitional arrangements through an amendment of the Patent Act 
1970, notified on March 26, 1999. 
Apart from the recent amendments made in March 1999, the Patent Act, 1970 
has not under gone any change. However, there has been considerable technological 
innovation and development of knowledge, and the concept of Intellectual Property 
(IP) as a resource for knowledge based industries has become well recognised the 
world over during this period of time. Devlopment of technological capability in India 
coupled with the need for property regime require that the Patent Act, 1970 be 
modified into a modem, harmonised and user-friendly Act to adequately protect 
national and public interests, while simultaneously meeting India's international 
obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
agreement. Cosequently, an amendment took place in the form of Patent Act 2005. 
However, to minimise the negative impact of this amendment, a number of safeguards 
have been brought in to the law. While many of these measures do safeguard public 
interests, at least some of the amendments raise fundamental questions about their 
legal validity and appropriateness (Pillai, 2005). 
With the omission of the controversial section 5 from the principal Act, 1970, 
patents shall now be available for inventions claiming pharmaceutical, food and 
agricultural chemical products for a term of 20 years. The exceptions to this general 
norm on patentability are the subject matters specified in section 3 of the Patents Act. 
Currently, a joint reading of sections 2(1) (j), 2((1) (I) with section 3 would determine 
the general ambit of patentability under the Indian law (Pillai, 2005). 
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Under amended Act, patent means a patent for any invention granted under 
this Act. After routing an application for patent through the 'Mail Box', all that a 
patentee can ask for is 'reasonable' royalty from an Indian company, which would 
continue to commercially exploit the claimed invention. As such, this provision has 
the potential of nullifying the purpose of the transitional protection provided in the 
TRIPs agreement. In case of agriculture, it is very likely that this new provision will 
add to the suffering of farmers, because under the new trading environment, farmers 
are asked to use patented seeds for which they have to pay the royalty to the 
companies, which in turn, will push the farmers in new debt burden. It seems as if 
amended Patent Act 2005 is not TRIPs complaint. 
The implication for agriculture of a new patent regime is mainly with regard to 
availability and price of seed for farmers. The new seed policy enables self-
certifications by the private manufacturers. Cooperatives and NGOs. There are about 
100 national seed laboratories and 20 State seed certification agencies in the country 
(Yerram, 2005). The Andhra Pradesh States Seeds Certification Agency was not able 
to meet the growing demand for certified seed and there were numerous complaints 
from the farmers that the seed certified by such organisation did not germinate in 
large number of cases. The compensations for failure also in dangered the interests, as 
they were not related to the input costs till the stage failure was noticed. In testing of 
new varieties and hybrids prior to commercial production, several violations to 
scientific norms were also noticed (Janaiah, 2004). In other words, regulatory 
mechanism to enforce standards is in the nascent stages not only in India, but also in 
several other developing nations. 
For a number of the developing countries with an agricultural based economy, 
the patent system poses a variety of problems. First the patent system is unlikely to 
work as an incentive to local innovations, except in countries with a significant 
private scientific and technological infrastructure. At the same time, the agreement, by 
not recognising Community Property Rights to traditional knowledge, has led 
commercial firms in developed countries seeking to obtain property rights to 
traditional or product varieties (basmati rice and the bank of the neem tree are the 
good examples). The agreement may also result in constraints on farmers use of their 
own seed saved from harvest for replanting and it is tended to encourage patents in 
process involving biotechnology aimed at providing substitute for existing developing 
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countries exports. Also, developing countries have experienced difficulties in 
implementing the procedures and legal commitments required by agreement. 
5.5: Protection of Plant Varieties 
In Article 27 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
agreement, the protection of plant verities is established, which defines the fields for 
application of patents. 
5.6.1: Patentable Subject Matter 
The Uruguay Round agreement has a rather inoffensive sounding Article 27 
on patentable subject matter. According to the Article 27.1 of the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, "Subject to the provisions 
of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products 
or processes, in all fields of technology provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application". 
Three sub paragraphs in Article 27 of the TRIPs agreement permit exceptions 
to the basic rule on patentability: 
Article 27.2 applies when members want to prevent the commercial 
exploitation of the invention to protect order public morality. This positively includes 
inventions that are dangerous to human, animal or plant life or health or are seriously 
pre-judicial to the environment. 
Article 27.3 (b) permits WTO members to exclude from patentability "plants 
and animals other than micro organism and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and micro biological 
processes. However, members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either 
by patents or by an effective sui-generis system or by any combination there of. 
A sui-generis system of protection is a special system adapted to a particular 
subject matter, as opposed to protection provided by the existing patent or copyright 
systems or one of the other main systems of Intellectual Property Protection (IPP). 
Thus, countries can make their own rules to protect new plant varieties with some 
form of Intellectual Property Rights, (IPRs) provided that such protection is effective 
(Tansey, 2005). 
These provisions compel WTO members to introduce Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) for plant verities, either through patents or through an original and 
efficient system to protect new plant varieties at national level, as for examples, the 
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system of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant 
(UPOV). It was established in 1961 (but came into force in 1968). This was amended 
twice in 1978 and in 1991. It issues a 'new variety certificate' for the protection of 
new varieties of plants (Analil, 2005). 
To be eligible for protection, a variety must be: 
New: the variety must not have been exploited commercially, 
Distinct: it must be clearly distinguishable from all other verities known at the 
application for protection, 
Uniform: all plants of the variety must be sufficiently uniform to allow it to be 
distinguished from other varieties taking into account the method of reproduction of 
the species and 
Stable: it must be possible for a variety to be reproduced unchanged. 
A new variety can be protected in this way, and users must pay royalties to the 
right holder, with two exceptions; 
(I) Research purposes: plant breeders may use a variety protected by a 'new variety 
certificate', provided it is for the purpose of creating a new variety without having to 
pay royalties. 
(II) The 'farmer's priviledge': a farmer may use the products of his harvest for 
seeding purposes, provided it is for his personal use. In the 1978 convention, this 
'privilege' was compulsory. In the 1991 version, however, it is optional (it is up to the 
signatory country) and it can be exercised as long as the legitimate interests of the 
inventor of the variety are safeguard. Among the countries that signed the 1991 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV) convention, 
this article is applied either by authorising farmers to produce farm-seeds without 
restrictions or to levy a tax on farm-seeds. 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV) 1991 
version comprises significantly higher standards of protection. It impels the system of 
protection closer to the patents. It further strengthens the monopoly rights of the 
breeder of a new variety. The breeder's exemption and the farmer's exemption have 
been considerably curtailed. The 1991 version is much less favorable to farmers 
(Analil, 2005). 
Initially, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant 
(UPOV) convention was adopted by 5 European countries and membership was 
restricted, but now membership is opened to all countries. At present, 46 countries 
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belong to International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV). 
Any new country wishing to join International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plant (UPOV) must now do so under the 1991 version. 
The main difference between protection through patents or through the 
certificate issued but International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant 
(UPOV) is that it is not possible to use a variety protected by a patent without paying 
royalties, even for research or farming purpose. This system reinforces considerably 
the 'new variety certificate'. In practice, patents protect all varieties of Genetically 
Modified Organism (GMO). Without paying royalties, it is illegal and is, therefore, 
considered as an act of piracy. Without a patent, returns on investments of 
biotechnology companies would be in sufficient. Genetically Modified Organism 
GMO's can only be profitable if they are patented. 
5.6: Concern of Developing Countries on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
Developing countries expressed strong reservations about the implementation 
of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement and 
they put forward several reasons for this. 
5.6.1: The Use of Farm Seeds 
It is usually permitted under other forms of plant variety protection, forbidden 
by patents. This is an extremely important issue because the use by farmer's part of 
their harvest for future sowing is a very widespread practice in over 90 percent of 
developing countries. 
Multinational Corporations (MNC's) were interested in seed patents, as that 
could have guaranteed the seed market. In many developed countries, seed production 
is now in the hands of Multinational Corporations, (MNC's) who have brought up all 
the smaller seed companies. Forcing farmers to buy their seeds every year creates 
several problems, the first one being obviously the cost. The type of available 
varieties is another. In general, seed companies do not offer all existing varieties for 
sale, specially local and traditional varieties. Forcing farmers to purchase seeds every 
year is an enormous asset for seed companies, giving them the power to control which 
varieties are cultivated. This could also lead to a loss of bio-diversity. 
However, in India this strategy cannot work, as there are no seed companies of 
any significant size that can be acquired. It is the farmers themselves who are the 
109 
largest seed producers with 87 percent. So, if Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
have to control seed production, they have to knock out the farmers from the market. 
By opting for the sui-generis system, the government has effectively blocked this 
strategy. 
Developing countries would like the principle of the 'farmer's previledge' to 
be recognised by the WTO agreement. But the major seed companies are completely 
opposed to this proposal, as it goes against their immediate financial interests and they 
are, therefore, exerting pressure on their governments. To prevent farmers from using 
farm seeds, biotechnological companies have been perfected a transgenic process, 
known as 'terminator'; by its detractors, that makes seeds from transgenic plant 
sterile. Seed companies have nevertheless developed research programmes to 
genetically restrict the 'farmer's priviledge'. 
5.6.2: Life Patenting and Bio-Piracy 
For the developing countries like India, the problem of life patenting and bio-
piracy is a very serious aspect. The leading biotechnology companies have drawn up 
an inventory of plants and micro-organisms are genetically modified, patented and 
then marketed. 
Big firms have also carried out field research among indigenous people to find 
out how they use medicinal plants. Once they acquire the necessary knowledge, they 
transform these locals' practices into mass produced medicines for the profit of the 
major companies. 
Haldi and neem have become the symbols of piracy in India. India's ancient 
use of Haldi, for medical remedy and healing property was sought to be patented 
under the American law in 1995. Luckily for India, Dr R.A Moshelkar, Director 
General of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research challenged it (Sharma and 
Ran 2005). The US patent office acknowledged its mistake and cancelled the patent 
on 'Haldi', however, for that CSIR was to delve deep in Vedas, Susrat charita and 
other ancient books to prove itself Similar was the case of patent right for Neem as a 
pesticide. Basmati rice, which was a universal variety in India, was tried to be 
patented as kasmati and texmati. 
Now, danger lurks with regard to Tulsi plant. These are a few cases of bio-
piracy and to prevent huge losses. There is urgent need to implement the laws 
forcefully and to create awareness at the mass level about these flora and fauna. 
The impact of both approaches on developing countries is the same: 
(I) The local people are deprived of their resources and can longer use the plants or 
medicinal formulas once they have been patented and 
(II) Above all, they do not derive any profits from commercialisation of plants or 
medicines, even though they are at the origin of the medicinal formulae and it is they 
who search for, cultivate and protect the plants coveted by big firms. 
5.7: The Preservation of Bio-Diversity 
The term 'bio-diversity' (or biological diversity) covers all that composes the 
living world: diversity of environments (ecosystems), diversity of species and genetic 
diversity with in the same species. This biological diversity is the common heritage of 
humanity. 
Introduction of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in agriculture may lead to 
erosion of biological diversity of cultivated plant species as more and more area 
would be occupied by genetically uniform crops, which will narrow the base of 
cultivated crops. On the issue of biodiversity of agriculture, the implication of 
Intellectual Property Rights is doubtful. However, patents are leading to privatisation 
of the biodiversity. An individual or a firm discovering a new plant variety can apply 
for a patent to protect the discovery. This prevents other people from freely using this 
plant variety, as well as from controlling or managing it. 
Individuals, who become owner of plant varieties, are only interested in those 
that offer potential profits. Their research, therefore, focuses on a small number of 
varieties. The interesting varieties thus, replace the others. They are cultivated more 
intensively, research concentrates on improving or protecting them. This results in the 
loss of bio-diversity. This question is of particular concern to developing countries, 
since, they have a very rich biological diversity. 
Bio-diversity is found in the poor and marginal farmer's field. The small scale 
subsistance farmers under the traditional law input framing system and mixed 
cropping pattern not only maintains but, year after year, further generates bio-
diversit)'. The industrialised nations have the technology but they do not have the bio-
resources, which are located in developing countries. The Harmonised Intellectual 
Property Regime is an attempt by these technology-rich-nations to create instruments 
to gain access to the bio-diversity and genetic wealth of developing countries and then 
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after minor modification such as 'reshuffling of genes' to convert that bio-diversity 
into Intellectual Property over which they can claim Exclusive Rights. 
5.8: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
and India 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement has 
significance in Indian agriculture because of rich bio-diversity. This agreement 
provides that technologies used in the production of traded goods will be patented and 
their use for production will not be made by any country, except the one where it has 
been patented. This will obviously make many of the imported commodities, using 
patented technology, more costly. So far as India is concerned, it is the cost of new 
varieties of imported seeds, which will increase, as the technology used in their 
development is obviously a foreign one. Thus, agriculture production may suffer. 
The general perception about Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) has been that it had been contrived by the developed countries to 
exploit the developing countries particularly in the fields of agriculture. But most 
recently, with a better under standing of the conditions of the agreement, that 
perception has undergone a change. Now it is realised that agreement holds immense 
possibilities, which will depend on how carefully we examine the conditions, access 
the implications and evolve strategies to counter the trades and exploit the 
opportunities. Sidhu, (1999) does not agree with the view that higher prices of 
imported seeds will adversely affect the growth of agricultural sector in India. 
According to him, despite the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs), it is not obligatory for the Indian farmers to use the imported 
seed if it is not economically remunerative, when judged in terms of productivity. 
Further, under the TRIPs provisions, fanners can use retain seed or seed received in 
exchange from other farmers? Moreover, the agreement on TRIPs does not cover self-
pollinated seeds like those of wheat and rice (Praveen, 2006). As a matter of fact, 
seeds of only a few plants are likely to be patented, i.e., only those which satisfied the 
criteria of 'novelty and distinctness'. It has been pointed out that India has a very 
strong infrastructure for plant breeding in the form of research and development 
organisation (Sharma, 2006). 
While in the light of above assertion, there is no need to take special steps to 
discourage the imports of hybrid seeds, developed in foreign countries. We must 
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continue the ban on the import of terminator seeds even it is quite cost effective till 
we ourselves are able to develop such a seed. 
Steps against bio-piracy are also extremely necessary. As a precautionary 
measure, foreign multinational should not be allowed to engage themselves in India, 
in the development of new plant varieties. 
In case of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), it is 
suggested that Indian agriculture should demand the preservation of traditional 
peasant practices, in particular the right to make their own seeds, trade them and sell 
their harvest. 
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Chapter 6 
International Competitiveness of Indian Agriculture 
6.1: Introduction 
Agriculture in India is more a livelihood matter than a commercial venture. 
Therefore, it is necessary to build capacities in the system, such that it is able to 
withstand the forces of globalisation and compete wherever possible. 
The decade of 1990's witnessed two significant developments that have 
profound impact on agriculture trade. The first development relates to liberalisation of 
economic policy as part of the economic reform programmes initiated in 1991. The 
second development concerns the new international trade regime following Uruguay 
Round agreement and formation of WTO. With the signing of WTO agreements that 
envisaged trade liberalisation, it was contended that India would have greater export 
growth in agricultural commodities and a favourable price environment for farm 
imports (Kaushik, 2006). Globalisation of Indian agriculture, as a result of WTO rules 
applicable to all the countries on the one hand, will provide it with opportunities in the 
international market and on the other, will expose it to competition from foreign 
supplier in the domestic market and force the domestic producers to adopt more 
efficient techniques of production. The view of many economists that if the. WTO 
rules are sincerely followed by all countries, both developed and underdeveloped, 
India is likely to benefit significantly from the globalisation of Indian agriculture, by 
way of an increase in the exports of agricultural commodities (Patil, 2005). This is 
because India has a comparative cost advantage in the production of many agricultural 
commodities. 
The agriculture exports have mainly been stressed under the new economic 
policy introduced in India in the year 1991 and the present world trade environment 
has opened up new opportunities and challenges for the Indian economy in this 
regard. The Government of India (2004) has made out a case that India had benefited 
form joining the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and its successor 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
However, there is dismay amongst many even today as to how India can 
export agricultural production, particularly food items, when a vast majority of the 
population is struggling to meet their basic consumption needs (Dattatreyule, 1994). 
Increasing production on a sustained basis, rising exportable surplus after catering the 
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domestic needs and quality improvement through proper processing are amongst the 
major essential conditions for export promotion of agricultural products. However, the 
reduction in tariffs and the removal of trade restrictions have exposed the Indian 
agriculture to unexpected challenges. 
Contrary to expectations and anticipations, the price situation changed 
dramatically after implementation of Uruguay Round Agreement. International prices 
of agriculture commodities have dropped to a very low level, and domestic prices 
have turned higher than the international prices. This has rendered Indian market 
attractive for import of several agriculture commodities. Moreover, in order to boost 
up agriculture export from India, it became necessary to improve the quality of 
agriculture output and to change the rural mind set for producing exportable goods. 
But this was not an easy task. Resource constraints and infrastructural bottlenecks 
have always been major hurdles in the way of agriculture. 
It is against this backdrop that an attempt is made in this chapter to analyse 
the growth performance of agriculture trade in India during 1995-96 to 2005-06. An 
assessment is also made as how much Indian agriculture trade has gained vis-a-vis the 
commitments given under Agreement on Agriculture. 
6.2: Methodological Issues 
The analysis of agriculture trade has been carried out using the broad trends in 
agriculture import and export as well as commodity wise export and import. Export 
competitiveness of individual agricultural goods in the present study is examined 
using Nominal Protection Co efficient (NPC), which is the ratio of domestic and 
international price indices. For domestic prices, we have taken wholesale price indices 
for selected agricultural goods and converted the series taking 1995=100 as the base 
year. For corresponding international prices, which were given in International 
Financial Statistics yearbook, no uniformity was found amongst the prices of a 
commodity for different countries. Thus, we set-up a bench mark and added up the 
prices of a particular commodity for different commodities year wise and converted 
the added series into an index of international prices taking 1995=100.This was done 
to compare the domestic and international price indices for each commodity. 
Mainly four measures are used to analyse export competitiveness and to find 
comparative advantage in export/ import of different commodities. Based on these 
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measures, one can find how resources should be re-allocated among different uses to 
improve their efficiency and to increase return to these resources. These measures are 
(I) Nominal Protection Co-efficient (NPC) 
(II) Effective Protection Co-efficient (EPC) 
(III) Effective Subsidy Co-efficient (ESC) 
(IV) Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) 
Out of these, first three measures are generally used to find the level of 
protection/disposition given to different commodities. They also reveal 
competitiveness for export. The fourth measure, i.e., Domestic Resource Cost reveals 
real cost of export to earn given amount from export and is used to find out whether it 
is worthwhile to use domestic resources for producing a commodity for export. 
(1) Nominal Protection Co-efficient (NPC) 
The Nominal Protection Coefficient is a ratio of domestic price to border 
price. Algebraically, it can be represented by the following formula 
Equation (6.1) 
NPCi = P^ / P^ 
Where, 
NPCi = Nominal protection coefficient of the commodity i. 
P. = Domestic price of commodity i. 
P^ = World reference price (border price-equivalent) of 
commodity i, adjusted for transportation, handling 
and marketing expenses. 
Nominal Protection Coefficient helps measure the divergence of domestic 
price from the world market price and thus determined the degree of export 
competitiveness of the commodities under consideration. The price variables capture 
the influence of various inefficiencies and distortions in different segment of the 
commodity sectors. However, Nominal Protection Coefficient is merely a rough 
estimation of export competitiveness of a particular commodity, as it fails to adjust for 
distortion in traded input prices that are often caused by tax/subsidy policies on 
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various inputs. Nominal Protection Coefficient greater than unity indicates effective 
incentive to producers compared to free trade scenario and Nominal Protection 
Coefficient lower than one indicates that the commodity is disprotected. Also, NPC < 
1 indicates the commodity is exportable or the commodity under consideration has a 
competitive advantage in exports. In other words, the commodity in question is export 
competitive. 
(II) Effective Protection Co-efficient 
Effective Protection Coefficient is an improvement over Nominal Protection 
Coefficient to the extent that it takes care of variation in domestic and international 
prices of tradable inputs. It is defined as the ratio of value added at domestic prices to 
the value added at border prices, expressed in local currency and is given by: 
Equation (6.2) 
EPCi 
( 
a 
A 
j = i 
Q. 
\ 
,w w 
Qi's in this expression cancels out and the whole expression in terms of value reduces 
to: 
EPCi 
V . 
; 
Where, 
EPCi 
Qi 
P. 
I 
d 
tW 
Effective Protection Coefficient of the Commodity i 
quantity of output of ith commodity 
Domestic price of commodity i 
World reference Price (border price-equivalent) of 
commodity i, adjusted for transportation, handling 
and marketing expenses 
Quantity of jth input required to produce a unit of 
commodity i 
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pW World reference Price (border price-equivalent) of 
rW 
Jth traded input, adjusted for transportation, handling 
and marketing expenses 
Value added at domestic prices 
Value added at world references prices (border price 
equivalent) 
Like Nominal Protection Coefficient, Effective Protection Coefficient greater 
than unity indicates effective incentives to producers compared to free trade scenario 
and vice versa. 
(Ill) Effective Subsidy Co-efficient 
Effective Subsidy Coefficient is further improvement over Nominal Protection 
Co-efficient, as it takes into account the subsidies and taxes on traded inputs. It is the 
ratio of value added at domestic price adjusted for subsidies and taxes to the value 
added at border price. It is calculated as under: 
Where Sj and Tj are subsidies and taxes respectively 
Equation (6.3) 
ESCi = 
Q; Pf^ - lAijP^ + 
J 
lAiJS - TAiJT 
[j = k + \ J j = k + l J 
Q^ tW • HAijP] 
7 = 1 ^ 
w 
Where, 
ESC i = Effective Subsidy Co-efficient of commodity i, 
Si and Ti are subsidies and taxes respectively, while other expressions are same, as 
mentioned above. 
(IV) Domestic Resource Cost 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) is the value of domestic resources needed to 
earn a unit of foreign exchange through export or save a unit of foreign exchange 
through import substitution by production of the commodity under consideration. The 
domestic resource included primary non-traded factors of production such as land 
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labour and non-traded capital. In Domestic Resource Cost calculations, value of 
domestic resources is estimated at their opportunity cost or shadow prices. Domestic 
Resource Cost is computed as under: 
Equation (6.4) 
DRCi 
7=1 
In this expression Pj^  refer to shadow price of J* primary input 
6.3: Growth Performance of Agriculture Trade in India: An 
Aggregate Picture 
6.3.1: Aggregate Trends in Total Import and Export of India 
Appendix Table A.6.1 gives the broad trends in India's total export and import as well 
as agro-export and agro-import at current prices. It can be seen from this table that 
over a period of one decade, i.e., from 1995-96 to 2005-06, total national export has 
grown nearly 4.27 times from Rs. 106353.35 crores in 1995-96 to Rs. 454799.97 
crores in 2005-06 with an annual average growth rate of 15.21 percent. On the other 
hand, increase in total national import during the same period has been slightly higher 
(nearly 5.14 times) with an annual average growth rate of 16.54 percent being more 
instable than export (as indicated by CV percent). 
In order to analyse the impact of WTO negotiations on India's trade more 
comprehensively, the whole study period (1995-96 to 2005-06) has been divided in to 
two sub-periods-from 1995-96 to 2000-01 and 2000-01 to 2005-06. It can be noticed 
from Appendix Table A.6.1 that both total import and total export have registered a 
tremendous growth during the latter period (2000-01 to 2005-06) as compared to that 
in the former period (1995-96 to 2000-01). Total national import grew at an average 
growth rate of 13.94 percent per annum during 1995-96 to 2000-01 and 23.16 percent 
per annum during 2000-01 to 2005-06. Similarly, average annual growth rate of total 
national export went up from 12.55 percent during 1995-96 to 2000-01 to 18.06 
percent during 2000-01 to 2005-06. However, both import and export became more 
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instable during 2000-01 to 2005-06 as compared to 1995-96 to 2000-01. This may be 
on account of making trade policy more liberalised removal of Quantitative 
Restrictions, higher prices of products in the domestic market, etc. in latter years. The 
income elasticity of total national import was 1.43 during 1995-96 to 2005-06, 1.11 
during 1995-96 to 2000-01 and 1.95 during 2000-01 to 2005-06, indicating a sharp 
rise in the elasticity coefficient from former sub period to latter sub period under 
study. This shows our growing dependence on foreign goods. A notable feature 
observable from Appendix Table A.6.1 is that the deficit in the trade account (net 
export) has shown a regular increase through out the period under study, except in the 
year 2000-01, when it fell sharply to reach at Rs. 26950.19 crores from Rs. 56433.33 
crores in 1999-00. 
Displayed in Appendix Table 6.2 and Fig 6.1a are the annual percentage 
changes over previous year in total national import, total national export and total net 
export. It can be observed from Fig. 6.1a and Appendix Tables A.6.2 that the annual 
percentage increase in total national import over previous year has been more 
pronounced than that in total national export and consequently, percentage change in 
total net export between two consecutive years occurs with a positive sign, except in 
the year 2000-01. 
The above trends suggest that total national export grew at a slower rate than 
total national import during 1995-96 to 2005-06. However, during 2000-01 to 
2005-06, the growth of export and import witnessed a sharp turn around. The 
acceleration in the growth of export reflected buoyant global demand coupled with 
improvements in world commodity prices in 2000 and the revival of world trade 
following the Asian crisis. Besides, various exports facilitating measures announced 
by the government, significant gains in selected sectors like textiles, engineering 
goods, electronic goods, chemicals, leather and leather manufacturers, ores and 
minerals and petroleum products also contributed to this strengthening of exports 
(Economic Survey, 2001-02, PP-136). On the other hand relatively lower prices of 
most of the commodities in the international market, growing demand of high quality 
finished products by India for industrial activities and inputs for export have resulted 
sharp growth in total national import by India. 
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6.3.2: Trends in Agro- Import and Agro-Export 
It is also found from Appendix Table A.6.1 that agriculture export has been 
much higher than agriculture import through out the period under study, but as far as 
their growth rates and CV (percent) are concerned, agriculture import grew at an 
average growth rate of 13.91 percent with a CV of 39.63 percent, whereas agriculture 
export grew at an annual growth rate of 7.99 percent with a CV of 28.03 percent 
during 1995-96 to 2005-06. If the trends in agriculture trade are analysed, in the two 
sub periods, it can be observed that whereas annual average growth rate of agriculture 
import declined from 21.32 percent during 1995-96 to 2000-01 to 11.8 percent during 
2000 01 to 2005-06, annual average growth rate in agriculture export showed an 
increase from 5.48 percent during 1995-96 to 2000-01 to 11.20 percent during 2000-1 
to 2005-06. The income elasticity of agriculture import fell from 1.71 during 1995-96 
to 2000-01 to 1.02 during 2000-01 to 2005-06; it was 1.23 during 1995-96 to 
2005-06. The fall in the elasticity co-efficient with respect to national income of 
agriculture import from former sub periods to the latter sub period may be interpreted 
mainly in two ways; 
(a) Either India has developed its potential in agriculture sector (after the 
establishment of WTO) to such an extent that it relies less on agriculture 
goods from other country's and so, the increased income is spent on the import 
of other goods or 
(b) Import of machines, capital equipments, manufactured products, etc. is being 
given more priority in a hurry to catch up the industrialised nations of the 
world by achieving rapid economic development. 
Unlike total net export which was negative in almost all the years of the study 
period, net agro-export has appeared with positive sign indicating the vary 
fundamental nature of the Indian economy (which is agrarian). It may be seen from 
Appendix Table A.6.1 that net agro-export witnessed a decline between the 
consecutive years from 1997-98 to 1999-2000 and revealed fluctuating trends there 
after. 
The annual percentage change over previous year in agriculture import during 
1995-96 to 2005-06 has been on an average 15.98 percent higher than that in 
agriculture export 9.61 percent (Appendix Table A.6.2, Fig 6.1b). However, during 
2000-01 to 2005-06, annual percentage change over previous year in agriculture 
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export has been nearly double (12.16 percent) on average as compared to that in 
agriculture import (6.42 percent). The above trends caused negative moment of net 
agro-export over previous year in many years of study period being on an average 
11.99 percent. Its average rose considerably from 8.86 percent during 1995-96 to 
2000-01 to as high as 25.80 percent during 2000-01 to 2005-06. 
6.3.3: Agro-Import and Agro-Export in Relation to National Import 
and National Export 
An interesting trend which is depicted in Appendix Table A.6.1 and Fig 6.2 is 
that whereas share of agro-import to national import shows fluctuations being on 
average 5.71 percent during the reference period 1995-96 to 2005-06, share of 
agro-export to total national export reveals a systematic and continuous decline from 
1997-98 to 2005-06 (though share of agro-export in total national export has been 
15.42 percent on average, which is higher than the average share of agro-import). 
What is observed from these trends is quite interesting. One may infer from the above 
trends that India is becoming competitive in other sector and diversifying its export 
basket. 
6.3.4: Ratio of Agro- Imports and Agro- Export and Total Import and 
Total Export to GDP (at factor cost) 
Portrayed in Appendix Table 6.3 and Fig.s 6.3a and 6.3b are the trends in the 
ratio of total export and import and agro-export and agro-import in relation to Gross 
Domestic Product. It may be noticed from the Appendix Table and the figures that the 
ratio of total export to GDP has been around 10.49 percent on average during 1995-96 
to 2005-06. This average rose from 9.52 percent during 1995-96 to 2000-01 to 11.47 
percent during 2000-01 to 2005-06. On the other hand, the ratio of agro-export to 
GDP was 7.25 percent on average during 1995-96 to 2005-06. It registered a 
continuous decline from 1995-96 to 1999-2000, but increased thereafter. 
A look at the total import as percent of GDP shows embarrassing trend. Total 
import as percent of GDP has never been less than the ratio of total export to GDP. 
The average ratio of national import to GDP increased from 11.50 percent during 
1995-96 to 2000-01 to 14.33 percent during 2000-01 to 2005-06. However, the ratio 
of agro-import to GDP has been permissible. But its average also went up from the 
earlier sub period to the latter sub period under study. The increase in the ratio of 
agro-import and total import to GDP during 2000-01 to 2005-06 as compared to 
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1995-96 to 2000-01 may be attributed to the dismantling of Quantitative Restrictions 
by the Government of India on imports of most of the agricultural products in 2001. 
An annoying trend observed from Appendix Table A.6.3 is that whereas total 
GDP at factor cost registered a growth rate of 11.30 percent per annum during 1995-
96 to 2005-06, total import grew at an annual average growth rate of 16.54 percent 
and total export at 15.21 percent over the same period. Similar is the case with the 
growth of agro-export and agro-import, when compared with the growth of GDP from 
agriculture sector. 
A clear picture has come up from Appendix Table A.6.3 and Fig's 6.3 a and 
6.3 b that total national export as percent of GDP as well as agriculture export as 
percent of GDP from agriculture witnessed a decline from 1995-96 to 1999-2000, and 
thereafter the ratio of agriculture export and total export to GDP showed an increasing 
sign with fluctuations. One of the reasons among many others poor growth of 
agriculture export may be attributed to the failure of poor quality of Indian agriculture 
products to clear the international standards of quality and control set by the CAC, by 
EU, Japan and US. The factors, which are acknowledged to have limited our export, 
are infrastructural inadequacies as well as unfavourable international prices. Meeting 
the Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary requirements of most trading partners also calls for 
substantial investment in developing quality standards and infrastructure facilities. 
The ratio of total import to GDP reveals no systematic trends except from 
2003-04 to 2005-06, when it showed an increasing pattern owing to the heavy import 
of capital goods comprising of transport equipments and non-electrical machinery 
(Economic Survey, 2007-08, pp-118). Likewise, fluctuating trends can be observed in 
the ratio of agriculture import to GDP. However, during the periods 1997-98 to 
1999-00 and 2001-02 to 2004-05, it witnessed a marginal increase. 
6.4: Commodity wise Agriculture Trade in India 
6.4.1: Principal Exports of Agriculture 
Among various agriculture goods that are exported from India, 8 commodities 
are considered in quantity terms and in terms of value, in the present analysis, as 
shown in Appendix Table A.6.4. In quantity terms during 1995-96 to 2005-06, the 
largest growth rate of export was registered by wheat (48.91 percent) followed by 
pulses (16.30 percent). The lowest growth has recorded by groundnuts as (1.90 
percent). The major commodities of export during the reference period as indicated by 
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their averages include non-basmati rice, wheat and basmati rice. However, the 
maximum fluctuations can be observed in the export of cotton raw including waste. 
In terms of Rs. lakh the highest growth during the whole period under study 
can be observed in the export of fresh fruits, i.e., (17.17 percent per annum). Pulses 
and fresh vegetables are next to it in this respect. Rest of the trends are almost similar 
to those by quantity. 
The difference in the order of commodities by quantity and by value in terms 
of annual average growth rate may be attributed to the inflationary pressure. It may 
also be seen from Appendix Table A.6.4 that the extent of increase in the export of 
agriculture goods has been slightly higher in value terms as compared to that in 
quantity terms during 1995-96 to 2005-06. Cotton raw including waste is found to be 
the exception where increase in value of export has been less than the increase in 
quantity exported, though the extent of increase in its export both in quantity and in 
value terms was the highest among all other goods exported. 
Appendix Table A.6.5 exhibits the annual percentage change over previous 
year in the export of agriculture goods. The maximum change (on average) in export 
both in quantity as well as in value terms between the consecutive years occurred in 
cotton raw including waste followed by wheat in quantity terms and spices in value 
terms. The lowest annual percentage change over previous year (on average) can be 
observed in spices in quantity terms and in cashew in value terms. In quantity terms, 
the maximum fluctuations in the annual percentage change over previous year were 
found in cashew and the least in basmati rice. But in value terms, spices replaced 
cashew. 
The total agro-export during 1995-96 to 2005-06 on average accounted for 
9.21 percent of spices, 8.81 percent of non-basmati rice, 6.15 percent of basmati rice, 
6.12 percent of cashew, etc.(Appendix Table A.6.6). The lowest share was that of 
groundnuts (1.18 percent). As stated earlier, cotton raw including waste has been the 
most instable item of agro-export. The agriculture goods, which witnessed a fall in 
their average shares of export in total agro-export from 1995-96 to 2000-01 to 2005-
06, included non basmati rice, basmati rice, groundnuts, cotton raw including waste 
and cashew. On the other hand, the average shares of wheat, pulses, fresh fruits and 
fresh vegetables in total agro-export have gone up. 
The share of the agriculture goods considered in the present analysis in total 
export from India reveals the fact that most of the agriculture goods comprise of less 
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than 1 percent share (on average) in total export during 1995-96 to 2005-06 with 
spices being the most instable item of export (Appendix Table A.6.7). Among all 
agricultural commodities, spices, cashew, basmati and non-basmati rice comprise 
greater share of export during the period under study. When two sub periods under 
study, i.e., from 1995-96 to 2000-01 and from 2000-01 to 2005-06 are considered, it 
is found that most of the commodities registered a decline in their average shares in 
total export, except wheat, fresh fruits and fresh vegetables, which increased slightly. 
6.4.2: Principal Agro-Imports of India 
Trends in major agriculture goods imported by India are depicted in Appendix 
Table A.6.8. It is apparent from this table that in terms of annual average growth rate 
during 1995-96 to 2005-06, cotton raw including waste, spices, pulses and cashew 
nuts are the major items of agriculture import for India with cotton raw including 
waste being again the most instable item of agriculture import (in terms of value). For 
most of the commodities the increase in import has been higher in value terms than in 
quantity terms during 1995-96 to 2005-06, indicating the influence of price changes 
of imported items. 
The annual percentage changes in import of the items being considered are 
given in Appendix Table A.6.9. The table shows that rice has recorded the greatest 
annual percentage change over previous year on average followed by wheat both in 
quantity and in value terms. The movement of import of wheat by quantity and value 
between the consecutive years has been most instable in comparison to other items of 
import. India is facing challenges in safeguarding the competitiveness in wheat as the 
countries like USA, Japan, etc. are developing their potential in this commodity. 
Appendix Table A.6.10 provides the percentage share of various agriculture 
goods in total agro-import for India during 1995-96 to 2005-06. The table indicates 
that, on average, pulses constituted the highest share in agro-import (16.66 percent) 
during 1995-96 to 2005-06 followed by cashew nuts (12.04 percent), cotton raw 
including waste (10.29 percent), spices (4.16 percent), wheat (3.44 percent), oilseeds 
(0.18 percent) and rice (0.06 percent). However, this ordered did not maintain in all 
the years of the study period. For example, the share of wheat increased continuously 
from 1995-96 to reach at the maximum of 13.26 percent in the year 1998-99, but 
declined thereafter and became almost negligible since 2002-03, while all other items 
of agriculture import showed almost fluctuating trends. The largest instability can be 
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observed in the share of rice whose Coefficient of Variation is 198.08 percent during 
1995-96 to 2005-06 this remained unchanged during the two sub periods, viz., from 
1995-96 to 2000-01 and from 2000-01 to 2005-06. Due to these fluctuating trends in 
almost all items of agro-import during 1995-96 to 2000-01 and during 2000-01 to 
2005-06, all items, except wheat and rice recorded an increase in their average shares. 
When compared between the two sub periods, the highest increase is observed in 
pulses from 7.53 percent during 1995-96 to 2000-01 to 23.95 percent during 2000-01 
to 2005-06. 
Almost similar pattern is visible if we examined the share of agriculture goods 
in total national import, as furnished in Appendix Table A.6.11. Here too, the import 
of pulses stood at the highest 0.55 percent on average followed by cashew nuts 0.40 
percent, cotton raw including waste 0.34 percent, wheat 0.18 percent, spices 0.13 
percent, oilseeds 0.01 percent and rice almost negligible. Again this order is not 
maintained through out the period under study. If we compare the average share of 
these items in total import between 1995-96 to 2000-01 and 2000-01 to 2005-06, than 
we find that wheat, cashew nut and oilseeds are the goods whose average share has 
come down, whereas that of pulses, spices and cotton raw including waste has gone 
up. A notable trend of Appendix Table A.6.11 is that the share of rice in total import 
showed no sign of steady change throughout the period under study, so is the case 
with oilseeds. In case of wheat, it exhibited steady growth from 1995-96 to 1998-99, 
than fell considerably and since 2000-01, it recorded a negligible portion in total 
import. It can also be noticed from these trends that no commodity other than pulses 
accounted for the maximum share in total import, which is greater or equal to 1 
percent. 
6.4.3: Gains from Agricultural Trade 
It has been widely documented (Nayyar and Sen, 1994 and Jenicek, 2001) that 
during post WTO period the gains from trade have not been evenly distributed among 
all WTO members. In order to take a stock of the India's gains from agriculture trade, 
India's commodity terms of trade in agriculture with the whole world have been 
worked out using Fisher's price index number for the commodities of export and 
import being considered in the present analysis. These trends are presented in 
Appendix Table A.6.12 (also shown in Fig 6.4). 
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It can be seen from Appendix Table A.6.12 that India enjoyed favourable 
terms of trade during post WTO period, i.e., (1995-96 to 2005-06) except for 2002-03. 
When lower export unit value was observed in most of the agriculture goods mainly 
on account of policy changes in prices declined in stocks and infrastructural 
bottlenecks (Economic survey, 2003-04) 
India's commodity terms of trade became highly favourable, as rose by 47.28 
percent in the year 1999-00. On an average per annum during 1995-96 to 2005-06, 
India's commodity terms of trade in agriculture were favourable by 20.06 percent. A 
comparison between 1995-96 to 2000-01 and 2001-02 to 2005-06 shows that on an 
average per annum India's agriculture terms of trade were more favourable 
(27.82 percent) in the former period than (13.18 percent) in the latter period. 
The averages of export unit value index and import unit value index describe 
well the reason why India enjoyed favourable terms of trade in agriculture during the 
reference period. Over the period 1995-96 to 2005-06, on an average per annum, the 
export unit value index was higher by 17.10 percent and the import unit value index 
was lower by .82 percent. This trend was better during 1995-96 to 2000-01 when a 
greater difference was pronounced between export unit value index and import unit 
value index. During this sub periods of the study, export unit value index was higher 
by 19.18 percent and the import unit value index was lower by 6.34 percent. 
Again during 2000-01 to 2005-06, the export unit value index was higher by 
15.82 percent and the import unit value index was higher by 4.40 percent, on an 
average per annum. Sharp price volatility can be observed in import than in export 
unit value index. 
On the whole, it can be said that India's agricultural terms of trade have not 
deteriorated, rather, India has marginally gained in her global agricultural trade during 
the post WTO period. But the gains from agricultural trade in the post WTO regime 
have been much less than expected. 
6.4.4: Destination of India's Agro-Export in Percentage Terms 
The information about country wise export of agricultural and allied products 
from India for 1995-96 to 2005-06 can be head from Appendix Table A.6.13. The 
data contained in the table clearly shows that the largest importer of India's farm 
product in terms of percentage share in the year 1995-96 was USA (17.4 percent) 
followed by china (10 percent), Japan (7 percent) etc. This picture however, changed 
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dramatically in 2005-06, when the largest importer of India's farm products was 
Spain comprising of (27.71 percent) followed by Iran (17.78 percent), USA (16.83 
percent) being at the third place. In recent times USA has decided to restore 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to India that allows a host of items to be 
imported under duty free tariff (lANS, 2005). 
This decision of the USA was envisaged to give a boost to the exports of India 
to the former. Moreover, it would improve bilateral economic and trade relations 
between two biggest democratic countries of the world. This, however, did not 
happen in a significant manner, as is evident from Appendix Table A.6.13. 
As far as export of farm produce to different trade blocks is concerned, 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is the biggest 
importer of Indian agricultural and allied products during 1995-96 to 2005-06. In 
percentage terms, our farm exports to the OECD have increased from 48.6 percent in 
1995-96 to 61.01 percent in 2005-06. European Union, being the second important 
trading block, accounted for 25.1 percent of India's agro-export in 1995-96, which 
went up to reach at 45.75 percent in 2005-06. The share of NAFTA countries declined 
marginally over this period from 18.4 percent in 1995-96 to 17.82 in 2005-06. On the 
other hand, the share of OPEC countries in India's agro-export increased more than 
twice from 7.1 percent to 14.74 percent during 1995-96 to 2005-06. Pakistan and 
Srilanka, being the SAARC member countries, constituted a meagre share of 1.5 
percent in 1995-96, which has not increased considerably over the decade and stood at 
2.44 percent in 2005-06. It is however, hoped that with the improvement in political 
diplomatic relations with the neighbouring countries, there will be a mutual benefit in 
trade in the near future. 
6.5: Export Competitiveness of Indian Agriculture 
It has been pointed out by many studies like Hasan Masood (2004), Radja 
Ramani (2004) and Salam, et.al. (2000)) that India's export competitiveness for 
several agriculture commodities is adversely affected after the establishment of WTO. 
This, according to these studies, is mainly on account of sharp decline in international 
prices of many agriculture goods. Thus, it is imperative for the present study to 
analyse the competitiveness of Indian agriculture for certain products in the post 
WTO period. This is done to examine the extent to which India has gained from the 
provision of Agreement on Agriculture as far as its agriculture trade is concerned. 
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Depicted in Appendix Tables from A.6.14 to A.6.23 are the trends in export 
competitiveness of some selected agriculture products. The behaviour of domestic and 
international prices indices of these agriculture products is also displayed in Figs, 
from 6.5 to 6.14. 
The commodities considered in this analysis include wheat, rice, maize, 
sugar, Soya bean. Soya bean oil, coffee, tea, coconut oil and tobacco. The exercise is 
carried out by working out the wholesale price indices of domestic and international 
market assuming 1995=100. 
It can be seen from these tables that during post WTO period India is having 
competitive disadvantage in almost all the commodities considered in the present 
analysis, as indicated by the ratio of domestic to international prices. The notable 
features of the trends in these tables are as follows, 
(a) During 1995-2005 growth in domestic price indices of all the commodities 
considered is found to be positive and more pronounced than the growth of 
international price indices which occurred with negative sign, 
(b) Co-relation co-efficient between the domestic and international price indices is 
also found to be negative during 1995-2005, indicating a sharp increase in 
domestic prices and considerable fall in international prices, as is visible in the 
Figs from 6.5 to 6.14, 
(c) The ratios of domestic price indices to international price indices for different 
commodities point towards the fact that all commodities in question could not 
attract the international demand and India is observed to have a competitive 
disadvantage in these products in the post WTO era. However, some commodities 
such as wheat, rice, maize, sugar, coffee and tobacco reflected a competitive 
advantage during the years 1996 and 1997. In case of tea, India enjoyed 
competitive advantage the years 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2005 due to lower 
domestic prices in comparison to international prices and 
(d) When the sub periods are considered, i.e., from 1995 to 2001 and from 2001 to 
2005, it has been observed that for all the commodities except tobacco, their exists 
a high positive correlation between domestic and international price indices during 
2001-2005. Over this period the average annual growth rate of international price 
indices has been much higher than that of domestic price indices for all the 
commodities, except sugar and soybean oil. 
6.6: Policies Affecting India's Export Competitiveness of Agriculture 
Commodities 
The competitiveness of Indian agriculture is influenced by a whole range of 
economic policies on the domestic as well as on the international front. On the 
international front, high price volatility of most of the agriculture goods coupled with 
continued support to agriculture by the developed countries have resulted 
uncompetitiveness for developing countries like India in most of the agriculture 
goods. On domestic front, policies targeted at the manufacturing sector have 
important implications for the agriculture sector through relative incentives for 
investment. Similarly, policies pertaining to input pricing, domestic marketing, 
investment in Research and Development (R& D) and rural infrastructure affect the 
international competitiveness of Indian agriculture. Thus, it becomes essential for the 
present study to examine the major policies that affect incentives for enhancing export 
competitiveness of agriculture goods. These policies can be grouped under three 
heads, namely, 
6.6.1 Policies at the macro level, 
6.6.2 Domestic market policies and 
6.6.3 Policies related to infrastructure, investments and institutions. 
6.6.1: Macro Economic Policy 
In the early period, the Indian Government was intended to provide cheaper 
food to the consumers on one hand, and to protect farmers from the vagaries of price 
movements on the other. A high protection was given to manufacturing sector through 
a combination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. As a result of these policies, a severe 
anti-agricultural bias was built into the structure of the Indian economy. However, 
starting in the mid 1980's, and particularly after 1990-91, there was pronounced, even 
a dramatic improvement in favour of agriculture. It is interesting to note that private 
investments appear to have induced evolution from food grain -led-growth during the 
1970's and 1980's to growth led by horticulture, livestock farming and fisheries in the 
1990's (Gulati and Bhatla, 2002). 
The sector of Indian priority and livelihood was thus, exposed to the 
international competition, especially, after mid 1990's with the establishment of 
WTO. This called for other initiatives for protecting the interest of the farmers and for 
providing them with appropriate prices for their products. 
130 
6.6.2: Domestic Market Policies 
More than 10 years after the economic reforms began in 1991-92, Indian 
agriculture continues to be subject to monopoly of domestic controls that distort 
agricultural incentives at the local level. Controls on the movement and stocking of 
agricultural commodities (food grains, edible oils, cotton or sugar) across the country 
have long been made in the past decade in removing these controls, and in February 
2001, the decisive step of abolishing these controls was taken. 
However, the domestic market has not been freed up from other inventionist 
policies. Levies on producers, in the form of compulsory acquisition of stocks by 
public sector agencies at fixed prices, continue to constrain the ability of the farmer to 
rely on the market to obtain the best price for major products. 
6.6.3: Policies Related to Infrastructure, Investments and Institutions 
In the past, the Indian farmers had suffered not only from the bias against 
agriculture at the macro economic level and from domestic restrictions on marketing 
and processing, but also from poor infrastructure. The greatest challenge lies in 
reducing the transaction costs of the farmers by providing them with world-class 
physical infrastructure, and for this, there has to be increasing public investment. 
However, it has been observed that during past couple of decades, investment in 
infrastructure has been declining mainly on account of increase in subsidies on 
fertilisers, irrigation and power and the high pay increases affected under the fifth pay 
commission for the Central and State Government Employees (Ahulwalia, 2002). It is 
true that input subsidies generally available to low-income and resource-poor farmers 
in developing countries are exempt from reduction commitments under the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and in any case these subsidies in India add up to 
less than the deminimis limit under that agreement. But the fact is that on account of 
the overall lack of financial resources, they crowed out public investment in rural 
infrastructure. 
Thus, there is a greater need to address these issues on priority in order to 
safeguard the interest of the farmers and to strengthen potential of this sector to 
compete in international market. 
6.7: Estimation Results 
The trend analysis of India's agro-export and agro-import suggests that 
agriculture trade got adversely affected during post WTO period. The growth of total 
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agro-export has been less than that of agro-import especially during 1995- 96 to 2000-
01. In order to take a stock of the major factors affecting India's agro-export and agro-
import, we have chosen three factors on a priory ground. These include Index of 
Trade Openness (TRADOP)-obtained by dividing the sum of total export and total 
import of India by GNP at market price, Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and 
the Dummy Variable (DUM) to capture the impact of dismantling Quantitative 
Restrictions by India in 2001 on imports of most of the agricultural products. Thus, 
the Dummy Variable takes the value zero from 1995-96 to 2000-01 and one from 
2000-01 to 2005-06. We hypothesise that all these explanatory variables affect 
agriculture import and agriculture export significantly. Per capita agriculture import 
and agriculture export have been identified as dependent variables. 
India's greater integration with the world economy was reflected by the trade 
openness indicator, the trade to GDP ratio, which increased from 22.5 percent of GDP 
in 2006-07. If services trade is included, the increase is higher at 48 percent of GDP in 
2006-07 from 29.2 percent of GDP in 2000-01, reflecting greater degree of openness 
(Economic Survey, 2007-08). In this light the index of trade openness as a factor 
affecting agriculture import and agriculture export for India assumes significance in 
the present study. There are some Indian studies by Murugavelu (2005) and Ravi 
P.C.Reddy (1998), which have considered this factor in their analysis. 
As far as the choice of real effective exchange rate index is concerned, it may 
be mentioned that in simplest index form, the trade weighted exchange rate can be 
found as a set of Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (NEER) in several databanks in 
the ESDS International macro-data collection. A country's NEER is a weighted 
average of its currency exchange rates with its major trading partners' currencies. The 
weightings will be based on the level of trade with each trading partner. Thus, a 
NEER gives a much better view of changes in a country's terms of trade with the rest 
of the World than bilateral or SDR rates. 
However, an important refinement of the NEER is the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER). This is particularly useful in considering comparative 
changes in a country's real economic circumstances. If the spot market rate for a 
country or its NEER shows a downward trend this could be because other countries 
are becoming relatively more productive. But it could arise from a difference in 
inflation rates between that country and others in the World. The REER is a NEER 
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with price or labour cost inflation removed. It is thus a better measure of comparative 
economic activity between countries than simple market rates. 
For empirical testing we have used Ordinary Least Squares procedure to 
estimate coefficients in the equation, which is in log linear form. This may be 
expressed as 
And 
InPAIM, =a+biTRADOP+b2REER+b3DUM+Ut (6.5) 
lnAEXPt= a+biTRADOP +b2REER, + bj DUM +Ur (6.6) 
Where, 
PAIMt = per capita agriculture import at time t 
AEXPt = agriculture export at time t 
TRADOPt = index of trade openness at time t 
REERt = index of real effective exchange rate at time t 
DUMt = dummy variable at time t 
Ut = stochastic term satisfying usual assumptions of classical linear 
regression model 
The choice of this formulation is simply because of the fact that we are 
interested in growth and not in absolute change. It is very likely that the explanatory 
variables chosen by us are correlated with each other, as is commonly experienced in 
most time series econometric studies. In an attempt to purge the problem of multi-
collinearity, equations have been re-estimated by dropping one explanatory variable 
after the other. In this way, we have obtained three equations in respect of each 
dependent variable. The estimation results are reported in Appendix Table A.6.24. It 
should be noted that for each regression equation, our null hypothesis is 
HQ. all estimated coefficients are zero 
against the alternative hypothesis 
Hi: they are significantly different from zero. 
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It can be observed from the table that the sign of estimated coefficients of the 
index of trade openness and dummy variable are positive and that of real effective 
exchange index is negative in case of per capita agriculture import, as found by earlier 
studies on the subject. However, none of these explanatory variables is found 
statistically significant for our data rejecting our alternative hypothesis. Furthermore, 
all these explanatory variables, taken together, explain only 6.8 percent of the total 
variation in per capita agriculture import. This value of R^  declines from equation 6.7 
to equation 6.9. It is interesting to note from equation 6.9 that index of trade openness 
is statistically significant and explains alone 42.1 percent of the total variation in per 
capita agriculture import. 
In case of agriculture export, the results are some how different. As suggested 
by the priory theory and shown by earlier studies, the sign of the coefficients of trade 
openness index and dummy variable is positive but that of real effective exchange rate 
index is negative. The negative sign of real effective exchange rate index in case of 
agriculture export finds neither the support of the previous studies nor that of the 
priory theory. The index of trade openness is found to be a significant explanatory 
variable affecting Indian agriculture export during post WTO period in all equations 
from 6.10 to 6.12. However, neither real effective exchange rate nor dummy variable 
is found statistically significant for our data. This leads us to reject the null hypothesis 
in case of trade openness index for all the three equations from 6.10 to 6.12, but 
accept it for other two explanatory variables, namely, real effective exchange rate 
index (REER) and dummy variable. A declining in the value of R^  is again observed 
for agricultural export, as we dropped one explanatory variable after the other. All the 
three explanatory variables taken together, explain 92.9 percent of the total variation 
in agriculture export, whereas the index of trade openness alone explain 88.4 percent 
of the total variation in agriculture export. 
For per capita agriculture import, all the three factors explain 60.8 percent of 
the total variation, whereas only 42.1 percent of the total variation in it is explained by 
index of trade openness. 
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From the above discussion it may be concluded that for our sample data, index 
of trade openness find strong support and is shown to be a significant explanatory 
variables more for agriculture export than for per capita agriculture import. But the 
index of real effective exchange rate (REER) and the impact of dismantling 
Quanfitative Restrictions by the Government of India in 2001 on imports of most of 
the agricultural products could not find any empirical support for our data. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary, Conclusion and Policy implications 
The present study is an attempt to analyse the growth performance of Indian 
agriculture during post WTO era and to trace various problems which it got 
confronted with, especially, after the signing of Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). 
This study leads to the conclusion that the establishment of GATT was a good effort 
made by the international community in order to reshape the world economy shattered 
by the Great Depression and the Second World War. One of the purpose of GATT of 
ensuring world trade among member countries, as stated in part IV of the draft, was 
to deal with principles and objectives for helping less developed countries, delineates 
commitments and joint action to achieve the objectives of trade and development of 
the world at large, in general and less developing countries, in particular. 
But a closer examination of various rounds of GATT before the Uruguay 
Round reveals that developed countries especially United States manipulated the 
principles in their own interests and emphasised and highlighted the problems only of 
specific industries by negotiating trade restrictive agreements entirely outside the 
framework of GATT rules. The developing countries continued to be disillusioned, 
although some palliatives in the form of GSP for helping them find markets for their 
products in developed countries were there. However, no balance, no substantial gains 
had accrued to the Least Developed Countries by such and other palliatives. The Least 
Developed Countries continued to remain outside the periphery of GATT and could 
not substantially and effectively influence the multilateral tariff and non-tariff 
negotiations at the GATT counter. 
Agriculture sector was also discriminated in earlier rounds of GATT. The 
original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 applied to trade in 
agriculture also, but it allowed various exceptions to the rules on non-tariff measures 
and subsidies, which led to reverse distortions in world agriculture trade. This also 
resulted in a proliferation of impediments to world agriculture trade including by 
means of import bans, quotas setting the maximum level of imports, minimum import 
prices and non-tariff measures maintained by State-Trading Enterprises. 
The Uruguay Round of GATT, the eight and the final round, was the largest 
trade negotiation of any kind in history. This round brought about the biggest reform 
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of the world's trading system since the creation of GATT. It made a new distinct 
phase in international economic and trade relationships. The rules of GATT could 
apply only to 'broader measures' affecting the import and export of goods, trade in 
goods and trade in services, treatment of foreign direct investment and protection and 
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights have not only been covered by the rules 
and disciplines, but have also been integrated by the agreement of the Uruguay Round 
as a 'single indivisible undertaking'. The Uruguay Round of GATT lasted for about 
seven and half years and it began to be realised that a significant progress was 
achieved in the areas relating to tariffs and related subjects. However, in order to 
resolve all pending issues and to conclude all negotiations during Uruguay Round, a 
deal was signed on 15 April, 1994 by the ministers from most of 123 participating 
governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocoo. This deal gave birth to World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 1995. 
Indeed, the emergence of WTO was a culmination of international efforts over 
the past 5 decades to establish a truly international trade organisation, which should 
cater to the growing needs of international economic community. With the basic 
objective of providing free and fairer trade among all nations by optimising the use of 
world's resources. Various agreements were concluded with the establishment of 
WTO. One of these agreements was Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). This 
agreement was considered a turning point in the reform of agricultural trade system. 
In the agriculture sector, AOA tried to bring disciplines and fair competition by 
removing the distortions. This agreement was designed to cover three aspects of 
agricultural trade, viz., market access, domestic support and export subsidies. 
It is true that the AOA has provided an excellent opportunity, a competitive 
atmosphere and a climate of exposure in the trading system to all developed as well as 
developing nations of the world. This agreement also led to greater accessibility of 
world's resources and full utilisation of the potential and capacity that each country 
inherits. The agreement has also given an opportunity to each country to perform in 
the trade of those goods in which it has comparative advantage. 
It is, however, an agreed fact that no agreement can benefit all countries at a 
time equally. This has been well observed in the case of AOA also. It has been found 
that the commitments of AOA are biased in favour of developed countries. Further, 
the provisions of AOA are badly affecting, in one way or the other, the 
153 
competitiveness of agriculture in developing countries. The AOA lias institutionalised 
inequalities between countries that can give substantial support and protection to their 
agricultural sector (developed countries) and those, which do not, or cannot provide 
such support (developing and least developed countries). There have been different 
rounds of negotiations on the provisions of AOA, but no satisfactory conclusion is 
reached. 
As far as the provision of tariffication under AOA is concerned, it has been 
found that the wide scale dumping in developing countries has displaced local 
production. The existing nature of tariffs as per WTO negotiations is causing a rise in 
huge import bills for India and other developing countries as well. This has resulted 
an increase in the miseries of farmers of these countries. India retained in its WTO 
schedule the tariff commitments it had made during the earlier rounds of GATT. 
These commitments included zero duties on certain cereals and milk products; thus, 
leaving apart some of the restrictive tariff lines. India has gone ahead unilaterally to 
reduce tariff barriers much below the bound rates of duty stipulated under Uruguay 
Round agreement. The most striking feature of India's post Uruguay Round tariffs is 
the wide gap between the bound and applied levels. 
The assessment of market access provision leads us to suggest that there 
should be equality in the tariff rates on agricultural and industrial goods, which may 
be ideal from efficiency and allocation viewpoint also. Developing countries like 
India can also resort to emergency protection if imports of a product cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers of directly competitive products. This is in view 
of the existing situation of rising import burdens, adding sufferings to the farmers, etc. 
The provision of domestic support has also proved to be by and large biased in 
favour of developed countries. Our study reveals that developed countries continue to 
provide support to their agriculture sector, which is relatively much larger in 
comparison to developing countries. This is supported by the fact that earlier the 
Indian agriculture prices were lower than international prices mostly, i.e., before the 
year 1996. But as a result of the heavy subsidisation of agricultural exports by the 
developed countries, the situation undertook a dramatic turn. 
The developing countries account for only 10 percent of the domestic support. 
The least developed countries share is almost negligible in the total domestic support. 
An assessment of this provision for Indian agriculture outlines that in India the 
product specific support (PSS) is negative for the commodities considered in this 
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study, which include wheat, rice, cotton, sugar, jute and groundnuts. On the other 
hand, non-product specific support, (NPSS) i.e., subsidies on agricultural inputs like 
irrigation, fertilisers, electricity and other subsidies given to marginal farmers and 
Farmers' cooperative societies in the form of seeds, development of oil seeds, pulses, 
etc, moves around the permissible level of 10 percent of the value of agriculture 
output. Therefore, India is under no serious obligation to reduce domestic support 
currently extended to the agriculture sector. 
In a broader perspective, the real picture seems contradictory of what was 
envisaged in the AOA with respect to the provision of domestic support. It has been 
observed in our analysis that the subsidies distorted and did not provide income 
support to farmers of developing countries. Developed countries are neglecting the 
proper implementation of AOA provisions particularly in the reduction of Aggregate 
Measurement of Support it is thus, necessary that if the farmers of developing and 
developed countries compete in the same market, then the huge annual subsidies that 
developed countries provide to their fanners must be reduced to the negligible 
amounts that developing countries earmark for their farm sector. In line with Huda 
and Gulati (2008), it is suggested that in order to ensure that the Green Box measures 
have a minimal effect, only small farmers should be eligible for such payments. 
Moreover, when all the farmers are eligible for input subsidies, the proportion of the 
subsidies given to low income or resource poor farmers be deducted from the 
computation of non product specific support. 
One of the international agreements that consolidate the trade in 'ideas' with 
in the sphere of WTO's activities is the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) agreement. It promotes the harmonisation of national Intellectual 
Property regimes. However, this agreement carries out with it many apprehensions 
and controversies. Like other provisions of AOA, the TRIPs provision has also proved 
to be partially advantageous for developing countries. For instance, in many 
developed countries, seed production is now in the hands of Multi National 
Co-operations, who have brought up all the smaller seed companies. Forcing farmers 
to buy their seeds every year creates problems, like the problem of cost and available 
varieties. 
This problem is observed to be quite serious in case of developing countries. 
However, in India this strategy cannot work. As there are no seed companies of any 
significant size that can be acquired. It is the farmers themselves who are the largest 
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seed producers. So, if the Multi National Co-operations have to control seed 
production, they have to knock out the farmers from the market. By opting for the 
sui-generis system, the government has effectively blocked this strategy. 
An important element of Intellectual Property is the patenting of products 
(both agricultural and non-agricultural). The patenting system in developing countries 
poses serious problems, e.g., it does not provide incentives to the local innovations. 
Moreover, by not recognising community property rights to traditional knowledge, 
this system has led commercial firms in developed countries seeking to obtain 
property rights to traditional or product varieties. 
In India, the Patent Act 1970 was having several lacunae. The Act was found 
to be not supporting the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement in many respects. In order to overcome the deficiencies of the 
Patent Act 1970, the Act was amended in 2005. While many of the measures 
incorporated in the amended Act do safeguard public interests, at least some of the 
amendments raise fundamental questions about their legal validity and 
appropriateness. In case of agriculture, it is very likely that this new provision will 
add to the suffering of the farmers, because under the new trading environment, 
farmers are asked to use patented seeds for which they have to pay the royalty to the 
companies which in turn, will push the farmers in to new debt burden. It seems as if 
amended Patent Act 2005 is not TRIPs compliant. 
Therefore, it is imperative for the Indian Government to realise these issues 
and to make best effort to address them at the earliest. This is necessary not only to 
safeguard the interest of the farmers but also to ensure a healthy environment in which 
Indian farmers and exporters of agricultural products may feel comfortable. For 
realisation of sustainable agricultural growth in India, channelling vast potential 
natural resources and strengthening rural infrastructure are required. Step against 
bio-piracy is also extremely necessarj'. As a precautionary measure, foreign 
multinational should not be allowed to engage themselves in India, in the 
development of new plant varieties. It is further suggested that Indian agriculture 
should demand the preservation of traditional peasant practices, in particular, the right 
to make their own seeds, trade them and sell their harvest. Above all, an urgent effort 
by all developing countries is required to re-negotiate and re-define different norms of 
TRIPs provision to make it more favourable for themselves. 
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The present study has also attempted to trace the growth and performance of 
agriculture trade in India during post WTO period (i.e., 1995-96 to 2005-06). Our 
analysis is in fine agreement with earlier studies on the subject and concludes that 
agriculture export of India has not grown in the post WTO period in the manner as 
was expected. 
Contrary to expectations and anticipations, the price situation changed 
dramatically after implementation of Uruguay Round Agreement. International prices 
of agriculture-commodities have dropped to a very low level and domestic prices 
turned higher than the international prices. This has rendered Indian market attractive 
for import of several agriculture commodities. The commodities like wheat, rice, 
maize, sugar, soyabean, soyabean oil, tea, coffee, coconut oil and tobacco, considered 
in the present analysis, for export competitiveness have been found to be 
uncompetitive over the period under study. The annual average growth rate of total 
national import has been slightly higher than that of total national export during 
1995-96 to 2005-06. On the other hand, it has been observed that whereas in absolute 
terms agriculture export has been higher than agriculture-import, but as far as their 
annual average growth rates are concerned, it is found to be higher in the latter than in 
the former. However, when the two sub periods, namely, 1995-96 to 2001-2002 and 
2000-01-2005-06 are taken into account, agriculture export has witnessed an increase 
in the annual average growth rate from the former sub period to the latter sub period 
while the growth rate of agriculture import declined. 
The ratio of total export to GDP declined from 1995-96 to 1999-2000, but 
increased thereafter. On the other hand, total import as percent of GDP has never been 
less than the ratio of total export to GDP. However, the ratio of agriculture-import to 
GDP has been permissible. 
Commodity wise analysis of India's agriculture trade reveals that the major 
exporting commodities during 1995-96 to 2005-06 are non-basmati rice, wheat and 
basmati rice. Maximum fluctuations were observed in cotton raw including waste. In 
terms of annual average growth rate during 1995-96 to 2005-06, cotton raw including 
waste, spices, pulses and cashew nuts are the major items of agriculture-import. The 
total agriculture-export on average during 1995-96 to 2005-06 accounted for 8.81 
percent of non-basmati rice, 6.15 percent of basmati rice and 6.12 percent of cashew. 
The income elasticity of total national import was 1.43 during 1995-96 to 2005-06, 
1.11 during 1995-96 to 2000-01 and 1.95 during 2000-01 to 2005-06, indicating a 
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sharp rise in the elasticity coefficient from former sub period to latter sub period 
under study. The deficit in the trade account (net export) has shown a regular increase 
through out the period under study. 
For the entire study period more fluctuations have been observed in total 
national import in comparison to national export. Similar is the case with agriculture 
import and agriculture export. This order was maintained even in the two sub periods. 
Likewise, the annual percentage change over previous year in total national import 
has been higher, on average, than that in total national export throughout the study 
period. Almost same trends can be observed in case of agriculture import and 
agriculture export. However, during 1995-96 to 2000-01, annual percentage change 
over previous year in total national export has been higher, on average, than that in 
total national import. During 2000-01 to 2005-06 this trend was observed in case of 
agriculture and agriculture export. 
The share of the agriculture goods considered in the present analysis in total 
export from India on average reveals the fact that most of the agriculture goods 
comprised of less than 1 percent share in total export during 1995-96 to 2005-06 with 
spices being the most instable item of export. 
As far as total agro-import is concerned, pulses constituted the highest share 
followed by cashew nuts, cotton raw including waste, spices, wheat, etc. Almost 
similar pattern is observed when the share of agriculture-goods in total national 
import is examined. 
India's agriculture terms of trade have not deteriorated rather; India has 
marginally gained in her global agriculture trade during the Post WTO period. But the 
gains form agriculture trade in the Post WTO regime has been much less than 
expected. 
As far as export of farm produce from India to different trade blocks is 
concerned. Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the 
biggest importer, European Union, being the second important trading block in this 
respect. The share of NAFTA country's declined marginally over the reference 
period, whereas that of OPEC countries increased more than twice. Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, being the SAARC member countries, constituted a meagre share. 
In order to take a stock of the major factors affecting India's agro-export and 
agro-import, we have chosen three factors on a priory basis. These include index of 
trade openness (TRADOP-obtained by dividing the sum of total export and total 
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import of India by GNP at marlcet price), real effective exchange rate (REER) and the 
dummy variable (DUM) to capture the impact of dismantling Quantitative 
Restrictions by India in 2001 on imports of most of the agricultural products. 
The results of multiple linear regression suggests that for our study data index 
of trade openness finds strong support and is shown to be a significant explanatory 
variable more for agriculture export than for per capita agriculture import. But the 
index of real effective exchange rate and the impact of dismantling Quantitative 
Restrictions by Government of India in 2001 on import of large number of agriculture 
items could not find any empirical support for our data. All three explanatory 
variables, taken together, explain 92.9 percent of the total variation in agriculture 
export, whereas the index of trade openness alone explains 88.4 percent of the 
variation in agriculture export (as indicated by R )^. 
For per capita agriculture import, all the three factors explain 60.8 percent of 
the total variation, whereas only 42.1 percent of the total variation in per capita 
agriculture import is explained by index of trade openness. 
In view of the growth performance of Indian agriculture trade in the new 
trading regime and the situation which is emerging at present due to international food 
prices and high prices of food articles, it is suggested that the Indian Government 
should focus its attention on various weaknesses prevalent in Indian agriculture 
making its product less competitive in the international market. Agriculture policy 
should be revised in the manner that would ensure the sustainability of agriculture 
trade and safeguard the interest of the farmers. There should be a rethinking on 
domestic price policy to make it more effective in the long run keeping in mind WTO 
mandatory negotiations. An important task ahead of Indian policy makers is to 
overcome the supply side constraints in agriculture sector by removing infrastructural 
bottlenecks. This can be done through large investment in rural infrastructure such as 
power, irrigation, fertilisers, etc instead of providing huge subsidies in these areas. 
An attempt should also be made to increase Research and Development 
activities in agriculture. Investment in biotechnology and creation of institutional 
arrangements for percolating benefits of research to all the cultivators. Credit facilities 
are to be made more effective (as is being attempted by the Government of India) and 
should be targeted to benefit small and marginal farmers whose interests has been 
ignored for quite a long time. 
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It is true that ignorance causes problems and education provides solutions to 
them. Thus, it is highly desirable to launch a mass scale campaign to educate the 
farmers about the demand of the day and to change their mindset to provoke them to 
produce those products which are commercially feasible and await their demand in 
the international market. India is abundant in manpower and should, therefore, utilise 
its human capital to achieve the desired goals. An another important issue that needs 
to be addressed seriously by the government is to improve its working of the 
statistical agencies so that more accurate forecasting could be made of the future 
demand from agriculture goods in the domestic as well as in the international market. 
It should be able to access its potential and capabilities which could yield the desired 
productivity. 
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Appendix Box A.1.1 
Different Rounds of G ATT 
Year 
1949 
1951 
1956 
1960 
1961 
1964 
1967 
1973 
Round 
Annecy 
Torque 
Geneva 
Geneva 
(Dillon Round) 
Geneva 
Kennedy Round 
Geneva 
Activities 
*contracting parties exchange some 5,000 tariff 
concessions 
* entry approved for 10 new GATT contracting 
parties. 
*8,700 tariff concessions agreed leading to an 
overall tariff reduction of approximately 25 
percent in relation to the 1947/48 level. 
*entri' approved for four new GATT contracting 
parties. 
*US $ 2.5 billion of tariff reductions agreed. 
* single schedule of concessions agreed for the 
recently established European Economic 
Eommunity, based on its common external tariff. 
*4,400 tariff concessions agreed covering US 34.9 
billion of trade. 
*GATT membership now raised to 50 contracting 
parties, who account the 75 percent of the world 
trade. 
* negotiations expanded from a product-by-
product approach to an industry/sector-wise 
method of cutting tariffs. 
*a 50 percent cut in tariffs achieved in many 
areas-tariff concessions covered estimated toll 
trade value of US $ 40 billion. 
*separate agreements concluded on grains and 
chemical products. 
*establishment of a code on Anti-dumping. 
*99 countries participated 
161 
1979 (Tokyo round) *tariff reductions and binding agreed covering 
more than $3000 billion of trade. 
*average tariff on manufactured goods in the 
world's nine major industrial markets reduced 
from 7 to 4.7 percent. 
*agreernent reached on technical barriers to trade; 
subsidies and countervailing measures, import 
licensing procedures; government procurement; 
customs valuation trade in bovine meat, dairy 
products and civil aircrafts; and a revised anti-
dumping code. 
1988 Geneva *125 countries participated 
1993 (Uruguay round) *revision and strengthening of GATT rules; 
GATT 1994. 
* substantial reductions in tariffs on trading goods. 
*for the first time Trade Related Investment 
Measures, trade in services and Intellectual 
Property Rights become the subject of multilateral 
negotiations resulting in specific agreements, 
•establishment of the WTO (equipped with a 
strengthened Dispute Settlement Mechanism). 
1997 Geneva. *23 founder contracting parties. 
*45,000 tariff concession agreed, covering US $ 
10 billion in trade. 
•commitment to future negotiating 'Rounds'. 
Source: Autar (2005) PP-13-14 
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Appendix A. 1.2 
Present Membership of WTO 
Understanding the WTO: The Organization 
Members and Observers 
153 members on 23 July 2008 (with dates of membership). 
Click any member to see key information on trade statistics, WTO commitments, 
disputes, trade policy reviews, and notifications. 
2. Albania 8 September 2000 
3. Angola 23 November 1996 
4. Antigua and Barbuda 1 January 1995 
5. Argentina 1 January 1995 
6. Armenia 5 February 2003 
7. Australia 1 January 1995 
8. Austria 1 January 1995 
9. Bahrain, Kingdom of 1 January 1995 
10. Bangladesh 1 January 1995 
11. Barbados 1 January 1995 
12. Belgium 1 January 1995 
13. Belize 1 January 1995 
H.Benin 22 February 1996 
15. Bolivia 12 September 1995 
16. Botswana 31 May 1995 
17. Brazil 1 January 1995 
18. Brunei Darussalam 1 January 1995 
19. Bulgaria 1 December 1996 
20. Burkina Faso 3 June 1995 
21. Burundi 23 July 1995 
22. Cambodia 13 October 2004 
23. Cameroon 13 December 1995 
24. Canada 1 January 1995 
25. Cape Verde 23 July 2008 
26. Centra! African Republic 31 May 1995 
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27. Chad 19 October 1996 
28. Chile lJanuaryl995 
29. China 11 December 2001 
30. Colombia 30 April 1995 
31. Congo 27 March 1997 
32. Costa Rica 1 January 1995 
33. Cote d'lvoire 1 January 1995 
34. Croatia 30 November 2000 
35. Cuba 20 April 1995 
36. Cyprus 30 July 1995 
37. Czech Republic 1 January 1995 
38. Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 January 1997 
39. Denmark 1 January 1995 
40. Djibouti 31 May 1995 
41. Dominica 1 January 1995 
42. Dominican Republic 9 March 1995 
43. Ecuador 21 January 1996 
44. Egypt 30 June 1995 
45. El Salvador 7 May 1995 
46. Estonia 13 November 1999 
47. European Communities 1 January 1995 
48. Fiji 14 January 1996 
49. Finland 1 January 1995 
50. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 4 April 2003 
51. France 1 January 1995 
52. Gabon 1 January 1995 
53. The Gambia 23 October 1996 
54. Georgia 14 June 2000 
55. Germany 1 January 1995 
56. Ghana 1 January 1995 
57. Greece 1 January 1995 
58. Grenada 22 February 1996 
59. Guatemala 21 July 1995 
60. Guinea 25 October 1995 
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61. Guinea Bissau 31 May 1995 
62. Guyana 1 January 1995 
63. Haiti 30 January 1996 
64. Honduras 1 January 1995 
65. Hong Kong, China 1 January 1995 
66. Hungary 1 January 1995 
67. Iceland 1 January 1995 
68. India 1 January 1995 
69. Indonesia 1 January 1995 
70. Ireland 1 January 1995 
71. Israel 21 Aprill995 
72. Italy 1 January 1995 
73. Jamaica 9 March 1995 
74. Japan 1 January 1995 
75. Jordan 11 April 2000 
76. Kenya 1 January 1995 
77. Korea, Republic of 1 January 1995 
78. Kuwait 1 January 1995 
79. Kyrgyz Republic 20 December 1998 
80. Latvia 10 February 1999 
81. Lesotho 31 May 1995 
82. Liechtenstein 1 September 1995 
83. Lithuania 31 May 2001 
84. Luxembourg 1 January 1995 
85. Macao, China 1 January 1995 
86. Madagascar 17 November 1995 
87. Malawi 31 May 1995 
88. Malaysia 1 January 1995 
89. Maldives 31 May 1995 
90. Mali 31 May 1995 
91. Malta 1 January 1995 
92. Mauritania 31 May 1995 
93. Mauritius 1 January 1995 
94. Mexico 1 January 1995 
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95. Moldova 26 July 2001 
96. Mongolia 29 January 1997 
97. Morocco 1 January 1995 
98. Mozambique 26 August 1995 
99. Myanmar 1 January 1995 
100. Namibia 1 January 1995 
101. Nepal 23 April 2004 
153 Netherlands — For the Kingdom in Europe and for the Netherlands 
Antilles 1 January 1995 
102. New Zealand 1 January 1995 
103. Nicaragua 3 September 1995 
104. Niger 13 December 1996 
105. Nigeria 1 January 1995 
106. Norway 1 January 1995 
107. Oman 9 November 2000 
108. Pakistan 1 January 1995 
109. Panama 6 September 1997 
110. Papua New Guinea 9 June 1996 
111. Paraguay 1 January 1995 
112. Peru 1 January 1995 
113. Philippines 1 January 1995 
114. Poland 1 July 1995 
115. Portugal 1 January 1995 
116. Qatar 13 January 1996 
117. Romania 1 January 1995 
118. Rwanda 22 May 1996 
119. Saint Kitts and Nevis 21 February 1996 
120. Saint Lucia 1 January 1995 
121. Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 1 January 1995 
122. Saudi Arabia 11 December 2005 
123. Senegal 1 January 1995 
124. Sierra Leone 23 July 1995 
125. Singapore 1 January 1995 
126. Slovak Republic 1 January 1995 
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127. Slovenia 30 July 1995 
128. Solomon Islands 26 July 1996 
129. South Africa 1 January 1995 
130. Spain 1 January 1995 
131. Sri Lanka 1 January 1995 
132. Suriname 1 January 1995 
133. Swaziland 1 January 1995 
134. Sweden 1 January 1995 
135. Switzerland 1 July 1995 
136. Chinese Taipei 1 January 2002 
137. Tanzania 1 January 1995 
138. Thailand 1 January 1995 
139. Togo 31 May 1995 
140. Tonga 27 July 2007 
141. Trinidad and Tobago 1 March 1995 
142. Tunisia 29 March 1995 
143. Turkey 26 March 1995 
144. Uganda 1 January 1995 
145. Ukraine 16 May 2008 
146. United Arab Emirates 10 April 1996 
147. United Kingdom 1 January 1995 
148. United States of America 1 January 1995 
149. Uruguay 1 January 1995 
150. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1 January 1995 
151. Viet Nam 11 January 2007 
152. Zambia 1 January 1995 
153. Zimbabwe 5 March 1995 
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Appendix Box A.1.3 
The Doha Declaration 
The Doha Declaration-comprising of a main Declaration, a Declaration on TRIPS 
Agreement and public health and a decision on implementation related issues and 
concerns-launches the future work programme of WTO and includes elaboration and 
timetables for the current negotiations in agriculture and services and 
negotiations/possible negotiations in a range of other issues. 
Implementation Issues: a number of implementation issues have been addressed in 
the Decision on implementation related issues and concerns including longer time 
frame (of six months) for compliance with new SPS and TBT measures, moratorium 
of two years on non-violation complaints under the TRIPS agreement, need for 
special care for initiation of back to back antidumping investigations within a year 
and co-operation and assistance by members in investigations relating to declared 
values. The declaration agrees that negotiations on all other outstanding 
implementation issues shall be an integral part of the work programme. Where 
specific negotiations are mandated, relevant implementation issues shall be addressed 
under that mandate and other outstanding implementation issues shall be addressed as 
a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies, which shall report to the Trade 
Negotiating Committee by the end of 2002 for appropriate action. 
Agriculture: the Declaration commits to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: 
substantial improvements in market access for developing countries; reductions of, 
with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in 
trade distorting domestic support being given by the developed countries. It also takes 
note of non-trade concerns of developing countries and their development needs 
including food security and rural development. Special and differential treatment for 
developing countries would be an integral part of the negotiations. 
TRIPS: the work programme mandates negotiations on establishment of multilateral 
system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and 
spirits by the 5"^  session of the Ministerial Conference. The issues related to extension 
of the higher level of protection of geographical indications to products other than 
wines and spirits, examination of relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the protection of traditional knowledge 
168 
and folklore and other relevant new developments would be addressed by the TRIPS 
Council as part of the implementation issues. Further, the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health is one the most significant outcomes of the Doha Conference. It 
recognizes that the TRIPS Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented 
in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and to 
promote access to medicines for all. 
Special and Differential Treatment (S&D): The negotiations shall fully take into 
account the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries. It 
has also been agreed to review all special and differential treatment provisions with to 
a view strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. 
Singapore issues: the issues relating to Trade and Investment, interaction between 
Trade and Competition, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade 
Facilitation will continue to be pursued in the Working Group Study process. 
Negotiation on these subjects, according to the Work Programme, will take place after 
the Fifth session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, 
by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations. 
Environment: Negotiations on limited aspects of trade and environment has been 
mandated, along with instructions to the Committee on Trade and Environment to 
pursue its work on all items on its agenda, giving particular to the issues of market 
access, the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and labeling. 
Negotiations under the work programme are to be concluded not later than 1 January 
2005. The conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of negotiations 
will be treated as parts of a single undertaking. The overall conduct of the 
negotiations is to be supervised by a Trade Negotiations Committee under the 
authority of the General Council. 
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey (2001-02) 
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Appendix Box A. 1.4 
Key Outcomes and Timelines of Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
. Resolve to complete the Doha Work Programme fully, and to conclude negotiations 
in 2006. 
. To establish modalities in agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) 
by April 30,2006 and prepare draft schedules by July 31,2006. 
Agriculture 
. Agricultural export subsidies to be phased out by the developed countries by 2013. 
. However, domestic support would continue implying that agricultural output of the 
developed countries would still be subsidised. 
. On grounds of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs, 
developing countries will be able to self-designate 'Special-Products' which will 
attract more flexible tariff reduction treatment. 
. Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSG) for developing countries. 
. For cotton, export subsidies will be eliminated by developed countries in 2006. 
Non-Agricultural market access 
. The Hong Kong declaration seeks to achieve the objective of reduction or 
elimination of tariffs including tariffs and tariffs escalation 
. It has been agreed that tariffs would be brought down according to the Swiss formula 
this formula proposed by Switzerland implies deeper cuts on higher tariffs and milder 
cuts on lower tariffs 
Less than Full Reciprocity 
Developing countries would sacrifices less than the developed countries. All cuts and 
concessions offered by developed nations will be reciprocated by developing 
countries in lesser measure. This clause would also give the developing countries a 
larger phase-out time to integrate themselves into the trading system. 
Services 
.On the services front not much progress was made. However, the members were 
asked to submit a second round of revised services offers by July 31 2006 and submit 
final draft schedules by October 31 2006. 
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TRIPS 
Amendment to TRIPS agreement reaffirmed to address public health concerns of 
developing countries. 
Development 
Least developed countries will be guaranteed duty-free quota free access for 97 
percent of their exports from 2008 or from not later than the coming into effect of any 
final trade treaty. 
Source: (Mishra and Puri, 2008) 
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Appendix Box A. 1.5 
URAOA Important Documents 
Schedules of Commitments 
The 1994 WTO signatories' Schedules 
of commitments, agreed to during the 
negotiations, detailed how the URAOA 
commitments are to be implemented. 
For tariffs, foe example, each 
Members' schedule sets out for each 
product the tariff rates (that is, the 
bound rate-the commitments not to 
increase the tariff above that stated 
level or ceiling) at the start and end of 
the implementation period. New 
members acceding to the WTO after 
the UR have to submit their Schedule 
of Commitments following 
negotiations with WTO members. 
Agriculture Supporting Tables (AGST) 
For commitments on export subsidies 
and domestic supports, the starting 
point is the "Supporting Tables 
Relating to Commitments on 
Agriculture Products in part IV of the 
Schedules"(GATT documents 
G/AG/AGST/vols-1-3). These tables 
show the amount each member country 
spent on different products and support 
schemes during the base periods, and 
how the starting point for reductions 
was calculated. 
Some provisions that were negotiated after 
the AGST tables were submitted are not 
reflected in the tables. Countries acceding 
to the WTO after the UR have had to 
prepare their own supporting tables, and 
for them the base period can be different 
from that used for the UR negotiations. 
"Accession to the WTO- information to be 
provided on Domestic Support and Export 
Subsidies in agriculture,"WT/ACC/4; 18 
March 1996. 
Modalities Document 
For many of the commitments made, such 
as the specific percentage reductions 
relating to domestic support and export 
subsidies, the methods of calculation 
establishing these reductions were set out 
in the important UR working document, 
"Modalities for the Establishment of 
Specific Binding Commitments under the 
reform 
programme"(MTN.GNG/MA/W/24). This 
has no legal force, but the reduction 
commitments, used to calculate Member's 
Schedules, are legally binding. However, 
as in the case of AGST tables, the 
commitments sometimes changed 
following negotiations between members. 
Source: Ingco and Croome (2005) 
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Appendix Box A.3.1 
Constituents of Green Box Support 
General Services 
Research 
Pest and Disease Control 
Training, extension, advisory 
Inspection and marketing services 
Other general services 
Stock holding for food security 
Domestic food aid 
De-coupled income support 
Income insurance and safety nets 
Relief from natural disasters 
Structural adjustment: resource 
retirement 
Structural adjustment: investment aids 
Environmental payments regional 
assistance, producers retirement 
Includes various rural capital works 
projects 
Agricultural and economic research, 
statistics, liberary services, outlook 
Animal and plant health and disease 
control 
Cooperative State extension and 
cooperative services 
Inspection of grain, imports, and food; 
market news and grading and 
standardisation 
Conservation operations and other non-
payment environmental activities 
Food Security Commodity Reserve 
Food stamps; women, infants, children 
nutrition 
1996 production flexibility contract 
payments 
(U.S. revenue insurance included in the 
AMS) 
Livestock and crop disaster payments 
(U.S. crop insurance included in the 
AMS) 
Conservation Reserve Programme 
Farm credit, ownership, operating loans 
(FmHA) 
Soil conservation and water quality 
programs 
Source: International Agriculture and Trade Reports No. 5, 1998 
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Appendix Box A.3.2 
The Peace Clause and Domestic Subsidies 
The 'Peace Clause' (Article 13 of the URAA) 
precludes most WTO dispute settlement 
challenges against a country in compliance 
with the Agreement, but ends after 2003. 
Many agricultural subsidies will then be 
vulnerable to legal challenge under Article 
XVI of GAm994, Articles 6.3 (a)-(c) and 
6.4 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) or with 
claims of nullification or impairment. 
Nonsubsidising developing countries will 
then be able to bargain using dispute 
settlement panels (or direct negotiations) to 
contest the compatibility of domestic farm 
policies with these more strict disciplines 
generally available to non-agricultural sectors 
in the WTO. The remedy would require 
elimination of subsidy or reduce its adverse 
effects. The various subsidy provisions of the 
WTO, therefore, represent potentially 
powerful disciplines on agricultural subsidies. 
Agricultural subsidies hitherto have 
been sheltered under various 
conditions from the application of 
several WTO provisions on subsidies. 
However, amber and blue box 
policies have not been entirely 
immune from countervailing duties 
and GATT 1994 Article XVI: 13 
even with the Peace Clause in effect. 
The dispute between new Zealand 
and the United States and Canada 
over the impact of Canadian dairy 
policy, together with the complaint 
by Brazil over U.S. cotton subsidies 
and the challenge by Australia, Brazil 
and Thailand of the EU sugar regime 
reflects the reduced protection from 
actionability relative to green box and 
export subsidies. 
Source: Richard and Timothy (2003) 
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Appendix Box A .3.3 
How Subsidies in Developed Countries Hurt Developing Countries 
Agricultural policies in rich countries still distort markets at home and aboard. Worse, 
they hurt the poor. Price-support mechanisms make domestic consumers pay more for 
their food, hitting low- income families the hardest. And for farmers in poor countries, 
OECD agricultural policies are disastrous. If those farmers are not being kept out of 
export markets by quotas or tariffs, they are being undercut in domestic markets by 
heavily subsidised produce from the developed world. While some have argued that 
rich -world subsidies are a net boon to poor countries because they provide cheap 
food to the masses, in those countries the poorest are often rural farmers, whose lives 
would be improved by higher prices for their products'. 
Source: http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm_id=4100673 
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Derbez Draft 
The 13' September draft completely failed to gauge and accommodate the 
mood of the participating countries. In fact, on several issues it ran contrary to 
that mood.... Domestic support subsidies of various categories also distort 
trade and they hugely distort trade. The 13* September draft only had 
marginal references about reduction of these subsidies. And when it came to 
developing countries reducing tariffs, the 13 September draft, effectively 
involved higher reduction of tariffs by the developing countries as against the 
developed countries... We made various calculations on the formulation of the 
13 September draft. I can tell you from India's point of view that it was scary 
due to the kind of reductions we would have had to face, in the face of no 
substantial reduction in subsidies... in relation to the Singapore issues, the \2^^ 
September draft was even more curious... On cotton again, four African 
countries are predominantly a one-crop nation whose economies have been 
very badly, adversely affected on account of huge cotton subsidies to 25,000 
farmers in one country - they receive a subsidy of $3.7 billion annually. The 
amount of $ 3.7 billion annually is the subsidy which is shared amongst 
25,000 farmers. The effect of that is to distort cotton prices which effects the 
economies of Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad. So, para 27 of the 13* 
September draft again spoke in terms of a study to be undertaken and almost 
the feel of para 27 was that some of the countries should be aided and advised, 
and then persuaded for crop diversification, because subsidies in any case 
cannot be reduced... It is obviously clear to me that this draft cannot be a 
starting point of any further negotiation. Secondly, it is also seen that the 
consensus element has become negligible..." 
Source: Debroy Bibek and Saqib Mohammed (2005) 
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Agricultural Products: 
Current and Minimum Marliet Access Commitments 
(Agreement on Agriculture, Article 5.2) 
Current Access Commitments 
A number of countries had special arrangements for imports of meat and other mainly 
temperate-zone products up to quota limits on either a duty-free or a preferential 
basis. In order to ensure that such imports are not affected by the application of higher 
rates resulting from tariffication, importing countries have given current access 
commitments by establishing tariff quotas to cover imports that were entering the 
market at lower duty rates. As a result of these commitments, imports up to quota 
levels are allowed at the lower existing rates. The higher rates ensuring from 
tariffication are applicable to imports over and above quota limits. 
Minimum access commitments 
For products for which little or no imports took place in the past because of the highly 
restrictive nature of the then-existing regime, countries were required to give 
minimum market access opportunity commitments. The commitments provide for the 
establishment of tariff quotas equal to 3% of domestic consumption in the base period 
1986-88 and rising to 5% by the end of 2000 for developed countries and 2004 for 
developing countries. Lower rates (specified in the national schedules but generally 
not greater than 32% of the bound tariffied rates) are applicable to imports up to the 
quota limits, while the higher rate resulting from tariffication apply to imports over 
quota limits. As a result of these minimum access commitments, countries will have 
to import modest amounts of their most restricted products. Products covered by 
minimum access commitments include meat, dairy products, and specified fresh 
vegetables and fruits. 
Source: Awasthi and Mishra (2004) 
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Appendix Box A.4.2 
Some of the Agricultural Market Access Provisions in the Uruguay Round 
Some of the Agricultural Market Access Provisions in the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations 
Tariffication, Tariff Bindings, and Reductions 
. Non -tariff barriers to be converted to tariff equivalents (tariffication) equal to the 
difference between internal and external prices existing in the base period. 
. All tariffs to be bound (i.e. cannot be increased without notification and 
compensation). 
. Reduce existing and new tariffs by 36 percent, on a simple average (unweighted) 
basis, in equal instalments over six years. 
. Reduce tariffs for each item by minimum of 15 percent. 
Minimum and Current Access 
. Minimum access import opportunities to be provided for products subject to 
tariffication with imports below 5 percent of domestic consumption in the base 
period. 
. Countries must agree to maintain current access opportunities equivalent to those 
existing in the base period. Current access import opportunities (for example under 
quotas or voluntary export restraints) to be provided for products subject to 
tariffication with imports exceeding 5 percent of domestic consumption in the base 
period. 
.To ensure that these access opportunities can be met, countries will establish tariff-
rate quotas, with the access amounts subject to a low duty and imports above that 
amount subject to the tariff established through tariffication. 
. Increase minimum access quotas from 3 percent of domestic consumption to 5 
percent over implementation period. 
Safeguard, Exceptions, and Special and Differential Treatment 
. Special temporary agricultural safeguard mechanism put in place for products 
subject to tariffication. Imposed if increase in volume of imports or drop in prices of 
imports exceeds certain trigger levels. 
178 
. Special treatment allows countries, under certain condition, to postpone tariffication 
up to the end of the implementation period as long as minimum access opportunities 
are provided. 
. Developing countries allowed the flexibility of ceiling bindings, longer 
implementation period (10 years) and lower reduction commitments in tariffs (24 
percent average reductions with 10 percent minimum). Least developed countries 
subject to tariffication and binding but exempted from reduction commitments. 
Implementation Period 
Implementation; six years, beginning in 1995(10 years for developing countries). 
Source: RIS based on International Agriculture and Trade reports no 4, 1998 
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Appendix Box A.4.3 
Who is Using Special Safeguards 
According to Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture Special Safeguard on 
imports may be taken temporarily to deal with special circumstances. As a part of 
this higher safeguard duties can be triggered automatically when imports volume 
rise above certain level or if prices fall below a certain level. In either case it is not 
necessary to demonstrate the serious injury is being caused to the domestic 
industry. At present 39 WTO Members currently used 6156 Special Safeguards on 
agricultural products. Below we provide a number of products which are 
safeguarded under this Article by member countries. 
Canada 150 Barbados 37 
United States 
European union 
Japan 
Korea 
Switzerland 
Australia 
Newziland 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
189 
539 
121 
111 
961 
10 
4 
293 
76 
Bulgaria 
Colombia 
Indonesia 
India 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
South Africa 
China 
21 
56 
13 
0 
72 
118 
52 
166 
84 
Source: WTO Secretariat background paper "Special Agricultural Safeguard" 
G/AG/NG/S/9Rev-l. 
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Appendix Box A.4.4 
Special Agricultural Safeguard: Quantitative Trigger Levels 
jIn accordance with Article 5, paragraph 4, of the AOA, an additional duty may 
Ibe imposed in any year where the absolute volume of imports (M) exceeds the 
isum of the base trigger level (x) multiplied by the average quantity of imports 
[during the three preceding years for which data are available ("" ) and the 
[absolute volume change in domestic consumption of the product concerned in 
(the most recent year for which data are available compared to the preceding year 
(y). In algebraic terms this is expressed as: 
Mj=Mx+y 
Where, Mt is the trigger level of imports and x (the base trigger level) is defined 
according to the following schedule based on the share of imports in domestic 
consumption during the three preceding years (S). Thus: 
\ — i — 
|x = 
r~ r •" 
125 %, 
no %, 
105 %, 
if 5 £10% 
i f l O % < 5 £ 3 0 % 
if 5 > 30% 
For example, if the share of imports in domestic consumption during the 
preceding three years is 7 percent, then x will be equal to 1.25. Thus an 
additional duty can be imposed if current imports (M) exceed the trigger volume 
(M.), i.e. 
M>1,25M+y. 
The maximum extra duty shall not exceed 30 percent of the level of the ordinary 
customs duty in effect in the year in which the action is taken, it shall only be 
maintained to the end of the year in which it has been imposed and cannot be 
applied to imports taking place within tariff quotas. 
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Appendix Box A.4.5 
Special Agricultural Safeguard: Price Trigger Levels 
|PM = current c.i.f import price of the shipment (expressed in domestic currency) 
IPT = trigger price (average c.i.f price for 1986-88) 
ID = (PT - PM)/PT (the percentage fall in the import price below the trigger price). 
iln accordance with Article 5, paragraph 5, of the AoA, an additional duty, 
lexpressed in ad valorem equivalent (t), may be imposed according to the 
Ifollowing schedule: 
1(a) D£ 10% 
i(b)10%<D£40% 
then t = 0 
then t = 0.27 (PT/PM) - 0.3 
(c) 40% < D £ 60% then t = 0.39 (PT/PM)-0.5 
(d) 60% < D £ 75% then t-0.47 (PT/PM)-0.7 
(e) D > 75% then t = 0.52 (PT/PM)-0.9 
Example: Assume a trigger price of US$120 per unit and that the current c.i.f 
import price is US$60. Since the import price is 50 percent of the trigger price, 
case (c) applies. Consequently, an additional duty equivalent to 28 percent of the 
c.i.f. import price could be levied, which would bring the price of the imported 
product to US$76.8. 
The additional duty can only be imposed on the shipment concerned and cannot 
be applied to imports taking place within tariff quotas. 
Source: Hathaway (2001) 
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Appendix Box A.5.1 
The Structure of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
PART I General Provisions and Basic Principles 
PART II Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual 
Property 
Rights 
I Copyrights and Related rights 
II Trademarks 
III Geographical indications 
IV Industrial Design 
V Patents 
VI Lay out designs(topographies) of Integrated Circuits 
VII Protection of Undisclosed information 
VIII Control of antidumping practices in contractual licenses 
PART III Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
I General obligations 
II Civil and administrative procedures and remedies 
III Provisional Measures 
IV Special requirements related to border measures 
V Criminal procedures 
PART IV Acquisition and Maintenance of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Related Inter Parties Procedures 
PART V Dispute Prevention and Settlement 
PART VI Transitional Arrangements 
PART VII Institutional Arrangements, Final Provisions 
Source: GATT1994,p365 
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Appendix Table A.3.1 
Extent of Market Price Support to Wheat in India 
Year 
1 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001 -02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
MSP (Rs/qy) 
2 
380 
475 
510 
550 
580 
610 
620 
620 
630 
640 
Import Price (Cif) 
(Rs/qt) 
3 
1,260.92 
659.00 
665.63 
645.77 
2,115.88 
680.09 
622.22 
543.47 
500.00 
Subsidy (2-3) 
(Rs/qt) 
4 
-880,92 
-184 
-155.63 
-95.77 
-1,535.88 
-70.09 
-2.22 
86.53 
140 
Total Production 
(000 Tonnes) 
5 
62,100 
69,350 
66,350 
71,290 
76,370 
69,680 
72,770 
65,760 
72,160 
68,640 
Extent of Support 
(4*5/100) Rs. 
Million) 
6 
-547051.32 
-127604.00 
-103260.50 
-68274.43 
-1172951.55 
-48838.71 
-1615.49 
62440.04 
96096.00 
Source: 
1 Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (various issues). 
2 Computed. 
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Appendix Table A.3.2 
Extent of Market Price Support to Rice in India 
Year 
1 
1995 - 96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001 - 02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
[2005 - 06 
MSP (Rs/qt) 
2 
360 
380 
415 
440 
490 
510 
530 
530 
550 
560 
570.00 
Import Price 
(Rs/qt) 
3 
625.00 
1,200.00 
812.03 
855.95 
1,347.99 
1,166.66 
1,252.87 
500 
Subsidy (2-3) 
(Rs/qt) 
4 
-265 
-785 
-372.03 
-365,95 
-837.99 
-636.66 
-722.87 
50 
Total Production 
(000 Tonnes) 
5 
76,980 
81,740 
82,530 
86,080 
89,680 
84,980 
93,340 
71,820 
88,530 
Extent of Support 
(4*5/100) Rs. Million 
6 
-20399.7 
-647860.50 
-320243.42 
-328183.96 
-712123.90 
1 -594258.44 
-519165.23 
44265.00 
Source: Same as in Appendix Table A.3.1 
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Appendix Table A.3.3 
Extent of Market Price Support to Groundnut in India 
Year 
1 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997 - 98 
1998-99 
1999 - 00 
2000-01 
2001 - 02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
MSP (Rs/qt) 
2 
900 
920 
980 
1,040 
1,155 
1,220 
1,340 
1,355 
1,400 
1,500 
1,520 
Export Price 
(Rs/qt) 
3 
1,940.03 
219.07 
2,307.66 
2,394.30 
2,350.97 
1,571.23 
2,224.44 
2,626.30 
1,012 
3,087.89 
2,703.95 
Subsidy (2-3) 
(Rs/qt) 
4 
-1,040.03 
-1,270.07 
-1,327.66 
-1,354.30 
-1,195.97 
-351.23 
-884.44 
-1,271.30 
387.68 
-1,587.89 
-1,183.95 
Total Production 
(000 Tonnes) 
5 
7,580 
8,640 
7,370 
8,980 
5,260 
6,410 
7,030 
4,120 
8,130 
6,770 
7,990.00 
Extent of Support 
(4*5/100) Rs. 
Million 
6 
-78834.27 
-109734.04 
-97848.54 
-121616.14 
-62908.02 
-22513.84 
-62176.13 
-52377.56 
31518.38 
-10500.15 
-94597.60 
Source: Same as in Appendix Table A.3. 
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Appendix Table A.3.4 
Extent of Market Price Support to Jute in India 
Year 
1 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999 - 00 
2000 - 01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
MSP (Rs/qt) 
2 
490 
510 
570 
650 
750 
785 
810 
850 
860 
890 
910 
Import Price 
(Rs/qt) 
3 
878.89 
1,575.70 
1,109.79 
868.48 
1,013.90 
1,252.36 
1,200.65 
940.93 
839 
1,532.78 
1.516.35 
Subsidy (2-3) 
(Rs/qt) 
4 
-388.89 
-1,065.7 
-539.79 
-218.48 
-263.90 
-467.36 
-390.65 
-90.93 
21.21 
-642.78 
-606.35 
Total Production 
(000 Tonnes) 
5 
8,810 
11,130 
11,020 
9,810 
10,560 
10,560 
11,680 
11,280 
11,170 
10,270 
10,840 
Extent of Support 
(4*5/100) Rs. Million 
6 
-34261.2 
-118612.41 
-59484.85 
-21432.88 
-27867.80 
. -49353.21 
-45627.92 
-10256.90 
2369.15 
-66013.50 
-65728.34 
Source: Same as in Appendix Table A.3.1 
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Appendix Table A.3.5 
Extent of Market Price Support To Cotton in India 
Year 
1 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999 - 00 
2000-01 
2001 - 02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
MSP (Rs/qt) 
2 
1,150 
1,180 
1,330 
1,440 
1,575 
1,625 
1,675 
1,675 
1,725 
1,760 
1,760 
Import Price 
(Rs/qt) 
3 
7,486.78 
10,808.21 
8,089.26 
6,639.54 
5,281.92 
5,578.87 
5,305.96 
5,292.32 
6,208 
5,908.83 
7,006.31 
Subsidy (2-3) 
(Rs/qt) 
4 
-6,336.78 
-9,628.2 
-6,759.26 
-5,199.54 
-3,706.92 
-3,953.87 
-3,630.96 
-3,617.32 
-4,483.10 
-4,148.83 
-5,246.31 
Total Production 
(000 Tonnes) 
5 
12,860 
14,230 
10,850 
122,490 
11,530 
95,200 
10,000 
86,200 
13,730 
16,430 
18,500 
Extent of Support 
(4*5/100) Rs. Million 
6 
-814909.9 
-1370094.28 
-733379.71 
-639023.46 
-427407.87 
-3764084.24 
-363096.00 
-3118129.84 
-615529.63 
-681652.76 
-970567.35 
Source: Same as in Appendix Table A.3.1 
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Appendix Table A.3.6 
Extent of Market Price Support To Sugar in India 
Year 
1 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001 - 02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
MSP (Rs/qt) 
2 
42.50 
45.90 
48.45 
52.70 
56.10 
59.50 
62.05 
69.50 
73 
74.50 
79.50 
Import Price 
(Rs/qt) 
3 
1,433.25 
1,492.95 
1,355.53 
1,234.04 
9,404.15 
1,023.35 
1,274.43 
792.42 
842.74 
1,046.57 
1,166.49 
Subsidy (2-3) 
4 
-1,390.75 
-1,447.05 
-1,307.08 
-1,181.34 
-9,384.05 
-963.85 
-1,212.38 
-722.92 
-769.74 
-972.07 
-1,086.99 
Total Production 
(000 Tonnes) 
5 
28,110 
27,756 
27,954 
28,872 
29,932 
29,596 
29,721 
29,738 
23,386 
23,708 
28,117 
Extent of Support 
(4*5/100) Rs. Million 
6 
-390939.82 
-401643.19 
-365381.14 
-341076.48 
-2798058.32 
-285261.04 
-360331.45 
-207752.74 
-180011.39 
-230458.35 
-305628 
Source: Same as in Appendix Table A.3.1 
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Appendix Table A.3.9 
Total Aggregate Measure of Support to Indian Agriculture 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Product Specific AMS 
-1,886,396.21 
-2,127,688 
-2,007,215 
-1,511,667 
-4,817,378 
-4,882,175 
-1,427,105 
-3,907,682 
-654,948 
-892,529 
-1,436,521 
Non-Product Specific 
AMS 
17,177.00 
24,378.08 
23,559.96 
24,425.22 
31,798.00 
36,007.00 
38,355.00 
135,592.00 
Total AMS 
-1,869,219,21 
-2,103,309.84 
-1,983,655.28 
-1,487,241.59 
-4,785,579.52 
-4,846,167.94 
-1,388,750.43 
-3,772,090.27 
-654,948.45 
-892,528.76 
-1,436,521.29 
Total AMS as % of Value of 
Agriculture Production 
-881 
-903 
-879 
-606 
-1,943 
-2,058 
-559 
-1,691 
-260.70 
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A.3.7 and Appendix Table A.3.8. 
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Appendix Table A.3.10 
Total Aggregate Measure of Support to Indian Agriculture as Percent of GDP 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997 - 98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000 - 01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Product Specific as 
Percentage of GDP in 
Agriculture 
-67.89 
-64 
-57 
-36 
-109 
-115 
-31 
-86 
-13 
Non-Product Specific 
as Percentage of GDP 
in Agriculture 
0.62 
0.73 
0.67 
0.58 
0.72 
0.85 
0.83 
2.97 
0.00 
Total AMS as 
Percentage of GDP 
in Agriculture 
-67.28 
-62.97 
-56.12 
-35.14 
-107.80 
-114.43 
-29.99 
-82.65 
-12.56 
Source: 
1 National Account Statistics (various issues). 
2 Computed. 
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Appendix Table A.3.11 
AMS Reduction Tiers Suggested in the WTO Negotiations 
US: four bands 
US$ 10 billion or less 
Between US$ 10-20 
billion 
Between US$ 20-40 
billion 
More than US$ 40 
billion 
All other 
countries 
US 
Japan 
TheEu 
G-20: four bands 
US$ 2 billion or 
less 
Between US$ 2-12 
billion 
Between US$ 12-
25 billion 
More than US$ 25 
billion 
Most developing, a few 
developed countries 
Mexico, other developed 
countries 
US 
The EU, Japan 
Australia: four bands 
US$ 1 billion or 
less 
Between US$ 1-10 
billion 
Between US$ 10-
25 billion 
More than US$ 25 
billion 
Most developing countries, 
Australia, New Zealand 
Thailand, other developed 
countries 
Mexico, the US 
The EU, Japan 
Source: (Aggarwal, 2005) 
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Appendix Table A.3.12 
TDS Reduction Tiers Suggested in the WTO Negotiations 
US: four bands 
Less than US$ 20 
billion 
Between US$ 20-
40 billion 
Between US$ 40-
60 billion 
More than US$ 
60 billion 
Other 
countries 
The US, Japan 
and Canada 
TheEu 
G-20: three bands for developed 
countries 
No cuts for developing countries with no AMS 
Separate band for developing counrties (2/3 cut 
of lowest band of developed countries) 
Less than US$ 10 
billion 
Between US$ 10-45 
billion 
More than US$ 45 
billion 
other developed countries 
The US and Japan 
TheEU 
Australia: five bands 
Less than US$ 5 billion 
Between US$ 5-30 
billion 
Between US$ 30-90 
billion 
More than US$ 90 
billion 
Developing countries with 
no AMS 
Switzerland, Norway, South 
Africa, Tunisia, etc. 
Canada, Mexico, Korea, 
Brazil, etc 
The US and Japan 
TheEU 
Source: (Agganwal, 2005) 
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Appendix Table A.3.13 
India's Non-Product Specific Support and Support under the S&D Provisions 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
S&D 
Non-product 
Specific 
Support 
Total Value of 
Agricultural 
Production 
In million US$ 
254.31 
4855.09 
5171.8 
5772.06 
930.34 
1003.48 
76736 
85280 
84972 
S&D 
JNon-product 
Specific 
Support 
As a percentage of total value of 
agricultural production 
0.33 
5.69 
6.09 
7.52 
1.09 
1.18 
Source: Calculated from India's Notification to WTO on Domestic Subsidies, 
WTO Document No.G/AG/N/IND/l(for 1995-96) and G/AG/N/IND/2 
(for 1996-97 and 1997-98). 
196 
Appendix Table A.4.1 
Tariffs and Bund Rates on Major Agricultural Commodities/Groups 
As on 31.03.2006 
S.No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Item description Basic duty (%) 
I. Cereals and Pulses 
Pulses other than peas 
Wheat 
Maize (com) seed 
Rice in the husk 
Husked (brown) rice; broken rice 
Semi-milled or wholly milled rice 
whether or not polished 
Millet, Jowar 
Sorghum 
Buck wheat and canary seed 
Other cereals (rye, barley, etc.) 
10 
50 
50 
80 
80 
70 
50 
50 
Free 
Free 
I. Cereals Products 
Atta 
Maida 
Sooji 
Wheat and potato starch 
Flour, meal and powder of dried 
leguminous vegetables including sago, 
tamarind and mango 
Other starches 
Roasted malt 
Unroasted malt 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
I. Dairy Products 
Fresh milk and cream 
Butter and melted butter (ghee) 
Cheese 
Milk powder 
Yoghurt 
30 
40 
30 
60 
30 
I. Plantation Crops 
Tea 
Coffee 
Coconut 
Copra 
Cassia and cinnamon 
Cloves 
Other Spices 
100 
100 
70 
70 
30 
35 
30/70 
V.Meat & Poultry 
Chicken sausages 100 
Bound duty 
(%) 
100 
100 
70 
80 
80 
70 
70 
80 
100/Free 
100 
150 
150 
150 
35 
150 
100 
100 
100 
100 
40 
40 
60 
150 
150 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
150/100 
150 
197 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Chicken leg (processed) 
Meat of poultry, not cut in pieces, 
fresh or chilled 
Raw hams, pig fat; meat of bovine 
animals 
Other meat and offal 
Processed hams 
Fish 
100 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
150 
100 
100 
100 
55 
Unbound 
VI. Sugar 
VII. Horticulture 
Apples 
Grapefruit 
Pears and quinces 
Strawberries, dried apricots etc. 
Oranges; lemons and limes; fresh 
grapes 
Fresh pomegranates, lichi, tamarind 
(fresh), custard apple 
Other fruits except Sapota (Black 
berries etc.) 
Garlic 
Onions 
Mushrooms 
Potato 
Sweet Potato 
Frozen vegetables-peas, beans, 
spinach, sweet com etc. 
Other edible roots and tubers with 
high starch or insulin content, fresh or 
chilled (cassava) 
All other vegetables 
Arecanut 
Hop cones (ground, powdered or 
inpellets) 
Hop cones (other than ground, 
powdered or inpellets) 
Betel leaves 
Planting materials of oilseeds 
Oilseeds, misc grains, seeds of fruits, 
industrial or medicinal plants (other 
than the kind used for sowing and hop 
cones) 
Basil, hyasop, rosemary, sage, savory 
comboge fruit rind 
Apricot, peach or plum stones and 
kernels 
Seeds of a kind used for sowing (other 
than vegetables seeds) 
50 
25 
30 
30 
30 
15 
30 
100 
5 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
100 
30 
30 
30 
5 
30 
15 
30 
15 
50 
100 
100 
35 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
150 
150 
100 
100 
100 
75 
100 
100 
10 
100 
100 
100 
100 
198 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Vegetables seeds 
oilcake and oilcake meal solvent 
exracted (defatted) variety of 
coconut/copra; oilcake and oilcake 
meal expeller variety of coconut/copra 
VIII. Edible oils (Crude) 
Soyabean oil 
Palm oil (for manufacture of 
vanaspati) 
Groundnut oil 
Sunflower/Safflower 
Coconut oil 
Rapeseed oil 
Colza or Mustard Oil 
Castor OilATung Oil 
Other Oils 
IX. Edible Oils (Refined) 
Soyabean Oil 
RBD Palmolein 
Palm Oil 
Groundnut Oil 
Sunflower/Safflower 
Coconut Oil Edible grade 
Coconut oil other 
Rapeseed Oil 
Colza or Mustard Oil 
Castor Oil/Tung Oil 
Other oils edible grade 
Other oils other than edible grade 
5 
15 
45 
80 
85 
75 
85/100 
75 
75 
85/100 
85/100 
45 
90 
90 
85 
85 
85 
100 
75 
75 
100 
85 
100 
10 
100 
45 
300 
300 
300 
800 
75 
75 
100 
100 
45 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
300 
75 
75 
100/300 
300 
100/300 
* With effect from 1.3.2006, all agricultural commodities will also attract a special 
additional duty of customs @4% 
Notes: 
1. The above basic customs duty are as on 1.1.2006. However, duty on pulses 
was reduced to zero on 8.6.2006 and validity period extended to 1.8.2007. 
2. For wheat,. Private trade was permitted to import at zero duty from 9.9.2006 
as against normal duty of 50 percent. Duty was earlier reduced to 5 percent on 
28.6.2006. Validity period extended from 31.12.2006 to 28.2.2007. 
3. For maize, import duty was reduced to zero from 25.1.2007 and valid up to 
31.12.2007. 
4. It may be mentioned that the duty on edible oils were reduced in Aguust 2006 
and in January 2007. 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Galance (2006-07). 
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Appendix Table A.6.2 
Annual Percentage Change over Previous Year in Agro-Export and Agro-Iimport and 
Total National Export and Import (at current prices) 
Year 
1995 - 96 
1996 - 97 
1997 - 98 
1998 - 99 
1999 - 00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Agriculture 
Imports 
12.27 
32.84 
65.83 
10.30 
-24.77 
34.51 
8.32 
24.78 
0.39 
-4.68 
Total National 
Imports 
13.24 
10.98 
15.67 
20.86 
5.93 
7.40 
21.21 
20.83 
33.96 
31.07 
Agiculture 
Exports 
18.45 
2,78 
2.73 
-0.77 
13.21 
3.74 
16.57 
7.54 
6.97 
24.93 
Total National 
Exports 
11.72 
9.50 
7.42 
13.84 
26.56 
3.80 
22.06 
14.98 
21.37 
27.73 
Net Agro-Export 
20.96 
-8.55 
-31.80 
-15.51 
79.21 
-18.70 
26.52 
-10.27 
16.42 
61.62 
Total Net Export 
23.14 
19.76 
60.24 
46.28 
-52.24 
34.25 
16.27 
56.27 
90.13 
40.59 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
Summary Statistics 
-24.77 5.93 -0.77 3.80 -31.80 
65.83 33.96 24.93 27.73 79.21 
15.98 18.11 9.61 15.90 11.99 
156.48 51.63 86.46 51.50 302.34 
-24.77 5.93 -0.77 7.42 -31.80 
65.83 20.86 18.45 26.56 79.21 
19.29 13.34 7.28 13.81 8.86 
172.33 41.49 111.97 54.496 493.39 
-24.77 5.93 3.74 3.80 -18.70 
34.51 33.96 24.93 27.73 79.21 
6.42 20.07 12.16 19.42 25.80 
331.17 57.96 64.02 45.73 150.17 
-52.24 
90.13 
33.47 
111.79 
-52.24 
60.24 
19.44 
223.34 
-52.24 
90.13 
30.88 
154.53 
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A.6.1. 
202 
Appendix Table A.6.3 
India's Total Exports and Total Imports and Agro-Exports and Agro-Imports in Relation to GDP 
(at factor cost) (in percent) 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Total GDP (at 
factor cost) 
1,073,271 
1,243,546 
1,390,148 
1,598,127 
1,761,932 
1,917,724 
2,094,013 
2,343,205 
2,622,050 
2,878,000 
3,276,000 
Total Exports 
as Percent of 
GDP 
9.91 
9.55 
9.36 
8.74 
9.03 
10.50 
9.98 
10.89 
11.19 
12.37 
13.88 
Total Imports 
as Percent of 
GDP 
11.43 
11.17 
11.09 
11.16 
12.23 
11.91 
11.71 
12.68 
13.70 
16.72 
19.25 
GDP from 
Agriculture 
277846.00 
334030.00 
353490.00 
406498.00 
422392.00 
423522.00 
473004.00 
456044.00 
484330,00 
484999.00 
536196.00 
Agro-Exports as 
Percent of GDP 
from Agriculture 
7.34 
7.23 
7.02 
6.28 
5.99 
6.77 
6.29 
7.60 
7.69 
8.22 
9.29 
Agro-Imports as 
Percent of GDP 
from Agriculture 
2.12 
1.98 
2.48 
3.58 
3.80 
2.85 
3.44 
3.86 
4.54 
4.55 
3.92 
Growth Rate (% per 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
mnum) 
11.30 
12.39 
11.29 
8.74 
13.88 
10.49 
14.65 
8.74 
10.50 
9.52 
6.61 
9.98 
13.88 
11.47 
12.46 
Summary Statistics 
11.09 
19.25 
13.00 
20.30 
11.09 
12.23 
11.50 
4.07 
11.71 
19.25 
14.33 
21.11 
5.67 
8.80 
3.83 
5.99 
9.29 
7.25 
13.21 
5.99 
7.34 
6.77 
7.96 
6.29 
9.29 
7.64 
13.92 
1.98 
4.55 
3.38 
26.63 
1.98 
3.80 
2.80 
26.96 
2.85 
4.55 
3.86 
16.90 
Source: 
1. Same as in Appendix Table A.6.1 
2. National Accoimts Statistics (Various Issiines), Central Statistical Organisation , National accoimts 
division, Ministry of Statistics and Programme implementation (GOI), New Delhi . 
3. Economic Survey 2007-08, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division (GOI), New Delh 
4. Computed. 
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Appendix Table A. 6.6 
Percentage Share of Exports of Agricultural Products in Total Agro-Exports 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000 - 01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 -04 
2004 - 05 
2005-06 
1995-96 to 2 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
1995-96 to 2 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
2000-01 to 2 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
Basmati 
Rice 
4.17 
5.16 
6.74 
7.36 
7.03 
7.47 
6.19 
4.99 
5.35 
7.08 
6 
005-06 
4.17 
7.47 
6.15 
17.89 
000-01 
4.17 
7.47 
6.32 
21.28 
005-06 
4.99 
7.47 
6.19 
15.49 
Non-
Basmati 
Rice 
18.22 
7.97 
6.44 
17.26 
5.32 
2.74 
4.45 
10.49 
5.84 
9.90 
8.32 
2.74 
18.22 
8.81 
56.45 
2.74 
18.22 
9.66 
67.29 
2.74 
10.49 
6.96 
44.68 
Wheat 
1.80 
2.89 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
1.55 
4.47 
4.91 
6.42 
3.66 
1 
0.00 
6.42 
2.44 
90.32 
0.00 
2.89 
1.04 
117.58 
1.12 
6.42 
3.69 
55.20 
Pulses 
0.65 
0.54 
1.43 
0.87 
1.66 
1.87 
1.23 
0.97 
0.88 
1.51 
2 
S 
0.54 
2.21 
1.26 
42.07 
0.54 
1,87 
1.17 
47.60 
0.88 
2.21 
1.45 
36.09 
Groundnuts 
1.13 
1.35 
2.24 
0.55 
1.47 
1.10 
0.84 
0.50 
1.46 
1.37 
1.01 
ummary Stati 
0.50 
2.24 
1.18 
41.13 
0.55 
2.24 
1.31 
42.66 
0.50 
1.46 
1.05 
33.64 
Cotton Raw 
Including 
Waste 
1.00 
6.52 
3.38 
0.81 
0.30 
0.78 
0.15 
0.14 
2.53 
1.06 
5.61 
sties 
0.14 
6.52 
2.02 
110.61 
0.30 
6.52 
2.13 
112.91 
0.14 
5.61 
1.71 
122.82 
Cashew 
6.06 
5.32 
5.57 
6.38 
9.70 
6.55 
5.98 
5.79 
4.56 
6.21 
5.15 
4.56 
9.70 
6.12 
21.67 
5.32 
9.70 
6.60 
24.13 
4.56 
6.55 
5.71 
12.84 
Fresh 
Fruits 
1.13 
1.01 
1.04 
1.04 
1.21 
1.34 
1.36 
1.25 
2.10 
2.16 
2.21 
1.01 
2.21 
1.44 
32.91 
1.01 
1.34 
1.13 
11.33 
1.25 
2.21 
1.74 
26.66 
Fresh 
Vegetables 
1.46 
1.38 
1.23 
1.07 
1.33 
1.59 
1.93 
1.78 
2.56 
2.16 
1.83 
1.07 
2.56 
1.67 
26.43 
1.07 
1.59 
1.34 
13,29 
1.59 
2.56 
1.98 
17.34 
Spices 
3.89 
49.72 
5.67 
6.40 
6.98 
5.66 
4.98 
4.66 
4.14 
4.72 
4.45 
3.89 
49.72 
9.21 
146.28 
3.89 
49.72 
13.05 
137.83 
4.14 
5.66 
4.77 
10.88 
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A.6.1 and Appendix Table A.6.4 
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Appendix Table A.6.7 
Share of Exports of Major Agricultural Products in Total Nationa 
Year 
1995 - 96 
1996-97 
1997 - 98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001 - 02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Basmati 
Rice 
0.80 
1.05 
1.29 
1.34 
1.12 
1.06 
0.88 
0.68 
0.68 
0.79 
0.67 
Non 
Basmati 
Rice 
3.50 
1.62 
1.23 
3.15 
0.85 
0.39 
0.63 
1.42 
0.74 
1.11 
0.91 
Wheat 
0.34 
0.59 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
0.64 
0.67 
0.82 
0.41 
0.12 
Pulses 
0.12 
0.11 
0.27 
0.16 
0.26 
0.27 
0.18 
0.13 
0.11 
0.17 
0.24 
Groundnuts 
0.22 
0.27 
0.43 
0.10 
0,23 
0.16 
0.12 
0.07 
0.19 
0.15 
0.11 
Cotton raw 
including 
waste 
0.19 
1.33 
0.65 
0.15 
0.05 
0.11 
0.02 
0.02 
0.32 
0.12 
0.61 
Cashew 
1.16 
1.08 
1.06 
1.16 
1.54 
0.93 
0.85 
0.79 
0.58 
0.70 
0.56 
Exports (in percent) 
Fresh 
Fruits 
0.22 
0.21 
0.20 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.17 
0.27 
0.24 
0.24 
Fresh 
Vegetable 
0.28 
0.28 
0.24 
0.20 
0.21 
0.23 
0.27 
0.24 
0.33 
0.24 
0.20 
Spices 
0.75 
10.11 
1.08 
1.17 
1.11 
0.81 
0.71 
0.63 
0.53 
0.53 
0.49 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.67 
1.34 
0.94 
25.98 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.80 
1.34 
1.11 
17.44 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.67 
1.06 
0.79 
19.77 
0.39 
3.50 
1.41 
71.47 
0.39 
3.50 
1.79 
70.53 
0.39 
1.42 
0.87 
42.14 
0.00 
0,82 
0.35 
86.42 
0,00 
0.59 
0.19 
125.36 
0.12 
0.82 
0.48 
56.96 
0,11 
0,27 
0,18 
35.23 
O.Il 
0.27 
0.20 
38.28 
0.11 
0,27 
0.18 
33.17 
Summary Statistics 
0.07 
0.43 
0.19 
54.54 
0.10 
0.43 
0.23 
47.97 
0.07 
0.19 
0.13 
31.45 
0,02 
1.33 
0.32 
122.98 
0.05 
1,33 
0,41 
120,46 
0,02 
0.61 
0.20 
114.80 
0.56 
1.54 
0.95 
30.99 
0.93 
1.54 
1.16 
17.88 
0.56 
0.93 
0.73 
20.21 
0.17 
0.27 
0.21 
13.82 
0.19 
0.22 
0.20 
5.06 
0.17 
0.27 
0.22 
17,49 
0.20 
0,33 
0,25 
16,11 
0,20 
0.28 
0.24 
14.86 
0.20 
0.33 
0,25 
17,21 
0,49 
10,11 
1,63 
173.45 
0,75 
10,11 
2.50 
148.98 
0.49 
0,81 
0,62 
20.17 
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A.6.1 and Appendix Table A.6.4 
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Appendix Table A.6.10 
Percentage Share of Imports of Agriculture Products in Total Agro-Imports 
Year 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997 - 98 
1998 - 99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Wheat 
0.12 
4.60 
11.05 
13.26 
8.82 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
Rice 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.34 
0.20 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Pulses 
7.80 
10.14 
9.49 
8.07 
4.04 
5.62 
35.92 
29.17 
26,01 
20.24 
27 
Spices 
0.84 
1.11 
1.18 
3.40 
3.35 
2.84 
5.69 
6.47 
6.43 
6.76 
8 
Cashew Nuts 
8.65 
0.78 
8.47 
11.03 
13.64 
10.95 
4.91 
14.01 
15.62 
20.55 
23.79 
Cotton raw including waste 
5.93 
0.36 
0.93 
4.34 
14.27 
13.47 
23.36 
11.85 
17.87 
12.93 
7.84 
Oilseeds 
0.41 
0.05 
0.02 
0.10 
0.18 
0.09 
0.02 
0.13 
0.16 
0.32 
0.54 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.00 
13.26 
3.44 
149.83 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.03 
13.26 
6.31 
88.98 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
164.90 
0.00 
0.34 
0.06 
198.08 
0.00 
0.34 
0.10 
139.67 
0.00 
0.20 
0.04 
223.17 
4.04 
35.92 
16.66 
67.30 
4.04 
10.14 
7.53 
30.78 
5.62 
35.92 
23.95 
43.09 
Summary Statistics 
0.84 
7.72 
4.16 
61.00 
0.84 
3.40 
2.12 
56.68 
2.84 
7.72 
5.98 
27.97 
0.78 
23.79 
12.04 
54.71 
0.78 
13.64 
8.92 
49.46 
4.91 
23.79 
14.97 
45.07 
0.36 
23.36 
10.29 
69.43 
0.36 
14.27 
6.55 
92.26 
7.84 
23.36 
14.55 
36.97 
0.02 
0.54 
0.18 
93.29 
0.02 
0.41 
0.14 
101.82 
0.02 
0.54 
0.21 
91.090 
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A.6.1 and Appendix Table A.6.8. 
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Appendix Table A.6.11 
Percentage Share of Imports of Major Agricultural Products in Total National Imports 
Year 
1995 - 96 
1996 - 97 
1997 - 98 
1998 - 99 
1999 - 00 
2000 - 01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Wheat 
0.01 
0.29 
0.63 
0.65 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rice 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Pulses 
0.56 
0.64 
0.54 
0.40 
0.16 
0.22 
1.29 
0.86 
0.64 
0.37 
0.37 
Spices 
0.06 
0.07 
0.07 
0.17 
0.14 
0.11 
0.20 
0.19 
0.16 
0.12 
0.11 
Cashew Nuts 
0.62 
0.05 
0.48 
0.54 
0.56 
0.42 
0.18 
0.41 
0.38 
0.38 
0.33 
Cotton Raw 
including Waste 
0.42 
0.02 
0.05 
0.21 
0.58 
0.52 
0.84 
0.35 
0.44 
0.24 
0.11 
Oilseeds 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
0.00 
0.65 
0.18 
149.10 
0.00 
0.65 
0.32 
88.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.56 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
196.91 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
136.88 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
228.41 
Summary Statistics 
0.16 
1.29 
0.55 
57.65 
0.16 
0.64 
0.42 
46.42 
0.22 
1.29 
0.62 
63.74 
0.06 
0.20 
0.13 
39.19 
0.06 
0.17 
0.10 
42.85 
0.11 
0.20 
0.15 
28.21 
0.05 
0.62 
0.40 
42.23 
0.05 
0.62 
0.45 
46.11 
0.18 
0.42 
0.35 
26.04 
0.02 
0.84 
0.34 
72,18 
0.02 
0.58 
0.30 
79.33 
0.11 
0.84 
0.41 
60.90 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
123.53 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
129.75 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
56.32 
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A.6.] and Appendix Table A.6.8 
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Appendix Table A.6.12 
India's Commodity Terms of Trade in Agriculture witli tlie Wliole World 
Year 
1995 - 96 
1996-97 
1997 - 98 
1998-99 
1999 - 00 
2000 - 01 
2001-02 
2002 - 03 
2003 - 04 
2004 - 05 
2005 - 06 
Export Unit Value Index 
(1995-96=100) 
100.00 
111.89 
113.99 
131.39 
135.87 
121.96 
111.84 
109.37 
103.84 
128.45 
119.46 
Import Unit Value Index 
(1995-96=100) 
100 
95.06 
87.98 
89.32 
92.25 
97.34 
89.69 
135.28 
92.74 
98.58 
112.74 
Commodity Terms of Trade 
100.00 
117.70 
129.56 
147.10 
147.28 
125.29 
124.69 
80.85 
111.97 
130.30 
105.96 
1995-96 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
1995-96 to 2000-01 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
2000-01 to 2005-06 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
Summary 
100.00 
135.87 
117.10 
9.76 
100.00 
135.87 
119.18 
11.15 
103.84 
128.45 
115.82 
7.83 
Statistics 
87.98 
135.28 
99.18 
13.94 
87.98 
100.00 
93.66 
4.98 
89.69 
135.28 
104.40 
16.36 
80.85 
147.28 
120.06 
16.12 
100.00 
147.28 
127.82 
9.97 
80.85 
130.30 
113.18 
16.15 
Source: Computed from Appndix Table A.6.4 and Appendix Table A.6.8. 
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Appendix Table A. 6.14 
Export Competitiveness of Wheat 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price 
Index of Wheat 
(D.P.)(1995 = 
100) 
100 
114.58 
126.46 
131.77 
154.72 
160.48 
157.24 
157.33 
160.93 
166.24 
167.95 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
14.58 
10.37 
4.20 
17.42 
3.72 
-2.02 
0.06 
2.29 
3.30 
1.03 
International Price 
Index of Wheat (LP.) 
(1995 = 100) 
100 
117.39 
94.02 
77.35 
69.35 
68.19 
76.41 
82.49 
90.61 
90.58 
86.71 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
17.39 
-19.91 
-17.73 
-10.34 
-1.67 
12.05 
7.96 
9.84 
-0.03 
-4.27 
Nominal Protection 
Cofficient (DP/IP) 
1 
0.97 
1.34 
1.7 
2.23 
2.35 
2.05 
1.90 
1.77 
1.83 
1.93 
Growth Rate (% per annum) 
1995 to 2005 4.82 
1995 to 2001 8.30 
2001 to 2005 1.89 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,1P) 
100.00 
167.95 
145.25 
15.90 
100.00 
160.48 
135.04 
17.26 
157.24 
167.95 
161.94 
3.07 
-1.48 
-7.55 
3.53 
Summary Statistics 
-2.02 
17.42 
5.49 
117.38 
-0.61 
-2.02 
17.42 
8.04 
91.46 
-0.85 
-2.02 
3.30 
0,93 
220.97 
0.67 
68.19 
117.39 
86.65 
16.55 
68.19 
117.39 
86.10 
21.24 
76.41 
90.61 
85.36 
7.05 
-19.91 
17.39 
-0.67 
-1885.43 
-19.91 
17.39 
-3.37 
-459.97 
-4.27 
12.05 
5.11 
136.01 
0.97 
2.35 
1.73 
26.31 
0.97 
2.35 
1.66 
34.45 
1.77 
2.05 
1.90 
5.60 
Source: 
1 .International Financial Statistics, Year Book, IMF (various issues), 
2. Computed. 
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Appendix Table A. 6.16 
Export Competitiveness of Maize 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price 
Index of Maize 
(D.P.) (1995 = 100) 
100 
103.26 
103.92 
95.80 
171.82 
121.70 
114.38 
121.30 
124.10 
123.03 
139.8 
Annual Percentage 
Change Over Previous 
Year 
3.26 
0.64 
-7.81 
79.35 
-29.17 
-6.01 
6.05 
2.31 
-0.86 
13.63 
International price 
Index of Maize (IP.) 
(1995 = 100) 
100 
142.48 
121.39 
77.92 
80.42 
120.00 
61.46 
85.79 
88.44 
78.63 
109.06 
Annual Percentage 
Change Over Previous 
Year 
42.48 
-14.80 
-35.81 
3.21 
49.22 
-48.78 
39.59 
3.09 
-11.09 
38.70 
Nominal Protection 
Cofficient (DP/IP) 
I 
0.72 
0.85 
1.22 
2.13 
1.01 
1.86 
1.41 
1.40 
1.56 
1.28 
Growth Rate (% per annum) 
2005 
2001 
2005 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,!P) 
Source: 
2.74 
4.51 
4.24 
95.80 
171.82 
119.92 
18.01 
95.80 
171.82 
115.84 
22.63 
114.38 
139.80 
124.52 
7.50 
1. Same as in Appendix Table A.6.I4, 
2. Computed. 
-29.17 
79.35 
6.14 
457.84 
-0.24 
-29.17 
79.35 
6.71 
557.16 
-0.28 
-6.01 
13.63 
3.02 
244.80 
0.95 
-2.66 
-7.61 
11.18 
Summary Statistics 
61.46 
142.48 
96.87 
24.83 
61.46 
142.48 
100.52 
28.76 
61.46 
109.06 
84.68 
20.33 
-48.78 
49.22 
6.58 
528.53 
-48.78 
49.22 
-0.75 
-5382.82 
-48.78 
39.59 
4.30 
861.14 
0.72 
2.13 
1.31 
32.41 
0.72 
2.13 
1.26 
42.49 
1.28 
1.86 
1.50 
14.88 
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Appendix Table A. 6.16 
Export Competitiveness of Maize 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price 
Index of Maize 
(D.P.) (1995 =100) 
100 
103.26 
103.92 
95.80 
171.82 
121.70 
114.38 
121.30 
124.10 
123.03 
139.8 
Annua) Percentage 
Change Over Previous 
Year 
3.26 
0.64 
-7.81 
79.35 
-29.17 
-6.01 
6.05 
2.31 
-0.86 
13.63 
International price 
Index of Maize (1.P.) 
(1995=100) 
100 
142.48 
121.39 
77.92 
80.42 
120.00 
61.46 
85.79 
88,44 
78.63 
109.06 
Annual Percentage 
Change Over Previous 
Year 
42.48 
-14.80 
-35.81 
3.21 
49.22 
-48.78 
39.59 
3.09 
-11.09 
38.70 
Nominal Protection 
Cofficient (DPAP) 
1 
0.72 
0.85 
1.22 
2.13 
1.01 
1.86 
1.41 
1.40 
1.56 
1.28 
Growth Rate (% 
2005 
2001 
2005 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV(%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
per annum) 
2.74 
4.51 
4.24 
95.80 
171.82 
119.92 
18.01 
95.80 
171.82 
115.84 
22.63 
114.38 
139.80 
124,52 
7.50 
1. Same as in Appendix Table A.6.14, 
2. Computed. 
-29.17 
79.35 
6.14 
457.84 
-0.24 
-29.17 
79.35 
6.71 
557.16 
-0.28 
-6.01 
13.63 
3.02 
244.80 
0.95 
-2.66 
-7.61 
11.18 
Summary Statistics 
61,46 
142.48 
96.87 
24.83 
61.46 
142.48 
100.52 
28.76 
61.46 
109.06 
84.68 
20.33 
-48.78 
49.22 
6.58 
528.53 
-48.78 
49.22 
-0.75 
-5382.82 
-48.78 
39.59 
4.30 
861.14 
0.72 
2.13 
1.31 
32.41 
0.72 
2.13 
1.26 
42.49 
1.28 
1.86 
1.50 
14.88 
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Appendix Table A. 6.17 
Export Competitiveness of Sugar 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price Index of 
Sugar (D.P.) (1995 = 
100) 
100 
104.6 
120.55 
124.60 
125.89 
131.33 
125.99 
118.06 
111.05 
129.49 
149.03 
Annual Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
4.60 
15.25 
3.36 
1.04 
4.32 
-4.07 
-6.29 
-5.94 
16.61 
15.09 
International Price Index 
ofSugar(I.P.)(1995 = 
100) 
100 
97.13 
96.24 
88.59 
86.38 
78.81 
81.45 
80.47 
85.36 
82.06 
85.5 
Annual Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
-2.87 
-0.92 
-7.95 
-2.49 
-8.76 
3.35 
-1.20 
6.08 
-3.87 
4.19 
Nominal 
Protection 
Cofficient 
(DP/IP) 
1 
1.07 
1.25 
1.4 
1.45 
1.66 
1.54 
1.46 
1.30 
1.57 
1.74 
Growth Rate (% per annum) 
1995 to 2005 
1995 to 2001 
2001 to 2005 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
1. Same as in Appendix 
2. Computed. 
2.29 
4.35 
4.38 
100.00 
149.03 
121.87 
11.12 
100.00 
131.33 
118.99 
10.01 
111.05 
149.03 
126.72 
11.34 
Table A.6.14, 
Summary Statistics 
-6.29 
16.61 
4.40 
198.63 
-0.62 
-4.07 
15.25 
4.08 
155.36 
-0.88 
-6.29 
16.61 
3.08 
379.89 
0.29 
-1.86 
-4.00 
1.17 
78.81 
100.00 
87.45 
8.30 
78.81 
100.00 
89.80 
9.13 
80.47 
85.50 
82.97 
2.79 
-8.76 
6.08 
-1.44 
-339.59 
-8.76 
3.35 
-3.27 
-138.09 
-3.87 
6.08 
1.71 
240.24 
1.00 
1.74 
1.40 
16.54 
1.00 
1.66 
1.34 
18.16 
1.30 
1.74 
1.52 
10.56 
Appendix Table A. 6.17 
Export Competitiveness of Sugar 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price Index of 
Sugar (D.P.) (1995 = 
100) 
100 
104.6 
120.55 
124.60 
125.89 
131.33 
125.99 
118.06 
111.05 
129.49 
149.03 
Annual Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
4.60 
15.25 
3.36 
1,04 
4.32 
-4.07 
-6.29 
-5.94 
16.61 
15.09 
International Price Index 
ofSugar(I.P.)(1995 = 
100) 
100 
97.13 
96.24 
88.59 
86.38 
78.81 
81.45 
80.47 
85.36 
82.06 
85.5 
Annua! Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
-2.87 
-0.92 
-7.95 
-2.49 
-8.76 
3.35 
-1.20 
6.08 
-3.87 
4.19 
Nominal 
Protection 
Cofficient 
(DP/IP) 
1 
1.07 
1.25 
1.4 
1.45 
1.66 
1.54 
1.46 
1.30 
1.57 
1.74 
Growth Rate (% per annum) 
1995 to 2005 
1995 to 2001 
2001 to 2005 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
1. Same as in Appendix 
2. Computed. 
2.29 
4.35 
4.38 
100.00 
149.03 
121.87 
11.12 
100.00 
131.33 
118.99 
10.01 
111.05 
149.03 
126.72 
11.34 
Table A.6.14, 
Summary Statistics 
-6.29 
16.61 
4.40 
198.63 
-0.62 
-4.07 
15.25 
4.08 
155.36 
-0.88 
-6.29 
16.61 
3.08 
379.89 
0.29 
-1.86 
-4.00 
1.17 
78.81 
100.00 
87.45 
8.30 
78.81 
100.00 
89.80 
9.13 
80.47 
85.50 
82.97 
2.79 
-8.76 
6.08 
-1.44 
-339.59 
-8.76 
3.35 
-3.27 
-138.09 
-3.87 
6.08 
1.71 
240.24 
1.00 
1.74 
1.40 
16.54 
1.00 
1.66 
1.34 
18.16 
1.30 
1.74 
1.52 
10.56 
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Appendix Table A.6.19 
Competitiveness of Soyabean Oil 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price 
Index of 
Soyabean Oil 
(D.P.)(1995 = 
100) 
100 
92.87 
86.82 
116.65 
105.07 
82.19 
76.31 
98.84 
120.39 
122.61 
123.06 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
-7.13 
-6.51 
34.36 
-9.93 
-21.78 
-7.15 
29.52 
21.80 
1.84 
0.37 
International Price 
Index of Soyabean Oil 
(l.P.) (1995 = 100) 
100 
93.08 
89.93 
96.2 
67.11 
60.17 
59.34 
70.09 
85.56 
100.98 
84.78 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
-6.92 
-3.38 
6.97 
-30.24 
-10.34 
-1.38 
18.12 
22.07 
18.02 
-16.04 
Nominal 
Protection 
Cofficient 
(DP/IP) 
1 
0.99 
0.96 
1.21 
1.56 
1.36 
1.28 
1.41 
1.40 
1.21 
1.45 
Growth Rate (% per 
1995 to 2005 
1995 to 2001 
2001 to 2005 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,1P) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
1. Same as in Append 
2. Computed. 
annum) 
2.28 
-3.04 
12.43 
76.31 
123.06 
102.26 
16.39 
0.56 
76.31 
116.65 
94.27 
14.85 
0.57 
76.31 
123.06 
108.24 
18.94 
0.91 
X Table A.6.14, 
-1.27 
-9.29 
11.39 
Summary Statistics 
59.34 
100.98 
82.48 
18.95 
59.34 
100.00 
80.83 
22.09 
59.34 
100.98 
80.15 
19.91 
0.96 
1.56 
1.26 
16.18 
0.96 
1.56 
1.19 
18.82 
1.21 
1.45 
1.35 
7.46 
-30.24 
22.07 
-0.31 
-5363.51 
-30.24 
6.97 
-7.55 
-166.44 
-16.04 
22.07 
8.16 
200.18 
0.96 
1.56 
1.26 
15.49 
0.96 
1.56 
1.19 
19.06 
1.21 
1.45 
1.35 
7.46 
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Appendix Table A.6.20 
Export Competitiveness of Coffee 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price Index 
ofCoffee(D.P)(1995 
=100) 
100 
82.94 
104.43 
102.62 
78.31 
68.26 
56.87 
45.49 
50.69 
51.82 
74.13 
Annual Percentage Change over 
Previous Year 
2306.56 
1812.29 
1846.99 
2452.68 
2829.97 
3418.55 
4300.97 
3851.47 
3767.23 
2604.71 
International Price 
Index of Coffee (LP.) 
(1995 =100) 
100 
77.56 
105.45 
81.37 
61.85 
51.30 
33.59 
31.34 
35.95 
44.47 
64.73 
Annual Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
-22.44 
35.96 
-22.84 
-23.99 
-17.06 
-34.52 
-6.70 
14.71 
23.70 
45.56 
Protection 
Cofficient 
(DP/IP) 
1 
1.06 
0.99 
1.26 
1.26 
1.33 
1.69 
1.45 
1.41 
1.16 
1.14 
Growth Rate (% per annum) 
1995 to 2005 -6.59 
1995 to 2001 -8.12 
2001 to 2005 6.83 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
1. Same as in Appendix 
2. Computed. 
45.49 
104.43 
74.14 
29.22 
56.87 
104.43 
84.78 
21.71 
45.49 
74.13 
55.80 
19.74 
Table A.6.14 
Summary Statistics 
1812.29 
4300.97 
2919.14 
29.82 
0.96 
1812.29 
3418.55 
2444.51 
25.04 
0.95 
2604.71 
4300.97 
3588.59 
17.65 
0.90 
-8.81 
-15.25 
18.08 
31.34 
105.45 
62.51 
41.72 
33.59 
105.45 
73.02 
35.46 
31.34 
64.73 
42.02 
32.45 
-34.52 
45.56 
-0.76 
3731.75 
-34.52 
35.96 
-14.15 
-178.13 
0.99 
1.69 
1.25 
17.01 
0.99 
1.69 
1.23 
20.04 
-34.52 
45.56 
8.55 
356.93 
1.14 
1.69 
1.37 
16.62 
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Appendix Table A. 6.21 
Export Competitiveness of Tea 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Domestic Price 
Index of Tea 
(D.P.)(1995 = 
100) 
100 
102.89 
138.98 
163.40 
153.33 
125.02 
128.01 
112.57 
111.06 
128.31 
116.15 
Annua! Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
2.89 
35.08 
17.57 
-6.16 
-18.46 
2.39 
-12.06 
-1.34 
15.53 
-9.48 
International 
Price Index of Tea 
(IP.) (1995 = 
100) 
100 
118.09 
138.99 
144.41 
127.06 
134.01 
118.71 
111.45 
118.83 
122.19 
131.6 
Annual Percentage 
Change over Previous 
Year 
18.09 
17.70 
3.90 
-12.01 
5.47 
-11.42 
-6.12 
6.62 
2.83 
7.70 
Nominal 
Protection 
Cofficient 
(DP/IP) 
1 
0.87 
0.99 
1.13 
1.2 
0.93 
1.07 
1.01 
0.93 
1.05 
0.88 
Growth Rate (% per 
1995 to 2005 
1995 to 2001 
2001 to 2005 
199S to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
annum) 
0.03 
4.49 
-0.63 
100.00 
163.40 
125.43 
16.01 
100.00 
163.40 
130.23 
18.29 
111.06 
128.31 
119.22 
7.02 
1. Same as in Appendix Table A.6.14, 
2. Computed. 
0.41 
2.45 
3.03 
Summary Statistics 
-18.46 
35.08 
2.60 
621.66 
0.76 
-18.46 
35.08 
5.55 
336.79 
0.80 
-12.06 
15.53 
-0.99 
-1104.14 
0.16 
100.00 
144.41 
124.12 
10,30 
100.00 
144.41 
125.90 
11.98 
111.45 
131.60 
120.56 
6.07 
-12.01 
18.09 
3.28 
322.00 
-12.01 
18.09 
3.62 
366.71 
-11.42 
7.70 
-0.08 
-10920.15 
0.87 
1.20 
1.01 
10.20 
0.87 
1.20 
1.03 
11.14 
0.88 
1.07 
0.99 
8.17 
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Appendix Table A. 6.23 
Export Competitiveness of Tobacco 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Index of Tobacco 
(D.P.)(1995 = 
100) 
100 
146.71 
141 
160.46 
147.73 
143.38 
127.32 
145.77 
143.29 
161.99 
176.00 
Annual Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
46.71 
-3.89 
13.80 
-7.93 
-2.94 
-11.20 
14.49 
-1.70 
13.05 
8.65 
Price Index of 
Tobacco (LP.) 
(1995 = 100) 
100 
115.63 
133.60 
126.2 
117.32 
113.04 
113.07 
103.41 
Percentage 
Change over 
Previous Year 
15.63 
15.54 
-5.54 
-7.04 
-3.65 
0.03 
-8.54 
Protection 
Cofficient 
(DP/IP) 
1 
1.26 
1.06 
1.27 
1.25 
1.26 
1.12 
1.40 
Growth Rate (% per annum) 
1995 to 2005 
1995 to 2001 
2001 to 2005 
1995 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
1995 to 2001 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,1P) 
2001 to 2005 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
CV (%) 
R(DP,IP) 
Source: 
2.70 
2.62 
7.82 
100.00 
176.00 
144.88 
13.56 
100.00 
160.46 
138.09 
14.09 
127.32 
176.00 
150.87 
12.37 
1. Same as in Table 7.14 
2. Computed. 
Summary 
-11.20 
46.71 
6.90 
244.61 
0.59 
-11.20 
46.71 
5.76 
379.44 
0.73 
-11.20 
14.49 
4.66 
233.97 
-1.00 
0.69 
Statistics 
100.00 
133.60 
115.28 
9.52 
100.00 
133.60 
116.98 
9.12 
103.41 
113.07 
108.24 
6.31 
-8.54 
15.63 
0.92 
1129.85 
-7.04 
15.63 
2.50 
417.17 
-8.54 
0.03 
-4.26 
-142.30 
1.00 
1.40 
1.20 
10.91 
1.00 
1.27 
1.17 
9.58 
1.12 
1.40 
1.26 
15.71 
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Appendix Table A.6.24 
Regression Results 
Dep.Var./ 
Equation 
In PAIM, 
Equation 6.7 
Equation 6.8 
Equation 6.9 
In AEXP, 
Equation 
6.10 
Equation 
6.11 
Equation 
6.12 
Cons. 
(Std.Error) 
10.304 
(6.393) 
12.380 
(6.557) 
5.769 
(.612) 
9.916 
(1.790) 
10.682 
(1.975) 
8.945 
(.182) 
TRADOP, 
(Std.Error) 
.003 
(.008) 
.010 
(.006) 
.013 
(.005) 
.009 
(.002) 
.011 
(.002) 
.012 
(.002) 
(Std.Erro 
r) 
-.037 
(.063) 
-.064 
(.063) 
-.007 
(.018) 
-.017 
(.019) 
DUM, 
(Std.Error) 
.427 
(.309) 
.158 
(.087) 
R^  
.570 
.452 
.382 
.916 
.877 
.865 
DW 
Stat. 
.567 
.607 
.724 
1.122 
.748 
.840 
SEE 
.32650 
.34454 
.34503 
.09144 
.10379 
.10251 
F. 
(SIG) 
3.090 
(.099) 
3.305 
(.090) 
5.570 
(.043) 
25.572 
(.000) 
28.494 
(.000) 
57.621 
(.000) 
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Appendix Table A.6.25 
Basic Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
Yeai-
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Population 
(million) 
928 
946 
964 
983 
1001 
1019 
1038 
1055 
1073 
1090 
1107 
Index of Trade 
Openness (1995-96 
= 100) 
100.00 
97,11 
96.61 
94.26 
99.52 
106.29 
103.36 
116.40 
122.19 
138.74 
157.64 
Real Effective Exchance Rate 
(1995-96 = 100) (36-currency 
bilateral weights) 
100.00 
97.52 
100.55 
97.28 
99.44 
100.63 
100.05 
97.36 
95.19 
95.39 
98.16 
log Per Capita 
Agriculture 
Imports (Rs.) 
6.45 
6.55 
6.81 
7.30 
7.38 
7.08 
7.36 
7.42 
7.62 
7.61 
7.55 
log Agriculture 
Exports 
(Rs crores) 
9.92 
10.09 
10.12 
10.15 
10.14 
10.26 
10.30 
10.45 
10.53 
10.59 
10.82 
Dummy 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Source: 
1. Agricultural Statistics at a Glance (various issues). 
2. National Acounts Statistics (various issues). 
3. Economic Survey (2007-08). 
4. Computed. 
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